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Abstract
The usual methods of getting anonymity, such as using a VPN or the
Tor network, requires some amount of trust: You have to either trust a
particular server or trust that not too many servers in a network have
been corrupted. In this thesis, we will explore how much we can do
without this assumption.
Throughout the thesis we will assume that there is an adversary who can
see all messages sent, that no two people have access to shared random-
ness and for much of the thesis we further assume that the adversary
has unbounded computational power. In this case, it is impossible for
one or more leakers to send any information without revealing some in-
formation about who they are. We define a measure of suspicion, which
captures the anonymity loss of revealing information in this model: to
reveal one bit of information, you will, in expectation, have to become
one bit more suspicious. This measure is used to compute the exact
amount of information a group of leakers can reveal if they want to keep
reasonable doubt about who the leakers are. We also get exact results for
the case where some people, censors, are trying to obstruct the leakage
by sending misleading messages. The main result in these models is that
(even without censors) the leakers can only reveal a very small amount
of information. However, the protocols shown to exists might still be a
useful alternative to warrant canaries.
We also consider the case where the adversary has bounded computa-
tional power. In this model, we show that it is still impossible for one
leaker to reveal information without losing some anonymity. However, if
we give the leaker access to a small anonymous channel, she can use this,
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In 2013, when an NSA contractor, Edward Snowden, leaked thousands of documents
revealing the scale of NSA’s mass surveillance, it started an international debate
about surveillance, privacy and anonymity. From the leaked files and from the
following debate, we learned that NSA’s goal is to “collect it all” [35]. It also became
widely known that for some purposes, such as locating and justifying killing people1,
the US government considers metadata (data about who communicates with whom,
when) to be sufficient. Such metadata cannot be hidden by just encrypting your
messages, as encryption itself does not provide anonymity.
In the debate following the Snowden leakage, people have questioned whether
we should be allowed to have secure communication. For example, during a speech
last year, 2015, the current prime minister of the United Kingdom, David Cameron,
asked rhetorically if we should allow people to communicate in ways that cannot be
deciphered by the government, and answered “no, we must not” [73]. This raises the
question: is it possible to prevent anonymous communication by banning it? In other
words, if an adversary will punish anyone it believes is attempting to communicate
anonymously or is helping others to do so, will it still be possible for people to
communicate anonymously? In this thesis, we will explore various models, in an
attempt to answer the question in the case where the adversary is able to punish
anyone connected to the network.
1Former head of the NSA, Michael Hayden, said “We [US government] kill people based on
metadata” [26].
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1.1 Scope of the thesis
The word “cryptogenography” was coined by Peter Winkler, one of my co-authors
on the paper “Cryptogenography” [9]. It is composed of three parts, crypto-geno-
graphy, each originating from Greek, and translates to hidden-origin-writing.2 The
idea is that people send public messages, each of which can be traced back to a
sender. The sequence of all the message is called the transcript and will be denoted
T . When everyone has written their messages, the resulting transcript T can be
interpreted as a message G(T ). We want to construct G in such a way that any
small subset of the people can make it likely that G(T ) will give the message they
intended to send, but in such a way that an observer cannot determine who these
people are.
In this thesis we consider a much stronger adversary than what is typical in
anonymity research. Throughout the thesis, we will assume that the adversary can
see all messages people sent. Such an adversary is called a global adversary, and is
common in anonymity research, but we will further assume the adversary knows any
randomness that is shared between at least two people. In some chapters, we will
also assume that the adversary has unbounded computational power and in some
chapters we will assume that the non-leakers are not willing to help the leakers. We
will now consider these assumptions in more detail.
1.1.1 Unbounded computational power
In Chapters 3-6 we will be assuming that the adversary has unbounded computa-
tional power. In practice, it is of course not possible to have unbounded computa-
tional power, but it could be used as a model of an adversary who has an extremely
large amount of computational power or has an efficient way of solving problems in
NP, possibly using quantum computers.3
Perhaps a more realistic scenario is one where the leakers cannot trust their own
devices. Typically in anonymity research, we consider a person and their computer
2Contrary to what was suggested by Richard J. Lipton [56], the name was not inspired by the
word “steganography”. However, Lipton’s comparison with steganography has inspired some of
the later research in this thesis, in particular Chapter 6.
3The adversary having quantum computers is not in itself enough to justify the assumption of
unbounded computational power, as you might still be able to use post-quantum cryptography [6].
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to be one node, which can communicate with the rest of the world. However, if there
is a risk that your computer has been hacked, or if you have limited control over
what programs run on your computer or what information they reveal, the computer
effectively becomes part of the “rest of the world”. This means that any encryption
would have to happen in the head of the sender. As computers have much more
computational power than humans, at least for purposes related to cryptography, it
is then reasonable to model the adversary’s computational power as unbounded.
1.1.2 Non-leakers will not help leakers
In Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 we will assume that no non-leakers are willing to help the
leakers. Furthermore, the results in Chapter 6 imply that the results in Chapters 3-5
also hold under this assumption. This assumption is why “anonymity without trust”
is part of the title of this thesis: we are exploring how you can send information
anonymously, if you cannot trust anyone.
At the time of writing, it seems that many people are willing to help others
communicate anonymously. For example, the Tor network currently has around
7000 relays [63]. However, we will now argue, in three different ways, that if it
was illegal to help leakers be anonymous, then it is reasonable to use a model that
assumes that non-leakers will not help the leakers.
First the obvious argument: people tend not to do things they might be punished
for, and if you help others to be anonymous, there will always be a risk that you
will be discovered. This would probably stop many people from helping leakers send
information anonymously, especially if the punishment was severe, but there might
still be people willing to take the risk.
The second argument is by (informal) reduction. Suppose you have a protocol
that ensures that l leakers can leak some information, with the help of h helpers
while preserving the anonymity of both the leakers and helpers. Then l + h leakers
can use this protocol to reveal the same amount of information while all of them
preserve anonymity: they simply choose h of them who will forget their information,
and act as helpers in the original protocol. Thus, l leakers and h helpers can at most
leak the same amount of information anonymously as l+h leakers. This shows that
upper bounds, in the case with any number of leakers but no helpers, translate to
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upper bounds in the case where there is a bounded number of helpers.
Finally, we will consider what happens when the leakers cannot trust any of the
helpers. This scenario might be plausible if it is illegal to be a helper and helpers
risk losing their anonymity. In that case there might not be any helpers, but there
might be many censors pretending to help the leakers, but who are just trying
to reveal the leakers. Suppose you have a protocol that allows l leakers to reveal
information with the help of h helpers. Assume further that the protocol ensures
that leakers are going to keep their anonymity, even if all the helpers collaborate
with the adversary. We will assume that the protocol gives a randomized algorithm
that the helpers should follow if they are honest. We can now construct a protocol
which allows l leakers to reveal some information without the use of helpers. The
leakers will simply use some public randomness to simulate some imaginary helpers.
The leakers would then send their messages as if the imaginary helpers existed and
were sending the simulated messages. Now, anyone seeing the communication can
simulate the helpers, so anyone can compute the transcript as it would have been
if the helpers were really there. Hence the resulting protocol will be as good for
revealing information as the original protocol. Furthermore, the leakers preserve
anonymity, as we assumed that the adversary in the original protocol had access to
all the helper’s information.
1.2 Contributions of the thesis
1.2.1 Suspicion
In Chapter 3 we define a measure of suspicion, which exactly captures the price for
revealing information, when observed by a computationally unbounded adversary:
in order to reveal one bit of information, you will in expectation become at least one
bit more suspicious, and you can always reveal one bit4 for the price of getting one bit
more suspicious in expectation. This measure will be useful in all the chapters where
the adversary has unbounded computational power (all chapters except Chapter 7).
4In the sense of mutual information.
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1.2.2 Information theoretic cryptogenography
In Chapter 3 we will consider a model where an adversary has unbounded computa-
tional power and can observe any message sent. Intuitively, it should be impossible
to reveal any information in this model, without losing anonymity. However, we
will see that many people can collaborate to reveal the information, by each making
hints towards the information, in a way that ensures that no one will look guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. If each person is a leaker with probability bl and they
want to ensure that an observer never says that there is probability above bm > bl
for the person being a leaker, then we can leak −bl log(1−bm)+bm log(1−bl)
bm
bits of infor-
mation per total number of people communicating. When there is a small number
of leakers, this means that they can leak − log(1−bm)
bm
− log(e) bits per leaker. We will
also prove matching upper bounds. In particular, this result proves the intuition
that a single leaker cannot reveal much information, when always observed by an
adversary with unbounded computational power, while keeping reasonable doubt.
This holds even if non-leakers try to help the leaker. We will also consider various
models where non-leakers can become leakers. Throughout this chapter we will as-
sume that non-leakers collaborate with the leakers, but a result in Chapter 6 implies
that this assumption is not necessary.
1.2.3 Resilient cryptogenography
In Chapter 4 we add censors to the model above. Censors are people who send
misleading messages in an attempt to prevent the leakage of information.5 We show
that if each person is a censor with probability bc, then the censors can prevent
any leakage of information if and only if bl + bc ≥ bm. In the case bl + bc < bm
the censors have two effects. First, they can lower the capacity, that is, they can
ensure that each leaker can only reveal a smaller number of bits than if there were
no censors. We find matching upper and lower bounds for the resulting capacity.
Secondly, the censors can create some ambiguity about the information x that the
leakers try to leak. An observer who watches the communication will not necessarily
be able to deduce the correct secret x, but will only be able to write down a list
5They could also attempt to reveal the leakers, but for the protocols we consider, the censors’
messages will not affect the leakers’ anonymity.
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of 1 + b bc
bl
c elements which, with overwhelming probability, will contain x. Again,
we will assume that people who are not leakers or censors will collaborate with the
leakers, but a result in Chapter 6 shows that this assumption can be removed.
1.2.4 Cryptogenography games
In Chapter 5 we analyse a game where one or more leakers in a group of people
want to reveal one or more bits of information. The leaker(s) win if an observer,
who is on their team, can guess the information, but an adversary who has the same
information cannot guess any of the leakers. For most of the chapter, we consider
what happens when we have one leaker and one bit of information. We show that





,6 and for a large number of people the winning probability is more than 0.5644 and
at most 3
4
. In the case where the number of leakers and bits of information tends to
infinity, we show that if bits per leaker tends to zero, the winning probability tends
to 1 and if the ratio tends to infinity, the winning probability tends to 0.
1.2.5 Anonymous steganography
Finally, in Chapter 7 we consider the case where the adversary has bounded com-
putational power, and where one leaker is trying to reveal information without help
from non-leakers. Furthermore, we will assume that the leaker has access to a small
or expensive anonymous channel. In this model we will see that the leaker can use
steganography and the small anonymous channel to anonymously reveal a much
larger amount of information than what she can send over the small channel. We
will also see that in this model it is impossible to reveal information anonymously
without using a small anonymous channel to bootstrap the communication.
1.3 Notation and preliminaries
We let [n] denote the set {1, . . . , n}. For a tuple or infinite sequence a, we let ai
denote the i’th element of a, and, unless stated otherwise, ai denotes the tuple of the
6The lower bound has since been improved to 0.3384 and the upper bound to 0.3672 [5].
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i first elements from a: (a1, . . . , ai). We use a−i to mean (a1, . . . , ai−1,⊥, ai+1, . . . , an)
and (a−i, b) to mean (a1, . . . , ai−1, b, ai+1, . . . , an) . Similar notation is used if A is a
tuple or sequence of random variables. For tuples a and b of na and nb elements we
let a ◦ b denote the tuple (a1, . . . , ana , b1, . . . , bnb). If a′ is a single element, we abuse
notation and write a ◦ a′ instead of a ◦ (a′).
A function is negligible if it goes to 0 faster than the inverse of any polyno-
mial. We write poly(·) and negl(·) to mean some polynomial and negligible function
respectively.
Unless stated otherwise, all random variables in this thesis are assumed to be
discrete. Random variables are denoted by capital letters and they take values from
the set denoted by the calligraphic version of the same letter (e.g. X takes values
from X ). Specific values taken by a random variable are denoted by the lower case
version of the same letter. If X and Y are random variables and Pr(Y = y) > 0, we
let X|Y=y denote the random variable X conditioned on Y = y. That is
Pr(X|Y=y = x) =
Pr(X = x, Y = y)
Pr(Y = y)
.
We typically write Pr(X = x|Y = y) instead of Pr(X|Y=y = x).
In the rest of this section we will give some definitions and results from infor-
mation theory. For an introduction to these concepts and for proofs, see Cover and
Thomas [18]. For a random variable X and a value x ∈ X with Pr(X = x) > 0 the
surprisal or the code-length7 of x is given by
− log(Pr(X = x)),
where log, as in the rest of this thesis, is the base-2 logarithm.
7If − log(Pr(X = x)) is an integer for all x ∈ X , and we want to find an optimal prefix-free
binary code for X, the length of the code for x should be − log(Pr(X = x)), thus the name code-
length. If they are not integers, we can instead use d− log(Pr(X = x))e and waste at most one
bit.
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The entropy of X, H(X), is the expected code-length of X




Pr(X = x) log(Pr(X = x)),
where we define 0 log(0) = 0.
The entropy of a random variable X can be thought of as the uncertainty about
X, or as the amount of information inX. For a tuple of random variables (X1, . . . Xk)
the entropy H(X1, . . . Xk) is simply the entropy of the random variable (X1, . . . , Xk).




Pr(Y = y)H(X|Y=y). (1.1)
A simple computation shows that
H(X|Y ) =H(X, Y )−H(Y ).
The mutual information I(X;Y ) of two random variables X, Y is given by
I(X;Y ) = H(X) +H(Y )−H(X, Y ) = H(Y )−H(Y |X).
This is known to be non-negative.
The mutual information satisfies a data processing inequality
I(X; f(Y )) ≤ I(X, Y ) (1.2)
for any function f and discrete random variables X, Y . This says that you cannot
get more information about X out of Y by computing some function on Y .
The mutual information I(X;Y |Z = z) of X and Y given Z = z is given by
I(X;Y |Z = z) = I(X|Z=z;Y |Z=z),
where the joint distribution of (X|Z=z, Y |Z=z) is given by (X, Y )|Z=z. The mutual
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information I(X;Y |Z) of X and Y given Z is
I(X;Y |Z) = EzI(X;Y |Z = z).
A simple computation shows that
I(X;Y |Z) = H(X,Z) +H(Y, Z)−H(X, Y, Z)−H(Z).
We will need the chain rule for mutual information,
I(X; (T1, . . . Tk)) =
k∑
i=1
I(X;Ti|(T1, . . . , Ti−1)).
Intuitively, this says that the information (T1, . . . , Tk) gives about X is the sum of
the information each of the Tis reveals, given the previous Tis.
Let X and Y be jointly distributed random variables, and f : Y → X a function.
We think of f(Y ) as a guess about what X is. The probability of error, Pe is now
Pr(f(Y ) 6= X). We will need (a weak version of) Fano’s inequality,
Pe ≥
H(X|Y )− 1
log(|X |) . (1.3)
A discrete memoryless channel (or channel for short) q consists of a finite input set
Y , a finite output set Z and for each element y ∈ Y of the input set a probability
distribution q(z|y) on the output set. If Alice has some information X that she
wants Bob to know, she can use a channel. To do that, Alice and Bob will have
to both know a code. An error correcting code, or simply a code, c : X → Yn is
a function that for each x ∈ X specifies what Alice should give as input to the
channel. Here n is the length of the code. Now the probability that Bob receives
Zc = z1 . . . zn when X = x is given by




Bob will then use a decoding function G which sends outputs z to guesses about X.
A rate R is achievable if for all ε > 0 there is a n > 0 such that for X uniformly
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distributed on {1, . . . , 2dRne} there is a code c of length n for q and a decoding
function G giving Pr(G(Z) = x|X = x) > 1− ε for all x ∈ X .
For a distribution p on the input set Y we get a joint distribution of (Y, Z) given




where max is over all distributions p of Y and the joint distribution of (Y, Z) is as
above. Shannon’s Noisy Coding Theorem says that any rate below C is achievable,
and no rate above C is achievable [67].








with equality if and only if p = q. The interpretation is, if X’s distribution is given
by p, and you encode values of X using a code optimized to the distribution q, you
get the shortest average code-length if and only if p = q.
For discrete probability distributions p and q over X , the Kullback-Leibler diver-










For numbers p, q ∈ [0, 1], the Kullback-Leibler divergence D(p||q) is the Kullback-
Leibler divergence of the {0, 1}-distribution where 1 has probability q from the
{0, 1}-distribution where 1 has probability p.
The Kullback-Leibler divergence is a measure of how far p is from q, but is not













2.1 Definition of anonymity
The word “anonymous” comes from the Greek word for “without a name”, and
intuitively we might think of a person as anonymous if we cannot name the person.
We will now give a more precise definition of anonymity.
First of all, anonymity depends on an adversary, also sometimes called the at-
tacker or, when passive, the observer. Anonymity is also with respect to a particular
role R [52]. In anonymity research R is typically either the role of being the sender
or the receiver of a message, but it could also be other things, such as attending a
demonstration. In this thesis, we will only focus on sender anonymity, that is, R
will always be the sender of a message.
A person who wants anonymity, Lea1, does not mind that the adversary knows
that she exists and knows her name. In fact we will assume that the adversary has
a way to refer to any particular person. In the real world, this could be a name
and address, a social security number or a physical body, but in our mathematical
formulation, it will simply be a number. Lea also does not mind that the adversary
realize that a particularly message m exists, and that someone must have played
the role R of sending that message. When we say that Lea has anonymity, it means
that the adversary cannot know if Lea played the role R. This is the unlinkability
1We follow a naming convention suggested by Nadia Heninger in private communication with
Claudio Orlandi [50]: the leaker is called Lea and the recipient is Joe the journalist.
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definition from Pfitzmann and Hansen [62].
If the adversary has no information at all about who was playing role R, the
person has perfect anonymity, and conversely if the adversary can link R to a
name/identifier with certainty, there is no anonymity at all. Typically, when a
person is trying to keep anonymity, we will be somewhere in between these two
extremes, and we need some way of measuring the amount of anonymity. As we will
see, there are many possible measures we could use.
One measure is the size of the anonymity set. The anonymity set for R for a
particular adversary A is the set of people who, given the adversary’s knowledge,
might be R [14, 62]. The disadvantage in using the size of the anonymity set as a
measure of anonymity, is that it ignores some information, for example, the adversary
might be 99.9% sure about who R is, and yet be unable to rule out any particular
person from being R. In this case there is almost no anonymity, yet the anonymity
set is as large as possible.
Another possible measure, is to use the adversary’s uncertainty, measured us-
ing the Shannon entropy, as a measure of the anonymity. This approach was sug-
gested by Diaz, Seys, Claessens and Preneel [21] and independently by Serjantov and
Danezis [66]. In each of these papers, we compute the distribution of the person,
I, who had role R given the knowledge of the adversary, and compute the Shannon
entropy, H(I), of the resulting variable. Diaz et al. [21] suggested using H(I)
HM
, where
HM is the maximal possible entropy of I, as a measure of the amount of anonymity
a system preserves. This measure is in the interval [0, 1], and gives us a measure
of how large a fraction of the possible anonymity a system preserves. Serjantov
and Danezis suggested simply using H(I) as a measure of the anonymity. This has
the theoretical advantage that it is independent of which users are considered to be
“part of the protocol” and it gives a measure of how much anonymity the sender
has, rather than how large a fraction of the possible anonymity the sender has.
The entropy, H(I), measures how much information the adversary would, on
average, have to get from elsewhere to completely reveal who had role R. However,
as pointed out by Tóth, Hornák, and Vajda [69], this measure does not capture all
the relevant information. For example, if the adversary estimates that one particular
suspect send a message with probability 50%, and otherwise has no idea who the
leaker is, the entropy is 1+ 1
2
log(world population−1) ≈ 17.4 bits, or approximately
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the same as if the adversary has no idea who among 217.4 ≈ 170 000 people had sent
the message. It is clear that in 50% of the cases, the leaker would strongly prefer
the second scenario, while the leaker would be almost indifferent in the other 50%
of the cases.
From the point of view of one particular leaker, it is probably more relevant how
suspicious she might appear to the adversary. For this reason, Tóth, Hornák, and
Vajda [69] suggested using a measure which we will call reasonable doubt. We say
that the adversary has reasonable doubt (at the bm level) about who had role R if,
whenever the anonymity system is used, the adversary will never estimate anyone
to have had role R with probability above bm.
A similar looking definition is the probability of error as suggested by Chatzikoko-
lakis, Palamidessi and Panangaden [12]. They imagine that the adversary will al-
ways make a guess about one person she thinks is a leaker2, and they defined the
probability of error to be the probability that the adversary is wrong about this
guess. Reasonable doubt at the bm level is a strictly stronger requirement than the
probability of error being at least 1 − bm. For a proof of this and more discussion
about the requirement of reasonable doubt, see Section 3.1.3
Clauß and Schiffner [16] suggested a measure similar to that of Serjantov and
Danezis, but using Rényi-Entropy (a generalization of Shannon entropy) instead
of Shannon entropy. At first, this seems to contain all the above as special cases:
Shannon entropy is a special case of Rényi-Entropy, the size of the anonymity set
is the exponential of the max-entropy, which is a special case of the Rényi-Entropy,
and finally, the maximal probability bm with which someone is estimated to have
role R, is exponential in the min-entropy. However, there is a subtle difference, as
Clauß and Schiffner (as well as [21, 66]) only seem to suggest a way of measuring
the anonymity given a particular run of the anonymity system, while the bm level
of reasonable doubt in Tóth et al. [69] is about the worst case run. Several other
measures of the anonymity of communication have been suggested [3, 24,32,79].
Finally, Backes et al. [2] suggests measuring anonymity using the language from
differential privacy [23]: we say that two random variables D0 and D1 are (ε, δ)-
differentially private if, for any adversary A taking values of D0 and D1 as input and
2In [12] it is assumed that there is only one sender/leaker, but it can be generalised to a situation
where the number of leakers in not fixed or known.
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outputting 0 or 1 we have: Pr(A(Di) = 0) ≤ eε Pr(A(D1−i) = 0) + δ for i ∈ {0, 1}.
Similarly, we say that D0 and D1 are computationally (ε, δ)-differentially private
if the inequality holds for all PPTs (Probabilistic Polynomial Time algorithms) A.
Now, we can define an anonymous communication protocol to be (ε, δ)-anonymous
if, for any two people plr0 and plr1, the adversarial view (the information available
to the adversary) D0 when plr0 sends a message and the adversarial view D1 when
plr1 sends the message are (ε, δ)-differentially private. The advantage in this defi-
nition is that it works no matter what prior information the adversary might have:
no matter how suspicious or innocent Lea looks to the adversary before the commu-
nication, if Lea uses a (ε, δ)-anonymous communication system to send a message,
the probability that the adversary will take a particular action against Lea, is only
a multiplicative factor of eε plus a constant of δ higher, than the probability that
the adversary would take the action against Lea if another person was sending the
message.
In this thesis, we will mostly use the measure from Tóth et al. [69], which we call
reasonable doubt, as well as a new measure of suspicion. The measure of suspicion
might seem unnatural at first, and we do not think that people who want to stay
anonymous will care about minimizing this particular measure. However, we will
see that suspicion captures exactly the anonymity you lose – seen from an adversary
with unbounded computational power who can see any message – when you send
information: to send one bit of information, you will, on average, have to become
one bit more suspicious. Knowing that suspicion is the currency with which you pay
to reveal information, makes it possible for a leaker to make the optimal trade-off
between sending information and keeping anonymity as measured by a measure she
does care about, such as reasonable doubt. The measure of suspicion might also
be useful for evaluating anonymous communication systems, which makes stronger
assumptions about the adversary, as it tells us how much information we could have
revealed without making such assumptions.
2.2 Ways of communicating anonymously
The simplest possible way to communicate anonymously, is to communicate through
a trusted party. For example, if Lea has a story she wants the world to know about,
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she might reveal it to a journalist, Joe, and ask him not to give away any information
that might identify her. While this method is simple, it is not very secure: Joe will
know who Lea is, and can always choose to reveal her identity. This would be a
problem if Joe is not trustworthy, for example, he might use this information to
blackmail Lea. Even if Joe is trustworthy, he might be forced, possibly by law, to
reveal Lea.
The anon.penet.fi mail relay was essentially an email version of the journalist
example above [19], except that it allowed communication to go both ways. This
service, running from 1993 to 1996, would store email addresses and corresponding
pseudonymous addresses. People could send an email through this system, and
the recipient would only see a pseudonymous address. Conversely, emails sent to
the pseudonymous address would be forwarded to a corresponding non-anonymous
address. However, in 1996, anon.penet.fi was obligated by a Finnish court to reveal
the email address of one of its users [39], and the service closed the same year,
because it could no longer protect the identity of its users [40].
Similar systems, called virtual private networks or VPNs, exist for web browsing,
for example Anonymizer [1]. Such services can choose not to keep logs in an attempt
to avoid legal attacks. However, the user still needs to trust one particular company.
We know that other types of companies have been forced to collaborate with intelli-
gence services while being prohibited from revealing this (this happened to Lavabit,
and caused the company to shut down [55] and it probably also happened to Mi-
crosoft, Google, Yahoo, Facebook and Apple as part of the Prism-program [36]), so
even a user who trusts the intentions of the people behind the company, might not
want to trust the company. Furthermore, even if the company can be trusted, an
attacker who can observe all information going through the server, might be able to
break the anonymity using traffic analysis.
Crowds [65] is another suggested method of achieving anonymity. To visit a
webpage, a crowd-user would relay its request through another crowd-user. This
second user will randomly choose either to send the request to the webpage, or to
a third crowd-user. If the request is sent to a third crowd-user, this user will not
know how many users have forwarded this request, so it will again either send the
request to the web-page or to another crowd-member. The probability pf that the
request is forwarded is some constant. The hope is that a weak adversary – for
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example an adversary who only controls a small number of crowd members, and
who can only see messages sent through these crowd members – cannot be certain
that any particular person is the sender of a message: she could just be relaying the
message for someone else. However, even an adversary who only controls a single
crowd member, might be able to use timing information to deduce that the person
sending request to it, is the original sender for the message. This effect could be
minimized by inserting time delays [65], but because the protocol corresponds to an
untimeable game [51] this leakage cannot be completely avoided. A more serious
problem is that crowds does not provide anonymity against a global adversary.
In the first paper in the field of anonymous communication [13], Chaum in-
troduced the concept of a Mix. This is a server that takes as input a stream of
messages, each of which has been encrypted, possibly with multiple layers of en-
cryption. The output of the mix is the same messages with the outermost layer of
encryption removed. The mix will output several messages at the same time, and
all the messages in each batch are sorted lexicographically. If done correctly, this
ensues that an outside observer cannot link any of the input messages to any of the
output messages.
If many people send messages through a sequence of mixes, called a cascade of
mixes, then an adversary would have to compromise each of the mixes to link an
input message to an output message. In particular, it provides anonymity against an
adversary who can observe all messages sent. One disadvantage is that if two people
sent many messages to each other, a relatively weak adversary, who only observes the
first and the last mix in the cascade, would be able to use traffic analysis. Another
disadvantage is that each message has to go through all the mixes. This means
that the system does not scale well, and that any one of the mixes can completely
obstruct the system.
Another possibility is to use a network of mixes, where each person can choose
which route their message takes through the network. This has the advantage that
the first and last mix on the route will be different for different people, which pre-
vents weak adversaries from doing a timing attack. Babel [37], Mixmaster [60] and
Mixminion [20] all use a network of mixes to allow users to send emails anonymously.
Onion Routing [34] is superficially very similar to mix networks, but does typ-
ically not involve any mixing [68]. This allows the servers to forward a message
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immediately after receiving it, instead of waiting for other messages to mix it with.
This in turns lowers the latency (the time from when a message is sent by the original
sender to when it is received by the intended recipient) which makes onion routing
suitable for web browsing. Instead of basing its security on mixing, onion routing
bases its security on the assumption that it is difficult for an adversary to observe
a large part of the network. In particular, Tor [22], which is an implementation of
onion routing, does not attempt to provide anonymity against a global adversary or
even against an adversary who controls both the first and the last onion router on
a path. These important differences between onion routing and mix networks were
pointed out by Syverson [68].
Tor also allows for the use of hidden services [22]. These are provided by servers
connected to the Tor network, in a way that does not reveal the server’s IP-address.
One particular kind of hidden service is SecureDrop [27], which is a whistleblower
system that media can host. It makes it possible for whistleblowers to connect to
the system through Tor, and upload documents and messages to journalists.
DC-nets, named after the dining cryptographers problem, gives a way of commu-
nicating information anonymously, even against a global adversary [14]. The only
assumption needed is that any two people have access to shared randomness, which
is not seen by the observer. This can be seen as a special case of secure multi-party
computation. In the general case of secure multi-party computation, each player has
an input to a function and we want to compute a function of these inputs, without
revealing any further information. If this function simply computes the list of in-
puts in lexicographical order, we have a way of publishing information anonymously.
Secure multi-party computation is possible against a global adversary if we assume
either that the adversary has bounded computational power or that any two people
have access to shared randomness unknown to the observer [4]. Furthermore, it
works even if the attacker can corrupt some participants, as long as less than one
third of the participants can be corrupted. Both DC-nets and multi-party compu-
tation have the disadvantage that the amount of communication required for each
participant is at least linear in the size of the anonymity set, which makes them
impractical for large scale use.
Several recent papers have attempted to construct practical protocols, that pro-
vide anonymity against traffic analysis. One such paper is Dissent [77]. In this
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paper, the authors suggest having a relatively small number of servers, say 5, which
will communicate in a way similar to DC-nets. The idea is that clients, who wish
to browse the web, will generate a request, and secret share this request among the
servers, that is, the client sends the request in such a way that all the servers have to
collaborate to get the request. The servers now collaborate to decrypt the request
in a way that does not reveal who made which request. Unlike for DC-nets, the
communication per client no longer grows with the number of clients. To provide
anonymity, we only need one of the servers to be honest.
Another such paper is Riposte [17], which works by using PIR (private informa-
tion retrieval) [15] in reverse. In PIR, several servers contains shares of a database,
and allow users to make requests to the servers, such that, assuming that the servers
are not colluding, the servers cannot know which part of the database the user is
looking at. Riposte turns this around to allow users to upload information to a
database. The result is a sender-anonymous twitter-like system, where each user
can upload small messages. Another recent idea is Vuvuzela [70], which uses a cas-
cade of mixes and dummy messages, among other ideas, to ensure (ε, δ)-differential
privacy against traffic attack.
For a survey of the anonymous communication literature until 2008, see Danezis
and Diaz [19]. This survey contains a more detailed description of many of the sys-
tems mentioned above, as well as description of many other anonymous communica-
tion systems and attacks against such systems. Freehaven maintains a bibliography
in anonymity [28], which currently contains more than 300 papers.
2.3 Other related ideas
While some of the above methods hide whether a particular person is sending infor-
mation at any moment, they do not typically hide who is taking part in the protocol.
Thus, an attacker who has the power to punish anyone it believes is attempting to
communicate anonymously or is helping others to do so, can prevent the above
methods from being used.
Steganography is a way of hiding communication, or at least making commu-
nication look like it is a different kind of communication [29, 64]. The idea is to
embed the file you want to send, called the payload, into an “innocent” file, called
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the covertext, to get an innocent looking file, called the stegotext. The recipient
of the message can then run an extraction algorithm on the stegotext to get the
payload. Steganography schemes that ensure that a random stegotext is indistin-
guishable to a random covertext have been suggested, both against computationally
bounded [42] and against computationally unbounded adversaries [10]. Unfortu-
nately, this requires that the distribution of the covertext is known, that you can
make exponentially many samples from the covertext or that you can break down
the covertext into smaller parts, such that for each part, you can sample from its
distribution given the previous parts. It is not clear how to do this for e.g. an image,
so in practice you have to use imperfect steganography.
While steganography itself does not provide anonymity, it can be combined with
anonymity techniques from above. For example, it can be used to hide the fact that
you are following the Tor protocol [59, 74], from a weak adversary. However, an
adversary who knows which servers are connected to the Tor network, will still be
able to see that you are connecting to one of those servers.
Another use of steganography is Message in a Bottle [45], which provides a way
for Lea – who lives in a country, Tyria, controlled by censors – to send information,
which the censors would want to censor, to the outside world. To do so, we need
the help of someone, Joe, from outside Tyria. Joe will distribute his public key,
and Lea will use this to encrypt her message. She will then embed this encrypted
message into an innocent image, and upload it to her blog. Most blogs send out a
blog ping to certain servers, and Joe goes through all such blog pings, and try to
extract messages from all images uploaded to blogs. From most blog posts he would
just get a random-looking sequence out, but from Lea’s blog post he will get the
intended message. This has been shown to be possible in practice [45]. The scheme
ensures that the censors do not learn that Lea is communicating with Joe, but Joe
will still learn who Lea is. In Chapter 7 we will see that a similar strategy can, in
theory, be used to bootstrap an anonymous channel.
One use of anonymity, is to make people give more honest answers to survey ques-
tions. However, when interviewed, people might not trust the promise of anonymity
they are given. One way to guarantee the respondent some amount of deniability
is randomized response [71]: suppose you want to know how large a fraction π of
people belong to a particular population A, but people are embarrassed to say that
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they belong to this population. You then give the respondent a spinner, which gives
“A” with some probability p and “not A” otherwise. Now, instead of asking people
which population they belong to, you ask them to spin the spinner secretly, and
ask if the result was the population they belong to. The closer p is to 1
2
the less
information the respondent reveals, but as long as p 6= 1
2
, we still get probabilistic
information about which population the respondent belongs to. By asking suffi-
ciently many people, we can, if they are honest, get an arbitrarily good estimate of
the true fraction π of people who belong to population A.
This idea has been analyzed further by many papers in the area of privacy
preserving data mining, including Evfimievski, Gehrke and Srikant [25]. In this
paper, the authors noted a fact, which will also be useful in this thesis: let bl be the
prior probability Pr(L = 1) that the respondent is of a certain type called 1, and
let r be an upper bound on the ratio between how likely the answer a is when the
respondent is of type 1 and when she is not, that is Pr(A=a|L=1)
Pr(A=a|L6=1) ≤ r. Then to ensure
that the posterior probability Pr(L = 1|A = a) that the respondent is of type 1, is
at most bm, it is enough that r ≤ bm(1−bl)bl(1−bm) .
Finally, one situation where people might want to send information anonymously,
is when they are under a gag order, that is, they have been ordered by court not
to reveal some information. For example, a company might want to reveal whether
they have been forced to give FBI access to their records, but would not be allowed
to say so if they had. One solution to this problem is a so-called “warrant canary”,
often used against Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act [33,75]: as long as Section 215
has not been used to compel a company to give access to their records, the company
can regularly publish a statement saying so. If the company stops publishing such
statements, people might conclude that the company has been forced to give access
to its records, but that it is not allowed to say so explicitly.
Most citizens would not notice if a company stopped sending out such a state-
ment, so a webpage, Canary Watch [72] has been set up to keep track of them. One
disadvantage in warrant canaries is that it is not always clear how to interpret the
absence of a message: in 2014 Apple stopped publishing a statement it had previ-
ously been publishing regularly, saying that they had received no surveillance orders
under Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act. It was not clear if that was because they
had now received such an order, or simply because they changed their reporting for-
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mat [75]. Furthermore, the legal issues around canary warrants are not settled. For
example, we do not know if a company, which has received an order which should
“kill” the canary, could be compelled to continue publishing (now false) statements





In this chapter we consider problems where one or more players might be trying to
leak information about the outcome of a random variable X. In the main result of
this chapter we assume that n players are communicating and each of them is a leaker
with probability bl. Each leaker wants to preserve reasonable doubt, that is, she
wants to ensure that an observer who knows X and has unbounded computational
power, will never assign probability above bm > bl to the event that she is a leaker. At
the same time the leakers want reliable leakage: they want to ensure that an observer
who does not know X before the communication, will after the communication be
able to guess X correctly which probability 1 − ε on average. We let n → ∞ and
let X be uniformly distributed over {0, 1}dnRe for some R. In Corollary 3.10 we
will see that it is possible to achieve reliable leakage while keeping reasonable doubt










We will also consider various related problems: in the risky model, we allow that
the leakers lose reasonable doubt with some small probability ε, but we will see that
this does not help the leakers reveal more information. We also consider a model
where the number of leakers is fixed and known rather than binomially distributed.
Finally, we consider some adaptive models, where players can become leakers as part
of the protocol. All the main positive results in this chapter will rely on Shannon’s
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Noisy-Channel Coding Theorem, so they will be existential rather than constructive.
The negative results will use a measure of suspicion which we will introduce in this
chapter.
The number of players is denoted n and the players are called plr1, . . . ,plrn.
Sometimes we will call plr1 Alice and plr2 Bob. We let Li be the random variable
that is 1 if player i knows the information and 0 otherwise. If there is only one
player we write L instead of L1. The joint distribution of (X,L1, . . . , Ln) is known
to everyone.
All messages are broadcast to all players and to two observers, Eve and Joe.
Both observers see the transcript, but Eve also know the secret X. We want to
reveal information about X to Joe, while at the same time make sure that for all i,
Eve does not get too sure that Li = 1. The random variable that is the transcript of
a protocol will be denoted T , and specific transcripts t. This is a tuple of messages,
so we can use the notation T k, Tk, t
k, tk as defined in the preliminaries. For example,
T k denotes the random variable that gives the tuple of the first k messages.
In this section we define the model for communication. Then in Section 3.1
we will define a measure of suspicion, and show how this can be used to measure
the amount of information, I(X;T ), the leakers can reveal. Here the amount of
information revealed is measured in mutual information, which means that Joe might
only get probabilistic information. In Section 3.2 we show how we can ensure reliable
leakage, that is, ensure that with probability 1− ε Joe’s guess about what X is will
be correct.
Throughout the chapter we will use the collaborating model, that is, we assume
that non-leakers will follow any protocol we ask them to follow. In particular, the
adversary is passive. In Chapter 6 we will define a model, where we do not need the
non-leakers to collaborate, and we will see that any protocol in the collaborating
model can be modified to work in the model where non-leakers are just following a
known communication protocol with sufficient randomness. The model in Chapter
6 will be more useful in practice, however when showing the existence of protocols,
it is easier first to do this in the collaborating model.
In the collaborating model we can tell all the players including the non-leaking
players to follow some communication protocol, called a collaborating cryptogenog-
raphy protocol. The messages sent by leaking player may depend on the value of
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X, but the messages of non-leaking players have to be independent of X given the
previous transcript. Formally, a collaborating cryptogenography protocol π specifies
for any possible value tk of the current transcript T k:
• Should the communication stop or continue, and if it should continue,
• Who is next to send a message, say plri, and
• A distribution p? and a set of distributions, {px}x∈X (the distributions p? and
{px}x∈X depend on π and tk). Now plri should choose a message using p?, if
Li = 0 and choose a message using px if Li = 1 and X = x.
Furthermore, for any protocol π, there should a number length(π) such that the
protocol will always terminate after at most length(π) messages. We assume that
both Joe and Eve know the protocol. They also know the prior distribution of
(X,L1, . . . , Ln), and we assume that they have unbounded computational power, in
particular they have enough computational power to compute (X,L1, . . . , Ln)|T=t
for any transcript t.
Another way of stating the above definition of collaborating cryptogenography
protocols is that the players follow a communication protocol1, and the leakers are
given x as input while the non-leakers are given a fixed input, say “you are not a
leaker”, which is not in X .
While we think of different players as different people, two or more different
players could be controlled by the same person. For example, they could be com-
municating in a chat room with perfect anonymity, except that a profile’s identity
will be revealed if the profile can be shown to be guilty in leaking with probability
greater than 95%. Here each player would correspond to a profile, but the same
person could have more profiles. However, we will use “player” and “person” as
synonyms.
1These were first defined by Yao [78]. Unlike in [78] we allow more than two players, allow the
protocol to specify who to send the next message, and allow each message to be more than one
bit. All this is standard in communication complexity, see for example Kushilevitz and Nisan [54].
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3.1 Bounds on I(X ;T )
3.1.1 Suspicion
First we will look at the problem where only one player is communicating and she
may or may not be trying to leak information. We will later use these results when
we analyse the many-player problem.
In the one player case, Alice sends one message A. If she is not trying to leak
information, she will choose this message in A randomly using a distribution p?. If
she is trying to leak information, and X = x, she will use a distribution px. For a
random variable Y jointly distributed with L and a value y ∈ Y with Pr(Y = y) > 0
we let cY=y = Pr(L = 1|Y = y). We usually suppress the random variable, and
write cy instead. Here Y could be a tuple of random variables, and y a tuple of
values. If y = (y1, y2) is a tuple, we write cy1y2 instead of c(y1,y2).
We want to see how much information Alice can leak to Joe (by choosing the
p’s), without being too suspicious to Eve. The following measure of suspicion turns
out to be useful.
Definition 3.1. Let Y be a random variable jointly distributed with L. Then the
suspicion (of Alice) given Y = y is
susp(Y = y) =− log(1− cy)
=− log(Pr(L = 0|Y = y)).
We see that susp(Y = y) depends on y and the joint distribution of L and Y ,
but to keep notation simple, we suppress the dependence on L. The suspicion of
Alice measures how suspicious Alice is to someone who knows that Y = y and
knows nothing more. For example Y could be the tuple that consists of the secret
information X and the current transcript. We can think of the suspicion as the
surprisal of the event “Alice did not have the information”.
Next we define the suspicion given a random variable Y , without setting it equal
to something.
Definition 3.2. The expected suspicion (of Alice) given Y or just the suspicion (of
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Alice) given Y is




Pr(Y = y) susp(Y = y). (3.1)
In each of these definitions, Y can consist of more than one random variable, e.g.
Y = (X,A). Finally, we can also combine these two definitions, giving
susp(X,A = a) =
∑
x∈X
Pr(X = x|A = a) susp((X,A) = (x, a)).
Where X and A can themselves be tuples of random variables.















Pr(A = a) susp(X,A = a),
which can be thought of as (3.1) given X.
Example 1. As an example, we will consider how suspicion behaves in a simple proto-
col with only one player. We assume the secret X and the random variable L which
indicates whether Alice is leaking are uniformly distributed on {0, 1} independently
from each other. Now
susp(X = 0) = − log(Pr(L = 0|X = 0)) = − log(0.5) = 1.
Similarly, susp(X = 1) = 1 so
susp(X) = Pr(X = 0) susp(X = 0) + Pr(X = 1) susp(X = 0) =
1
2
· 1 + 1
2
· 1 = 1.
That is, before any information has been revealed, we are 1 bit suspicious towards
Alice. Now suppose Alice makes a guess about what X is. If L = 1 she knows
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the true value and she will say this value, but otherwise she will guess uniformly
at random from {0, 1}. The resulting protocol is given more formally in Figure 3.1.
We see that Pr(X = a|A = a) = 3
4
, Pr(X = 1 − a|A = a) = 1
4
and Pr(L = 0|X =
A = a) = 1
3
.
Input distribution: (X,L) uniformly distributed on {0, 1}2. Alice learns L and if
L = 1 she also learns X.
Protocol:
1. If L = 1 then A := X, if L = 0, then A← {0, 1}.
2. Alice sends A.
Figure 3.1: Protocol from Example 1.
Now we get
susp(X = 1− a,A = a) = − log(Pr(L = 0|X = 1− a,A = a)) = − log(1) = 0.
This fits well with our interpretation of susp as how suspicious Eve should be towards
Alice: if X is different from Alice’s guess, Eve knows that Alice did not have the
information, and hence, Eve should no longer be suspicious towards her. On the
other hand we have






that is, if Eve knows X and see that Alice’s guess of X is correct, Eve should
get more suspicious towards Alice. Next we will compute Eve’s expected suspicion
before X is revealed.
susp(X,A = a) = Pr(X = a|A = a) susp(X = a,A = a)















The interpretation is this: suppose Eve knows that Alice’s message is a and Eve
knows that she will soon learn X. How suspicious does Eve expect she will be to-
wards Alice once she learns X? Notice that this is different from susp(A = a) which
is how suspicious Eve currently is towards Alice: while an observer’s probability
that Alice is leaking is a martingale, the suspicion is not.












If Alice did not send any messages, Eve’s expected suspicion towards Alice would
be susp(X) = 1, so this protocol causes Alice to look, on average, 0.189 bits more
suspicious that if she did not send any messages. At the same time the amount of



















As we will see in the Lemma below, this is not a coincidence.
The above example has some similarities to randomized response [71]: there is a
truth X and Alice message depends probabilistically on X. However, there is also
an important difference. In randomized response, Alice would spin a spinner that
shows 0 with probability 1
3
and 1 otherwise, and she would announce if the spinner
showed X or 1 −X. First of all this means that Alice never has to say “0” or “1”
but instead says “same” or ”different”. This could make a difference in a survey
where, instead of “1” we have “I have been unfaithful to my husband”. Whether
or not she has been unfaithful, she might be more comfortable saying “same” or
“different”, especially if the interview is recorded. Secondly, and more importantly,
in randomized response Alice would always be actively collaborating. In contrast,
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when Alice in the above example sends a message which improves the observer’s
belief about X, it will sometimes be by chance (when L = 0) and sometimes because
she was deliberately sending information (when L = 1). This could potentially make
both a psychological and a legal difference.
When Alice sends a message A this might reveal some information about X, but
at the same time, she will also reveal some information about whether she is trying
to leak X. We would like to bound I(A;X) by the information A reveals about L.
This is not possible. If, for example, we set A = X whenever L = 1 and A = a 6∈ X
when L = 0, then I(A;X) = Pr(L = 1)H(A) which can be arbitrarily large, but
I(A;L) ≤ H(L) ≤ 1. Instead, we will generalize the example above, and show that
I(A;X) can be bounded by the expected increase in suspicion given X, and that
this bound is tight.
Lemma 3.1. If Alice sends a message A, we have
I(X;A) ≤ susp(X,A)− susp(X).
That is, the amount of information she sends about X is at most her expected in-
crease in suspicion given X. There is equality if and only if the distribution of A is
the same as A|L=0.




Pr(X = x) log(1− cx).












Pr(X = x,A = a)
(







Now it follows that the cost in suspicion given X of sending A is
susp(X,A)− susp(X) = −
∑
x,a






Next we want to see how much information A gives about X, that is I(A;X) =
H(A)−H(A|X). We claim that this is bounded by the cost in suspicion, or equiv-




















Pr(A = a|X = x)
=
Pr(L = 0|X = x,A = a)
Pr(L = 0|X = x) Pr(A = a|X = x)
=
Pr(L = 0, X = x,A = a)
Pr(X = x,A = a)
Pr(X = x)
Pr(L = 0, X = x)
Pr(X = x,A = a)
Pr(X = x)
=
Pr(L = 0, X = x,A = a)
Pr(L = 0, X = x)
= Pr(A = a|X = x, L = 0)
= Pr(A = a|L = 0) (3.4)
Here, the last equation follows from the assumption that A does not depend on X
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Pr(A = a) log(Pr(A = a))
=H(A).
Here the first equality follows from (3.2) and (3.3), the second follows from (3.4)
and the inequality follows from inequality (1.4). There is equality if and only if
Pr(A = a) = Pr(A = a|L = 0) for all a.
We will now turn to the problem where many people are communicating. We
assume that they send messages one at a time, so we can break the protocol into
time periods where only one person is communicating, and see the entire protocol
as a sequence of one player protocols. To make the notation simpler, we will assume
that the protocol runs for a fixed number of messages, and the player to talk in
round k only depends on k, not on which previous messages was sent. Any protocol
π can be turned into such a protocol π′ by adding dummy messages: In round k of π′
we let plrk mod n talk. They follow protocol π in the sense that if it is not plrk mod n
turn to talk according to π she sends some fixed message 1, and if it is her turn, she
chooses her message as in π. The following corollary shows that a statement similar
to Lemma 3.1 holds for each single message in a protocol with many players.
Corollary 3.2. Let (L, T k−1, X) have some joint distribution, where T k−1 denotes
previous transcript. Let Tk be the next message sent by Alice. Then
I(X;Tk|T k−1) ≤ susp(X,T k)− susp(X,T k−1).
Proof. For a particular value tk−1 of T k−1 we use Lemma 3.1 with (X,Tk)|Tk−1=tk−1
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as (X,A). This gives us
I(X;Tk|T k−1 = tk−1) ≤ susp(X,Tk, T k−1 = tk−1)− susp(X,T k−1 = tk−1).
By multiplying each side by Pr(T k−1 = tk−1) and summing over all possible tk−1 we
get the desired inequality.
A protocol consists of a sequence of messages that each leaks some information
and increases the suspicion of the sender. We can add up the increases in suspicion,
and using the chain rule for mutual information we can also add up the amount
of revealed information. However, Bob’s message might not only affect his own
suspicion, it might also affect Alice’s suspicion. To show an upper bound on the
amount of information the players can leak, we need to show that one person’s
message will, in expectation, never make another person’s suspicion decrease. We
get this from the following proposition by setting Y = (X,T k−1) and B = Tk.
Proposition 3.3. For any joint distribution on (L, Y,B) we have susp(Y ) ≤ susp(Y,B).
Proof. We have




Pr(B = b|Y = y) Pr(L = 0|Y = y,B = b)
)
susp(Y = y,B) =−
∑
b∈B
Pr(B = b|Y = y) log (Pr(L = 0|Y = y,B = b)) .
As p 7→ − log(p) is convex, Jensen’s inequality gives us
susp(Y = y,B) ≥ susp(Y = y).
Multiplying each side by Pr(Y = y) and summing over all y ∈ Y gives us the desired
inequality.
Let suspi denote the suspicion of plri.
2
2This is defined similar to the suspicion of Alice, except using Li instead of L.
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(suspi(X,T )− suspi(X)) .





Now Corollary 3.2 shows that I(X;Tk|T k−1) ≤ suspi(X,T k)−suspi(X,T k−1) if plri
send the k’th message and Proposition 3.3 shows that suspi′(X,T
k) ≥ suspi′(X,T k−1)









By summing over all rounds in the protocol, we get the theorem.
3.1.2 Keeping reasonable doubt
Until now we have bounded the amount of information the players can leak by the
expected increase in some measure, suspicion, that we defined for the purpose. But
there is no reason to think that someone who is leaking information cares about
the expectation of this measure. A more likely scenario, is that each person leaking
wants to ensure reasonable doubt, that is, they want to ensure that after the leakage,
an observer who knows X will assign probability at most bm to the event that she
was leaking information: Pr(Li = 1|X = x, T = t) ≤ bm. If this is the case for all x
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Pr(X = x, T = t)(− log(1− bm))
=− log(1− bm).
If we assume that each player before the protocol had probability bl < bm of leaking
independently of X, that is Pr(Li = 1|X = x) = bl for all x and i, we have




(suspi(X,T )− suspi(X)) = (− log(1− bm) + log(1− bl))n. (3.5)
This gives us an upper bound on how much information the leakers can reveal.
However, it is not possible to reach this bound: to reach it, we would need to have
Pr(Li = 1|X = x, T = t) = bm for all x, t, i. But the probability Pr(Li = 1|X =
x) = bl can also be computed as Et∼T Pr(Li = 1|X = x, T = t), so Pr(Li = 1|X =
x, T = t) cannot be constantly bm > bl. The following theorem improves the upper
bound from (3.5) by taking this into account.
Theorem 3.5. Let π be a collaborating cryptogenography protocol, and T be its
transcript. If for all players plri and all x ∈ X and all transcripts t we have
Pr(Li = 1|X = x) = bl, and Pr(Li = 1|T = t,X = x) ≤ bm then





















bl = 0.5 bm = 0.95
Figure 3.2: This figure illustrates Theorem 3.5. The curve shows the function p 7→
− log(1 − p), which is used for computing the suspicion. The line from (0, 0) to
(bm,− log(1− bm)) shows the maximum expected posterior suspicion plri can have
if she started with Pr(Li = 1|X = x) = p and have Pr(Li|X = x, T = t) ≤ bm for all
transcripts t. The second coordinate of (bl,− log(1 − bl)) gives the prior suspicion
towards plri, so the dotted line gives the amount of information that player i can
leak.
Proof. If Pr(Li = 1|X = x, T = t) ≤ bm then
suspi(X = x, T = t) =− log(1− Pr(Li = 1|X = x, T = t))
≤− log(1− bm)
bm
Pr(Li = 1|X = x, T = t). (3.6)
This inequaility follows from the fact that we have equality when Pr(Li = 1|X =
x, T = t) is 0 or bm, and the left hand side is convex in Pr(Li = 1|X = x, T = t)
while the right hand side is linear.
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Pr(X = x, T = t)
− log(1− bm)
bm






































It is clear that the upper bound from Theorem 3.5 cannot be achieved for all




∣∣∣∣∣∣ bl(1−bm)bm(1−bl)) we must




∣∣∣∣∣∣ bl(1−bm)bm(1−bl)), that is, the players do not have
enough information to send to reach the upper bound. Even if H(X) is high, we may
not be able to reach the upper bound. If it is known that L1 = L2 = · · · = Ln the
suspicion of the players will not depend on the player, only on the messages sent.
So this problem will be equivalent to the case where only one person is sending
messages.
We will now give an example where the upper bound from Theorem 3.5 is achiev-
able. We will refer back to this example when we prove that reliable leakage is
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possible.
Example 2. Assume that X,L1, . . . , Ln are all independent, and Pr(Li = 1) = bl











∈ (0, 1) so 0 < a < d.




. By multiplying both sides by
1−bl
a































































We are now ready for the example. Assume that X is uniformly distributed
on {1, . . . , d}n. Each player plri now sends one message, independently of which
messages the other players send. If Li = 0, plri chooses a message in {1, . . . , d}
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uniformly at random. If Li = 1 and Xi = xi, then plri chooses a message in
{xi + 1, xi + 2 . . . , xi + a} mod d
uniformly at random. Here we use k mod d to mean the number in {1, . . . d} that
is equal to k modulo d. We can also write this set as xi + [a] mod d. The resulting
protocol is defined more formally in Figure 3.3.
Parameters:
n : number of players
bl : probability of each player being leaker
a < d : two natural numbers
Input distribution: X,L1, . . . , Ln are independently distributed, X uniformly
distributed on [d]n and for each i: Pr(Li = 1) = bl. Each plri learns Li and if
Li = 1 she also learns X.
Protocol:
1. For i from 1 to n:
2. If Li = 1 then Ti ← Xi + [a] mod d, if Li = 0, then Ti ← [d]
3. Player i sends Ti
Figure 3.3: Protocol from Example 2.
We see that over random choice of X, the message, Ti, that plri sends, is uni-
formly distributed on {1, . . . , d}, so H(Ti) = log(d). We want to compute H(Ti|X).
Given X, each of the d−a elements not in xi+[a] mod d can only be sent if L = 0,
so they will be sent with probability 1−bl
d
. Each of the a elements in the set xi + [a]
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H(Ti|X = x) =−
∑
ti∈Ti

































































































The tuples (Xi, Ti, Li) where i ranges over {1, . . . n} are independent from each other,




∣∣∣∣∣∣ bl(1−bm)bm(1−bl)) as wanted.
Finally, we need to show that the leakers have reasonable doubt, that is, Pr(Li =
1|T = t,X = x) ≤ bm. The probability is 0 if plri sends a message not in xi + [a]
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mod d. Otherwise, we use independence and then Bayes’ Theorem to get
Pr(Li = 1|T = t,X = x) = Pr(Li = 1|Ti = ti, Xi = xi)
=
Pr(Ti = ti|Li = 1, Xi = xi) Pr(Li = 1|Xi = xi)















Here the penultimate equality follows from (3.7).
3.1.3 Why use reasonable doubt?
The requirement of reasonable doubt, which can be formally stated as
∀i, x, t : Pr(Li = 1|X = x, T = t) ≤ bm,
is easily confused with the requirement that an observer can only guess a leaker with
probability at most bm, that is
∀d : Pr(Ld(X,T ) = 1) ≤ bm
where the for-all quantifier is over all decision functions : functions d that map a
tuple (x, t) of a secret and a transcript to a guess of who is a leaker. This last
requirement is equivalent to the probability of error, as defined by Chatzikokolakis,
Palamidessi and Panangaden [12]3, being at most 1− bm. However, we will see that
the probability-of-error requirement is weaker than the corresponding requirement
of reasonable doubt. To prove this, we will first give an alternative way of defining
reasonable doubt.
Definition 3.3. An incomplete decision function d′ is a function that for each tuple
(x, t) of secret and transcript will either return the number i of a player or a special
3Note, however, that [12] only gave this definition in a model with only one sender.
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symbol ⊥, and such that there is at least one tuple (x, t) with Pr(X = x, T = t) > 0
such that d′(x, t) 6= ⊥.
We let D′ denote the set of all incomplete decision functions, and let D denote
the set of complete decision functions, that is d ∈ D′ that does not take the value
⊥.
We can use incomplete decision functions to give an alternative characterization
of reasonable doubt: we have reasonable doubt at the bm level if and only if an
adversary (modelled by an incomplete decision function) can guess a leaker with
probability at most bm given that the adversary makes a guess. This is formalised
by the following theorem.
Theorem 3.6. For any distribution of (L,X, T ) we have
∀i, x, t : Pr(Li = 1|X = x, T = t) ≤ bm
if and only if
∀d′ ∈ D′ : Pr(Ld′(X,T ) = 1|d′(X,T ) 6= ⊥) ≤ bm.
The intuition is that the incomplete decision function d′ that maximizes its prob-
ability of guessing correctly given that it does not return ⊥ is the function that only
returns ⊥ for the input (x, t) where the observer is most confident about who is a
leaker. So both the characterizations give us the level of confidence the observer will
have in the worst case.
Proof. “⇒” Suppose L,X, T satisfy ∀i, x, t : Pr(Li = 1|X = x, T = t) ≤ bm. Then
we have
Pr(Ld′(X,T ) = 1|d′(X,T ) 6= ⊥)
=
∑
(x,t):d′(x,t) 6=⊥ Pr(X = x, T = t) Pr(Ld′(x,t) = 1|X = x, T = t)∑
(x,t):d′(x,t)6=⊥ Pr(X = x, T = t)
≤
∑
(x,t):d′(x,t) 6=⊥ Pr(X = x, T = t)bm∑
(x,t):d′(x,t)6=⊥ Pr(X = x, T = t)
= bm.
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In the inequality we are using that when x and t are fixed, d′(x, t) is a constant.
“⇐”: We show this by contraposition: suppose for contradiction that there exist
i0, x0, t0 with Pr(Li0 = 1|X = x0, T = t0) > bm. Then we define the function
d′i0,x0,t0 ∈ D′ which on input (x0, t0) returns i0 and on all other inputs (x, t) returns
⊥. Now
Pr(Ld′i0,x0,t0 (X,T )
= 1|d′i0,x0,t0(X,T ) 6= ⊥) = Pr(Li0 = 1|X = x0, T = t0) > bm.
This alternative characterization makes it easy to compare reasonable doubt with
the probability of error.
Corollary 3.7. If L,X, T give reasonable doubt at the bm level, the probability of
error is at least 1− bm.
This shows that the requirement of reasonable doubt is stronger that the require-
ment of large probability of error. Below we will see that it is strictly stronger, but
first we will prove the corollary.
Proof. Assume that L, T,X gives reasonable doubt at the bm level, then by Theo-
rem 3.6 we have ∀d′ ∈ D′ : Pr(Ld′(X,T ) = 1|d′(X,T ) 6= ⊥) ≤ bm. As D ⊂ D′ we have
in particular ∀d ∈ D : Pr(Ld(X,T ) = 1|d(X,T ) 6= ⊥) = Pr(Ld(X,T ) = 1) ≤ bm which
is equivalent to the probability of error being at least 1− bm.
To see that the opposite implication does not hold, suppose that n = 100, and
L is such that only one person, chosen uniformly at random, is a leaker. Suppose
further that with probability 10% the transcript T completely reveals the leaker,






= 0.891. However, the transcript sometimes completely reveals
the leaker, so Pr(Li = 1|X = x, T = t) is not bounded by any number bm < 1. This
shows that the requirement of reasonable doubt at the bm level is a strictly stronger
than the requirement of a probability of error of at least 1− bm.
Theorem 3.6 shows that reasonable doubt provides a guarantee to the users of
the anonymity system: we can interpret an incomplete decision function d′ as an
action taken against a player. If d′ returns ⊥ then no action is taken, if d′ returns
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a player then that player might be punished or investigated further. Theorem 3.6
shows that if an adversary takes action against someone, based only on this person’s
participation in an anonymity system which provides reasonable doubt at the bm
level, the adversary will, with probability at least 1 − bm given that the adversary
takes action, take action against someone who is not a leaker. Such a guarantee is
particularly useful if the adversary is limited by legal rights, if the possible action
is expensive for the adversary or if the adversary for some other reason is reluctant
to take action against someone who could be innocent. In particular, let a rational
adversary be an adversary who gets utility rl > 0 for punishing a leaker and utility
ri < 0 for punishing an innocent and who chooses whether to punish in a way that
optimizes this utility.4 Such a rational adversary will use its punishment on a player
for some transcripts if and only if the player does not have reasonable doubt at the




Unfortunately, the requirement of reasonable doubt gives no guarantee that the
leaker is not going to stand out. For example, suppose it is known that there is
exactly one leaker and we want reasonable doubt at the 10% level. This could be
achieved if, given the communication, 10 people are equally likely to be the leaker.
However, it could also be that given the communication, one person is a leaker
will probability 10% and 90 other people are each the leaker with probability 1%.
Against a rational adversary this should not make any difference to the person who
is a leaker with probability 10%. But if the adversary has other motives, such as
not wanting to look weak or wanting to intimidate people, the person who appears
guilty with probability 10% might be in more danger in the second scenario that in
the first.
In the case where the number of leakers is not known, this effect can be even
more extreme. Consider the protocol from Example 2 with bl = 0.1, bm = 0.9
(giving a = 1 and d = 81) and n = 90. In expectation, n(bl + (1− bl)ad) = 909 = 10
players should send a message that is consistent with being a leaker, and each of
these would have Pr(Li = 1|X = x, T = t) = 0.9. So in expectation, one of these
would be innocent. However, suppose that a very unlikely event happens: only one
4The term “rational adversary” might be misleading, as we are also assuming that the utility
is on a certain form. In more complicated scenarios it might be perfectly rational for an adversary
to punish people just to intimidating them to not leak information.
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player sends a message that is consistent with being a leaker. The computations in
Example 2 shows that for this player, i, we still have Pr(Li = 1|X = x, T = t) = 0.9,
but an irrational adversary might be more likely to punish one person, who is most
likely a leaker, than to punish 10 people, which most likely has at least one innocent
among them (even though each of them is most likely a leaker).
Notice, however, that if we allow for the possibility that the true value of bl might
be different from the 0.1 the protocol was designed for, then a transcript where only
one player sends a message consistent with being a leaker, is evidence that bl < 0.1.
In fact, even if bl = 0 we would expect 90 · 181 = 109 = 1.11 . . . people to send
messages consistent with being leakers. So a rational adversary, who is uncertain
about bl, should be less likely to punish people if only a small number of them might
be leakers. Conversely, if everyone sends messages consistent with being a leaker,
that is strong evidence that bl ≈ 1 and a rational adversary might punish everyone.
To summarize, if you want to prevent being punished by a rational adversary,
reasonable doubt is the right measure of your anonymity: the level of reasonable
doubt tells you exactly for which utility functions the rational adversary would, for
some transcripts, punish you. However, if the level of reasonable doubt is not suffi-
cient to prevent you from being punished in every scenario, the level of reasonable
doubt does not tell you how likely you get a transcript where you will be punished.
On the other hand, if you want to prevent the leaker from being punished by an ad-
versary who always punishes exactly one person, then the probability of error is the
relevant measure of anonymity. You can easily imagine other type of adversaries, for
example an adversary that will punish people if they are sufficiently more suspicious
than everyone else, but we will not attempt to construct measures of anonymity for
use when faced with such adversaries.
3.2 Reliable leakage
In Example 2, Joe would receive some information about X in the sense of informa-
tion theory: before he sees the transcript, any value of X would be as likely as any
other value, and when he knows the transcript, he has a much better idea about
what X is. However, his best guess about what X is, is still very unlikely to be
correct. In this section, we want to show that we can have reliable leakage. That
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is, no matter what value X is taking, we want Joe to be able to guess the correct
value with high probability. We will see that this is possible, even when X has




∣∣∣∣∣∣ bl(1−bm)bm(1−bl)). Joe’s guess would have to be a function G of
the transcript t. Saying that Joe will guess X correctly with high probability when
X = x is the same as saying that Pr(G(T ) = x|X = x) is close to one.
Definition 3.4. Let L = (L1, . . . , Ln) be a tuple of random variables, where the Li
takes values in {0, 1}.
A risky (n, h, L, bm, ε)-protocol is a collaborating cryptogenography protocol to-
gether with a function G from the set of possible transcripts to X = {1, . . . , 2dhe}
such that when X and L are distributed independently and X is uniformly dis-
tributed on X , then for any x ∈ X , there is probability at least 1− ε that a random
transcript t distributed as T |X=x satisfies
Reasonable doubt: ∀i : Pr(Li = 1|T = t,X = x) ≤ bm, and
Reliable leakage: G(t) = x
That is, no matter the value of X, with high probability Joe can guess the
value of X, and with high probability no player will be estimated to have leaked
the information with probability greater than bm by Eve. However, there might be
a small risk that someone will be estimated to have leaked the information with
probability greater than bm. This is the reason we call it a risky protocol. A safe
protocol is a protocol where this never happens.
Definition 3.5. A safe (n, h, L, bm, ε)-protocol is a risky (n, h, L, bm, ε)-protocol
where Pr(Li = 1|T = t,X = x) ≤ bm for all i, t, x with Pr(T = t,X = x) > 0.
First we will consider the case where L1, . . . , Ln are independent, and the Li’s all
have the same distribution. The following definitions of achievability and capacity
are based on the similar definitions from information theory, as given by Shannon
[67], but instead of measuring these in bits per time unit or per usage of a channel,
we measure them in bits per player.
Definition 3.6. Let Indepbl(n) be the random variable (L1, . . . , Ln) where L1, . . . , Ln
are independent, and each Li is distributed on {0, 1} and Pr(L1 = 1) = bl.
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A rate R is safely/riskily (Indepbl , bm)-achievable if for all ε > 0 and all n0, there
exists a safe/risky (n, nR, Indepbl(n), bm, ε)-protocol with n ≥ n0.
The safe/risky (Indepbl , bm)-capacity is the supremum of all safely/riskily (Indepbl , bm)-
achievable rates.
It turns out that the safe and the risky (Indepbl , bm)-capacities are the same, but
at the moment we will only consider the safe capacity.




∣∣∣∣∣∣ bl(1−bm)bm(1−bl)) is safely (Indepbl , bm)-achievable.




∣∣∣∣∣∣ bl(1−bm)bm(1−bl)) is safely (Indepbl , bm)-





∣∣∣∣∣∣ bl(1−bm)bm(1−bl)) > 0. We know from Theorem 3.5 that









H(X|T ) = H(X)− I(X;T ) ≥ Rn− (R− δ)n = δn.





Thus, for sufficiently large n0 and sufficiently small ε we cannot have Pe ≤ ε. When
Pr(G(T ) 6= X) = Pe > ε there must exist an x ∈ X such that Pr(G(T ) 6= x|X =
x) > ε, so R is not safely bm-achievable.
The idea in the proof of the following theorem is to consider each person to be
one usage of a channel. As the proof relies on Shannon’s Noisy-Channel Coding
Theorem it is not constructive.




∣∣∣∣∣∣ bl(1−bm)bm(1−bl)) is safely (Indepbl , bm)-achievable.




∣∣∣∣∣∣ bl(1−bm)bm(1−bl)) and let b′m ≤ bm be a number such that bl(1−b′m)b′m(1−bl) is




∣∣∣∣∣∣ bl(1−b′m)b′m(1−bl)). We need to show that given ε > 0 and n0 there
exists a (n,Rn, Indepbl(n), bm, ε)-protocol with n ≥ n0.
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Use bl and b
′







. We consider the
channel C that on input j with probability bl returns a random uniformly distributed
element in {j + 1, j + 2 . . . , j + a} mod d, and with probability 1 − bl it returns
a random and uniformly distributed element in {1, . . . , d}. Thus, C is the channel




if t ∈ (j + [a] mod d) and Pr(C(j) = t) = 1−bl
d
for all other t ∈ [d].
We see that if leaker choose their message uniformly from some set on the form
(j + [a] mod d) and non-leaker choose their message uniformly form [d] then each
person sending a message corresponds exactly to using this channel once. The com-
putation (3.10) from Example 2 shows that when input of this channel is uniformly





Thus, the capacity of the channel is at least this value.5 We now use Shannon’s
Noisy-Channel Coding Theorem to get an error correcting code c : X → {1, . . . , d}n
for this channel, that achieves rate R, has n ≥ n0 and for each x fails with probability
less than ε. Formally that means that
∀x : Pr(G(Cn(c(X))) 6= X|X = x) ≤ ε (3.12)
where G : {1, . . . , d}n → X is a decoding function for c and Cn = (C1, . . . , Cn) is
repeated use of the channel C defined above: Cn(j1, . . . , jn) = (C(j1), . . . , C(jn))
and for fixed j = (j1, . . . , jn) all the coordinates of C
n(j) are independent.
When X = x, any player plri that is not leaking will send a message ti chosen
uniformly at random from [d] and any player plri with Li = 1 chooses a message ti
uniformly at random from (j + [a] mod d), where j = c(x)i is the i’th letter in the
codeword for x. For a more formal describtion of the protocol, see Figure 3.4.
Since each person corresponds to one use of the channel C we have ti = C(c(X)i)
and hence T = Cn(c(X)). By (3.12) this ensures that ∀x : Pr(G(T ) 6= X|X = x) ≤
ε, so we have reliable leakage.
To finish the proof that there exists a (n,Rn, Indepbl(n), bm, ε)-protocol, we need
to check that the protocol also gives reasonable doubt. Given X the random variable
(Ti, Li), is independent from T1, L1, . . . , Ti−1, Li−1, Ti+1, Li+1, . . . , Tn, Ln. Using the
computation from (3.11) we now get that Pr(Li = 1|T = t,X = x) is either 0 or
5In fact, it is exactly this value because the channel is symmetric.
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Parameters:
n : number of players
bl : probability of each player being leaker
a < d : two natural numbers
c : an error correcting code
Input distribution: X,L1, . . . , Ln are independently distributed, X uniformly
distributed on {0, 1}dRne and for each i: Pr(Li = 1) = bl. Each plri learns Li and
if Li = 1 she also learns X.
Protocol:
1. For i from 1 to n:
2. If Li = 1 then Ti ← c(x)i + [a] mod d, if Li = 0, then Ti ← [d]
3. Player i sends Ti
Figure 3.4: Protocol from the proof of Theorem 3.9.
b′m ≤ bm so we also achieve reasonable doubt.





Proof. Follows from Proposition 3.8 and Theorem 3.9.
Corollary 3.10 shows that if you want information about something that some
proportion bl of the population knows, but no one wants other people to think that
they know it with probability greater than bm, you can still get information about




∣∣∣∣∣∣ bl(1−bm)bm(1−bl)) bits per person you ask. What if only
l people in the world have the information? They are allowed to blend into a group
of any size n, and observers will think that any person in the larger group is as
likely as anyone else to have the information. Only the number of people with the
information is known to everyone. Can they reveal an arbitrarily large amount of
information by blending into a sufficiently large group?
60
If they are part of a group of n → ∞ people, then each person in the larger
group would have the information with probability bl =
l
n
. If we forget that exactly
l people know the information, and instead assume that all the Lis are independent

























bits of information, where e is the base of the natural logarithm. We will see that
even in the case where the number of leakers is known and constant, we can still get
this rate. First we define the distribution of (L1, . . . , Ln) that we get in this case.
Definition 3.7. Let Fixed(l, n) be the random variable (L1, . . . , Ln) that is dis-
tributed such that the set of leakers {plri|Li = 1} is uniformly distributed over all
subsets of {plr1, . . . ,plrn} of size l.
A rate R is safely/riskily (Fixed, bm)-achievable if for all ε > 0 and all l0, there
exists a safe/risky (n, lR,Fixed(l, n), bm, ε)-protocol for some l ≥ l0 and some n.
The safe/risky (Fixed, bm)-capacity is the supremum of all safely/riskily (Fixed, bm)-
achievable rates.
Notice that in this definition, the rate is measured in bits per leaker rather than
bits per person communicating. That is because in this setup we assume that the
number of people with the information is the bounded resource, and that they can
find an arbitrarily large group of person to hide in.
Again, it turns out that the safe and the risky (Fixed, bm)-capacities are actually
the same, but for the proofs it will be convenient to have both definitions.
Proposition 3.11. No rate R > − log(1−bm)
bm
− log(e), where e is the base of the
natural logarithm is safely (Fixed, bm)-achievable.
Proof. This proof is very similar to the proof of Proposition 3.8.
Assume for contradiction that R > − log(1−bm)
bm
− log(e) is safely bm-achievable.
Consider a safe (n, lR,Fixed(l, n), bm, ε)-protocol π. We know from Theorem 3.5
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that
I(X;T ) ≤ −
l
n












Here the second inequality follows from ln(1 + x) ≤ x or equivalently log(1 − x) ≤
−x
ln(2)




















Thus, if we choose l0 sufficiently large and ε sufficiently small we cannot have l ≥ l0
and Pe ≤ ε, so there must be some value x where the probability of error Pr(G(T ) 6=
x|X = x) is greater than ε.
Theorem 3.12. Any rate R < − log(1−bm)
bm
− log(e) is riskily (Fixed, bm)-achievable.
Before we give a proof of this Theorem, notice that there are two reasons that the
proof of a lower bound in the Indepbl model given in Theorem 3.9 does not translate
directly to a lower bound for the Fixed model. First, in the protocol given in the
proof of Theorem 3.9, there is a very small risk that only the leakers send messages
consistent with being leakers. This is fine when the Li’s are independent: even if all
but one player are revealed as non-leakers, that does not change the probability of
the last player being a leaker. However, when the total number of leakers is known,
this would completely reveal who the leakers are. This is why Theorem 3.12 is about
risky achievability rather than safe achievability. The second problem is that the
different usages of the channel are no longer independent as the number of leakers is
constant. Intuitively, this should not be a problem, it should only make the channel
more reliable. However, to show that this works, we would have to go through the
proof of Shannon’s Noisy-Channel Coding Theorem, and show that it still works.
Instead, we will give a shorter but less natural proof, where we divide the players
into two groups and use Theorem 3.9 on each group. As we are using Theorem 3.9
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the proof in not constructive.
Proof. Let R < − log(1−bm)
bm
− log(e), then we can find rational bl > 0 and rational
bm




∣∣∣∣∣∣ bl(1−b′m)b′m(1−bl)). Let n0, ε > 0 be
given. By Theorem 3.9 for any ε′ > 0 and any n′0 there exists a safe (n, n(R +
δ), Indepbl(n), bm
′, ε′)-protocol where n > n′0. Take such a protocol, where ε
′ > 0 is
sufficiently small and n′0 is sufficiently large. As bl, and hence the denominator of
bl, is fixed and n can be sufficiently large, we can increase n a little to ensure that
bln is an integer, while still keeping the rate at least R. Thus we can assume that
we have a (n, nR, Indepbl(n), bm
′, ε′)-protocol, where l := bln is an integer.
Now we will use this to make a risky (2n, 2dnRe,Fixed(2nbl), bm, ε)-protocol. For
such a protocol, X should be uniformly distributed on {1, . . . , 22dnRe}, but instead
we can also think of X as a tuple (X1, X2) where the Xi are independent and each
Xi is uniformly distributed on {1, . . . , 2dnRe}. Now we split the 2n players into two
groups of n, and let the first group use the protocol from the proof of Theorem 3.9
to leak X1, and the second group use the same protocol to leak X2. We let Joe’s
guess of the value of X1 be a function G1 depending only of the transcript of the
communication of the first group, and his guess of X2 be a function G2 depending
only on the transcript of the second group. These functions are the same as G in the
proof of Theorem 3.9. The resulting protocol is defined more formally in Figure 3.5.
The total number of leakers is 2nbl, but the number of leakers in each half varies.
Let SIndep denote random variable that gives the number of leakers among n people,
when each is leaking with probability bl =
l
n
, independently of each other. So SIndep





. Let SFixed,1 denote the number of leakers
in the first group as chosen above. Now we have.


















n : half the number of players
bl : probability of each player being leaker
bm : threshold of reasonable doubt
R : rate
ε′ > 0 : a sufficiently small number
π′ : an (n, dnRe, Indepbl , bm, ε′)-protocol
Input distribution: X,L1, . . . , Ln are independently distributed, X uniformly
distributed on {0, 1}2dRne and for each i: Pr(Li = 1) = bl. Each plri learns Li and
if Li = 1 she also learns X.
Protocol:
1. Parse X ∈ {0, 1}2dRne as (X1, X2) with Xi ∈ {0, 1}dRne
2. Let plr1, . . . ,plrn use π
′ to reveal X1
3. Let plrn+1, . . . ,plr2n use π
′ to reveal X2
Figure 3.5: Protocol from the proof of Theorem 3.12. The complications in the
proof is in choosing a sufficiently small ε′ and showing that the resulting protocol
has reasonable doubt and reliable leakage. The protocol is not constructive because
we only have an existence proof for πIndep.
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A simple computation shows
Pr(SFixed,1 = k) Pr(SIndep = k + 1)
Pr(SIndep = k) Pr(SFixed,1 = k + 1)
=












































































Given that SIndep = k = SFixed,1, the distribution on (L1, . . . , Ln) and transcript
is the same in the protocol for Indepbl as it is for the first group in the above protocol.
As Joe’s guessing function is the same in the two cases, the probability of error given
SIndep = k = SFixed,1 is the same in the two protocols. Let Ek denote the probability
of error in the protocol for Indepbl given SIndep = k, and let EFixed,1 denote the
65








2 Pr(SIndep = k)Ek
≤2ε′.
By the same argument, the probability that Joe guess X2 wrong is at most 2ε
′, so
the probability that he guess X = (X1, X2) is at most 4ε
′. By choosing a sufficiently
low ε′ this is less than ε/2
To compute the posterior probability Pr(Li = 1|X = x, T = t) that plri was
leaking, we have to take the entire transcript from both groups into account. Given
T and X, let K denote the set of players who sent a message consistent with knowing
X, and let |K| denote the cardinality of K. Let S be the set of the 2l leaking players,
and let s be a set of 2l players. Now
Pr(S = s|X = x, T = t) = Pr(T = t|S = s,X = x) Pr(S = s|X = x)
P (T = t|X = x) .
This is 0 if s contains players who send a message not consistent with having the
information, and is constant for all other s. Thus, any two players who send a
message consistent with having the information, are equally likely to have known
X given T and X, so they will have Pr(Li = 1|T = t,X = x) = 2l|K| . So to
ensure that Pr(Li = 1|T = t,X = x) ≤ bm with high probability (for each x and
random t) we only need to ensure that with high probability, |K| ≥ 2l
bm
. We see that
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, which has expectation




























The variance of the binomial distribution B(n, p) is np(1−p), so the variance of |K| is
(2n−2l)bl(1−bl). Hence, for sufficiently high n (and thus l) Chebyshev’s inequality,
shows that |K| ≥ 2l
bm
with probability at least 1− ε/2. Thus, for sufficiently large n′0
and sufficiently low ε′, the resulting protocol is a risky (2n, 2dnRe,Fixed(2nb), bm, ε)-
protocol.
3.2.1 General L-structures




which is at most the risky (Fixed, bm)-capacity. To finish the proof that they are
both − log(1−bm)
bm
− log(e), we only need to show that the safe capacity is not smaller
than the risky. Notice that the corresponding claim is not true if we are only
interested in the mutual information between X and transcript T . Here there exists
a collaborating cryptography protocol where with probability 1 − 10−100 we have,
Pr(Li = 1|T = t) < bl + 10−100, and yet I(X;T ) ≥ 10100. To do this we need to take
X to have extremely high entropy, and with a probability 10−100 a leaking player
will send X in a message, and otherwise just send some fixed message. On the other
hand, if we require that Pr(Li = 1|T = t) < bl + 10−100 holds for all transcripts,
then I(X;T ) has to be small compared to total number of players. The point of
this section is to show that you cannot do something similar for reliable leakage.
We will do so in a much more general setting than the rest of the thesis using an
abstraction we call L-structures. These L-structures will not be used in the rest of
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the thesis. Readers who are willing to accept that safe and risky capacities are the
same can skip this section.
The concept of L-structures generalises Indepbl and Fixed. Remember that the
difference between Indepbl and Fixed capacity is not only in the distributions on
(L1, . . . Ln), but also in what we are trying to minimize the use of. In Indepbl we
want to have as few people communicating as possible, while in Fixed we only care
about the number of people who are leaking. Our general definition has to capture
this difference as well.
Definition 3.8. An L-structure (L, C) is a set L of joint distributions of (L1, . . . , Ln)
(where n does not need to be the same for each element), where each Li is distributed
on {0, 1}, together with a cost function C : L→ R≥0.
Indepbl is the L-structure (LIndepbl , C#), where LIndepbl is the set of distributions
on (L1, . . . , Ln) (over n ∈ N) where for all i, Pr(Li = 1) = bl and the Li are
independent, and C# is the function that sends a distribution on (L1, . . . , Ln) to n.
Fixed is the L-structure (LFixed, CFixed) of distributions on (L1, . . . , Ln) such that
for some number l the set {i|Li = 1} is uniformly distributed over all subsets of
{1, . . . , n} of size l, and CFixed sends such a distribution on (L1, . . . , Ln) to this
number l.
For an L-structure (L, C) a rate R is safely/riskily (L, C, bm)-achievable if for
all ε > 0 and all h0 ≥ 0 there exists a safe/riskily (n, h, L, bm, ε)-protocol with
h ≥ h0, h ≥ C(L)R and L ∈ L.
The safe/risky (L, C, bm)-capacity is the supremum of all safely/riskily (L, C, bm)-
achievable rates.
We see that Definition 3.8 agrees with Definition 3.6 and Definition 3.7,6 and is
much more general.
Proposition 3.14. Let (L, C) be an L-structure. The safe (L, C, bm)-capacity and
the risky (L, C, bm)-capacity are non-decreasing functions of bm.
6In Definition 3.6 and Definition 3.7 the lower bounds which prevent solutions with small number
of people and small entropy are given as ∀n0∃n : n ≥ n0 respectively ∀l0∃l : l ≥ l0 instead of
∀h0∃h : nR = h ≥ h0 respectively ∀h0∃h : lR = h ≥ h0 as in Definition 3.8. However, for fixed R,
these requirements are equivalent.
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Proof. Let bm
′ > bm. It is clear that any safe/risky (n, h, L, bm, ε)-protocol is a
safe/risky (n, h, L, bm
′, ε)-protocol, so any safe/riskily (L, C, bm)-achievable rate is a
safe/riskily (L, C, bm
′)-achievable rate.
Proposition 3.15. Let (L, C) be an L-structure. The safe (L, C, bm)-capacity is at
most the risky (L, C, bm)-capacity.
Proof. Any safe (n, h, L, bm, ε)-protocol is a risky (n, h, L, bm, ε)-protocol, so any
safely (L, C, bm)-achievable rate is riskily (L, C, bm)-achievable.
The opposite inequality almost holds. Before we show that, we need a lemma. We
could easily get the lemma below from results in Chapter 6, but to avoid references
to later chapters, we state and prove the result in this chapter. The proof of the
lemma is constructive.
Lemma 3.16. For any risky (n, h, L, bm, ε)-protocol π, there is a risky (n, h, L, bm, ε)-
protocol π′ where each message is either 0 or 1, and given previous transcript and
given that the person sending the message is not leaking, there is at least probability
1/3 of the message being 0 and at least 1/3 of it being 1.
Proof. To restrict to {0, 1} we simply send one bit at a time, so now we only have





]. If the next message is 0 with probability p < 1/3, given that the sender
is not leaking we modify the protocol (the case where p > 2/3 is similar). First,
the player plri sending the message decides if she would have sent 0 or 1 in the old
protocol π. Call this message a. If a = 0 she chooses a number r in the interval
(0, p) uniformly at random, if a = 1 she chooses a number r in (p, 1) uniformly at
random. She then sends the bits of r one bit at a time until
• She says 1, or
• Given transcript until now, there is probability at least 1
3
that a = 0
In the first case we know that a = 1, and we can go to the next round of π as if she
had just sent the message 1 in π. Each time plri says 0, it doubles the probability
that a = 0 given the transcript, so if we are in the second case (and was not before
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Parameters:
n : number of players
h : number of bits being leaked
L : distribution of leakers
bm : threshold of reasonable doubt
ε : acceptable probability of error
π : a risky (n, h, L, bm, ε)-protocol
Input distribution: X and L are independently distributed, X uniformly dis-
tributed on {0, 1}h, distribution of L = (L1, . . . , Ln) is a parameter. Each plri
learns Li and if Li = 1 she also learns X.
Protocol:
1. T := λ
2. While T is not a complete transcript of π
3. Let i be the player to send the next bit in π when the transcript is T
4. If there is only one possible bit a that player i can send, set T = T ◦ a, else
5. Let p ∈ (0, 1) be the probability that the next bit would be 1 given Li = 0
6. Player i choose the next bit a to send according to π
7. If a = 0 player i chooses r ← (0, p) otherwise she chooses r ← (p, 1)
8. While no message has been added to T
9. If p ∈ [1/3, 2/3] then player i sends a, T := T ◦ a, otherwise
10. Player i sends first bit r1 of r
11. If r1 < p < 1/2 or r1 > p > 1/2 then T := T ◦ r1 otherwise
12. p := frac(2p), r := frac(2r) where frac(x) = x− bxc
Figure 3.6: Protocol from the proof of Lemma 3.16.
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the last message), Pr(a = 0|T ) < 2
3
. In this case she will simply reveal a in the next
message. For a more formal description of the protocol, see Figure 3.6.
Instead of choosing a real number uniformly from (0, p) or (p, 1), which would
require access to randomness with infinite entropy, plri can just in each step com-
pute the probabilities of sending 0 or 1 given that she had chosen such a number.
Thus, if for every probability p′ every player has access to a coin that ends head up
with probability p′, they only need a finite number of coin flips to follow the above
protocol.
The following lemma “almost” says that the safe (L, C, bm)-capacity is the same
as the risky (L, C, bm)-capacity. The proof is constructive, so if you can find good
risky protocols, you can also find good safe protocols.
Lemma 3.17. Let bm
′ > bm. The safe (L, C, bm
′)-capacity is at least the same as
the risky (L, C, bm)-capacity.
Proof. To show this, it is enough to show that if R is a riskily (L, C, bm)-achievable
rate, then R is safely (L, C, bm
′)-achievable. Let R be a riskily (L, C, bm)-achievable
rate, and let ε′ > 0 and h′0 be given. We want to show that there exists a safe
(n′, h′, L, bm
′, ε′)-protocol with h′ ≥ h′0, L ∈ L and h′ ≥ C(L)R.
As R is riskily (L, C, bm)-achievable, there exists a risky (n, h, L, bm, ε)-protocol
for any ε > 0 and some L ∈ L, h ≥ h′0, h ≥ C(L)R and n. Let π be such a protocol,
where ε is a small number to be specified later.
We want to modify π to make it a safe protocol π′. First, by Lemma 3.16 we
can assume that all messages send in π are in {0, 1} and given that the sender is
not leaking, it has probability at least 1/3 of being 0 and at least probability 1/3 of
being 1.
To ensure that for no transcript t and player plri we have Pr(Li = 1|X = x, T =
t) > bm
′, we modify the protocol, such that everyone starts to pretend ignorance if
the next message could result in Pr(Li = 1|X = x, T k+1 = tk+1) > bm′. Formally,
we define a protocol π′ that starts of as π but if at some point the transcript is tk
and for some i and b ∈ {0, 1} we have Pr(Li = 1|T k+1 = tk ◦ b,X = x) > bm′ all the
players pretends ignorance, that is for the rest of the protocol they send messages
as if they did not have the information and were following π. Notice that only the
players who knows the information x can decide if they should pretend ignorance,
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but this is not a problem as the players who do not have the information, are already
sending messages as if they did not have the information. The protocol is also given
in Figure 3.7.
Parameters:
n : number of players
h : number of bits being leaked
L : distribution of leakers
b′m > bm : thresholds of reasonable doubt for the safe respecitively the risky protocol
ε : acceptable probability of error
π : a risky (n, h, L, bm, ε)-protocol where the players send one bit at a time and the
probability a non-leaker sending 1 is always in [1/3, 2/3]
Input distribution: X and L are independently distributed, X uniformly dis-
tributed on {0, 1}h, distribution of L = (L1, . . . , Ln) is a parameter. Each plri
learns Li and if Li = 1 she also learns X.
Protocol:
1. While the players have not reach the end of π and the players are not pretend-
ing ignorance:
2. Each leaker decides if for some i and some possible next messages tk+1 we
have Pr(Li = 1|X = x, T k+1 = tk+1) > bm′. If yes they start to pretend
ignorance
3. If the leaker are not pretending ignorance, the next player in π sends a
message as if following π.
4. If the leakers are pretending ignorance, everyone follows π but as if they where
non-leakers.
Figure 3.7: Protocol from the proof of Lemma 3.17.
First we want to show that π′ is bm
′-safe. As long as they do not pretend
ignorance we know that Pr(Li = 1|T k = tk, X = x) ≤ bm′ for the partial transcript
tk and all i. If at some point they start to pretend ignorance, we have Pr(Li = 1|T k =
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tk, X = x) ≤ bm′ before they start, and all messages will be chosen as if no one had
the information. Eve, who knows X, can compute Pr(Li = 1|T k+1 = tk◦b,X = x) >
bm
′ for each i and b, so she knows if everyone is pretending ignorance. Thus, Eve
does not learn anything about L from listening to the rest of the communication,
so we will still have Pr(Li = 1|T = t,X = x) ≤ bm′ when π′ terminates.
Fix x ∈ X . We want to compute the probability that they pretend ignorance
given X = x. Let Epar,>b′m denote
7 the event that for transcript T from the execution
of π, we can find some k and some i such that we have Pr(Li = 1|T k = tk, X = x) >
bm
′. That is, at some point in the execution of π, an observer would say that plri
was leaking with probability greater than bm
′. Let Etot,>bm be that event that for the
complete transcript there is some i such that Pr(Li = 1|T = t,X = x) > bm. For
each transcript t where Pr(Li = 1|T k = tk, X = x) > bm′ for some k, i, we consider
that smallest k such that Pr(Li = 1|T k = tk, X = x) > bm′ happens for some i. For
this fixed tk let T−[k] denote the random variable that is distributed as the rest of
the transcript given that the transcript starts with tk and X = x. Let Stk denote
the random variable
Stk = Pr(Li = 1|T = tk ◦ T−[k], X = x).
That is, Stk is a function of T
−[k]. We see that Stk takes values in [0, 1] and EStk =
Pr(Li = 1|T k = tk, X = x) > b′m so by Markov’s inequality on 1− Stk we get












1−bm > 0. So
bm
′−bm
1−bm Pr(Epar,>bm′|X = x) ≤ Pr(Etot,>bm|X = x) ≤ ε,
where the last inequality follows from the assumption about π.
Let Eig be the event that in the evaluation of π
′ the players pretends ignorance.
The players only pretends ignorance if they are one message away from making
Epar,>bm′ happen. We assumed that in π each possible message get sent with proba-
bility at least 1/3 if the sender is not leaking. As there is probability at least 1− bm′
that he is not leaking, each possible message gets sent with probability at least 1−bm
′
3





Pr(Eig|X = x) ≤ Pr(Epar,>bm′|X = x). Thus,
Pr(Eig|X = x) ≤
3
1− bm′
Pr(Epar,>bm′ |X = x) ≤ 3ε
(1− bm)
(bm
′ − bm)(1− bm′)
.
Let T ′ denote the random variable you get from running π′ and T the random
variable you get from running π, with a joint distribution of (X,L, T, T ′) such that
(X,L, T ) = (X,L, T ′) unless the players pretends ignorance. We need to show that
there is a decoding function G′ from the set of complete transcripts to possible values
of X such that for each x, Pr(G′(T ′) = x|X = x) ≥ 1 − ε′. From the assumptions
about π we know that there is a function G from the set of possible transcripts
to the support of X such that for each x, Pr(G(T ) = x|X = x) ≥ 1 − ε. We
know that in π′ and for fixed x, the players only pretends ignorance with probability
at most 3ε(1−bm)
(bm
′−bm)(1−bm′) , so by setting G
′ = G we get Pr(G′(T ′) = x|X = x) ≥
1 − ε − 3ε(1−bm)
(bm
′−bm)(1−bm′) . For sufficiently small ε (depending only on ε
′, bm and bm
′)
this is more than 1− ε′ and we are done.
If we add a continuity assumption, we get that the safe and the risky bm capacity
are the same.
Corollary 3.18. Let (L, C) be a L-structure. If the safe (L, C, bm)-capacity as a
function of bm is right-continuous at bm0, or if the risky (L, C, bm)-capacity as a
function of bm is left-continuous at bm0 then the safe (L, C, bm0)-capacity and the
risky (L, C, bm0)-capacity are the same.
Proof. Assume that the safe (L, C, bm)-capacity as a function of bm a right-continuous
at bm0 . Then Lemma 3.17 shows that the risky (L, C, bm)-capacity is at most the
safe (L, C, bm
′)-capacity for all bm
′ > bm. By continuity assumption, this gives us
that the risky (L, C, bm)-capacity is at most the safe (L, C, bm)-capacity. Proposition
3.15 shows the opposite inequality. The proof of the second part of the corollary is
similar.
Corollary 3.19. Let (L, C) be a L-structure. The safe (L, C, bm)-capacity and the
risky (L, C, bm)-capacity are the same for all but at most countably many values
bm ∈ (0, 1).
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Proof. By Proposition 3.14, the safe (L, C, bm)-capacity is a monotone function, so
it is continuous in all but countably many points. Now Corollary 3.18 implies that
it is the same as the risky (L, C, bm)-capacity in all but countably many points.
As promised, we can now show that the safe and the risky (Indepbl , bm)-capacities
are the same.
Corollary 3.20. The safe (Indepbl , bm)-capacity and the risky (Indepbl , bm)-capacity
are the same for all bm ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. We know from Corollary 3.10 that the safe (Indepbl , bm)-capacity is a con-
tinuous function of bm. Now Corollary 3.18 implies that it is the same as the risky
(Indepbl , bm)-capacity.
Corollary 3.21. Let c ∈ (0, 1). The safe (Fixed, bm)-capacity and the risky (Fixed, bm)-
capacity are both − log(1−bm)
bm
− log(e).
Proof. We know from Proposition 3.11 that the safe (Fixed, bm)-capacity is at most
− log(1−bm)
bm
− log(e), we know from Theorem 3.12 that the risky (Fixed, bm′)-capacity
is at least − log(1−bm)
bm
− log(e), and from Corollary 3.19 that they are the same except
on at most countably many values. Thus, they must both be − log(1−bm)
bm
− log(e) on
all but countably many values. We know from 3.14 that both are monotone, so they
must both be − log(1−bm)
bm
− log(e) without exceptions.
3.3 Adaptive cryptogenographic protocols
Until now we have assumed that each player is either leaker or not a leaker. In this
section we study some adaptive models where people start as non-leakers, but might
start to leak at some point. Once a person is a leaker, that person will always be a
leaker.
An adaptive cryptogenography protocol π is defined as follows: for each partial
transcript tk, each vector L·,k−1 = (L1,k−1, . . . , Ln,k−1) describing the set of leaker
when the k’th message was sent, and each secret x, π gives a probability distribution
over vectors L·,k ≥ L·,k−1 describing the set of leakers after the k’th message. We
assume that no one is leaking from the beginning, that is, L·,0 = (0, . . . , 0). Like a
collaborative cryptogenography protocol, π specifies for each partial transcript tk
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• Should the communication stop or continue, and if it should continue,
• Who is next to send a message, say plri, and
• A distribution p? and a set of distributions, {px}x∈X (the distributions p? and
{px}x∈X depend on π and tk). Now plri should choose a message using p?, if
Li,k = 0 and choose a message using px if Li,k = 1 and X = x.
Here it is natural to put some restriction on how many leakers there can be, and
on what can influence whether a person becomes a leaker. We suggest two ways
of putting a limitation on the total number of leakers, and three different rules for
what can affect the probability that a person becomes a leaker, giving a total of six
different combinations. In this section we will find the capacities for two of them.
The two ways of restricting the total number of leakers are called “bl-threshold”
and “bl-dormant”. The bl-threshold restriction requires that the expected number
of leakers at the end of the protocol is at most bln. This is a slightly unnatural
requirement, but is the easiest to analyse. A more natural requirement is the bl-
dormant restriction, which say that at the beginning each player is chosen to be a
“dormant” leaker with probability bl, and only dormant leakers can become leakers.
We can think of dormant leakers as people with the personality or the capacity
to become leakers. Clearly, the bl-dormant model is more restrictive than the bl-
threshold model, but on the other hand, the leakers can do more in the bl-dormant
model than in Indepbl in the static model: If you take bl = bm, the (Indepbl , bm)-
capacity is 0, but in the bl-dormant model you can leak information, for example by




The three models for how a player become a leaker are called “centrally organ-
ised”, “informed choice” and “uninformed choice”. In the centrally organised model
we assume that there is someone organising who become leakers. We assume this
person has all the relevant information, tk, L·,k−1 and x, and hence there is no re-
striction on the distribution of L·,k except L·,k ≥ L·,k−1, that is leakers cannot turn
into non-leakers. This model is probably unrealistic, but good for showing upper
bounds. In the informed choice we assume that even the non-leakers know x, and






Exact result in Theorem 3.27
Figure 3.8: Diagram showing the different models for adaptive leakage. There are
two different ways to restrict the total number of leakers, three different models for
how a player can becomes a leaker, and for each of the resulting 6 models we can
consider both the safe and the risky capacity. In each model the top dot represents
the risky capacity and the bottom dot represents the safe capacity. The lines show
trivial inequalities between the capacities, where the capacity represented by a higher
point on the line is an upper bound for the capacity represented by the lower point.
In Theorem 3.27 we see that all the capacities represented by points in the ellipse
are the same.
the decision on whether to become a leaker on her own. That is, the distribution
of Li,k depends on Li,k−1, x and t
k but given x and tk it is independent from all the
other Lj,k’s and Lj,k−1’s. Finally, there is the uninformed choice model where the
players only learn x when they decide to become leakers. Here Li,k only depends on
Li,k−1 and t
k.
These give 6 different models that we call adaptive models. We use Mbl to denote
an adaptive model with parameter bl. While “bl-dormant informed choice” and “bl-
dormant uninformed choice” are probably the most realistic models, “bl-threshold
centrally organised” and “bl-threshold informed choice” seem to be the easiest to
analyse.
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Pr(X = x, T k = tk) log(Pr(Li,k = 0|X = x, T k, tk)).
We define Li = Li,length(π) and similarly suspi = suspi,length(π).
Definition 3.10. A risky (n, h,Mbl , bm, ε)-protocol is an adaptive cryptogenography
protocol satisfying the requirements of model Mbl together with a function G from
the set of possible transcripts to X = {1, . . . , 2dhe} such that for any x ∈ X , there is
probability at least 1− ε that a random transcript t distributed as T |X=x satisfies
Reasonable doubt: ∀i : Pr(Li = 1|T = t,X = x) ≤ c, and
Reliable leakage: G(t) = x
A safe (n, h,Mbl , bm, ε)-protocol is a risky (n, h,Mbl , bm, ε)-protocol where Pr(Li =
1|T = t,X = x) ≤ bm for all i, t, x with Pr(T = t,X = x) > 0.
A rate R is safely/riskily bm-achievable for Mbl if for all ε > 0 and all n0, there
exists a safe/risky (n, nR,Mbl , bm, ε)-protocol for some n ≥ n0.
The safe/risky bm-capacity for Mbl is the supremum of all safely/riskily bm-
achievable rates for Mbl .




Proof. As “bl-threshold centrally organised” is the least restrictive model, we can
assume that Mbl is this model. Let π be an adaptive cryptogenography protocol for
Mbl . The function
−bl log(1−bm)
bm
− bl log(e) is increasing in bl, so we can assume that
the expected number of leakers at the end of π is exactly bln, as the protocol would
otherwise be an Mb′l-protocol for some b
′
l < bl.
As when we proved Theorem 3.4 we can assume that the next player to send a
message does not depend on the previous transcript tk−1, but only on the number
of messages sent. If plrj sends the k’th message Corollary 3.2 tells us that
I(X;Tk|T k−1) ≤ suspj,k−1(X,T k)− suspj,k−1(X,T k−1), (3.13)
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and Proposition 3.3 tells us that for i 6= j
suspi,k−1(X,T
k) ≥ suspi,k−1(X,T k−1). (3.14)
If we move right hand side of (3.14) to the other side, sum over all i 6= j and add









In this adaptive model we also need to consider how it affects the suspicion that
players can turn into leakers. By a small abuse of notation we let ci,k′,x,tk denote
Pr(Li,k′ = 1|X = x, T k = tk), and ci,k denote Pr(Li,k = 1). As ddx log(x) ≥ log(e) for






Pr(X = x, T k = tk)
(





Pr(X = x, T k = tk) log(e)
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= (ci,k − ci,k−1) log(e). (3.16)
If we move right hand side of (3.16) to the other side, sum over all i and add the




















(suspi(X,T )− log(e) Pr(Li = 1)) .
We have Pr(Li = 1|X = x, T = t) ≤ bm so by the same argument as in Theorem
3.5 we have
suspi(X = x, T = t) ≤
− log(1− bm)
bm
Pr(Li = 1|X = x, T = t).









Pr(X = x, T = t)
− log(1− bm)
bm
















Here the last inequality follows from the assumption that E
∑
i Li = nbl By applying
Fano’s inequality as in the proof of Proposition 3.8, it follows that the safe bm-




In the next two propositions we show that this upper bound also holds for risky
protocols. It is proved in a constructive way, so if you can find good risky protocols
you can also find good safe protocols.
Proposition 3.23. Let bm
′ > bm. The safe bm
′-capacity for “bl-threshold centrally
organised” is at least the same as the risky bm-capacity for “bl-threshold centrally
organised”.
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Proof. Let Mbl be the model “bl-threshold centrally organised”. We use that same
strategy as in the proof of Lemma 3.17. Assume that R is riskily bm-achievable
for Mbl . To show the statement, it is enough to show that R is then safely b
′
m-
achievable for Mbl . Let ε
′ > 0 and n′0 be given. We need to show that there exists a
safe (n′, Rn′,Mbl , bm
′, ε′)-protocol, where n′ ≥ n′0. As R is riskily bm-achievable for
Mbl , there exists a risky (n, nR,Mbl , bm, ε) protocol for any ε > 0 and where n ≥ n′0.
Let π be such a protocol for a small ε to be specified later. We will modify π to get
a safe protocol π′. By Lemma 3.16 we can assume that all messages sent in π are
in {0, 1} and given that the sender is not leaking, it has probability at least 1/3 of
being 0 and at least probability 1/3 of being 1.
As in the proof of Lemma 3.17, modify the π by forcing the players to pretend
ignorance in some situations. To pretend ignorance means that all the players send
messages as if they were non-leakers. If we want all the players to pretend ignorance
from a certain point, it is important that all the leakers can decide whether they
should pretend ignorance, but the non-leaker does not have to know, as they are
already sending messages as if they were non-leaker. If Eve is able to decide if all
the players pretend ignorance, it implies that once the players pretend ignorance,
she does not get any further information.
We require the players to pretend ignorance from round k + 1 and onwards, if
the current transcript is tk and Pr(Li,k = 1|T k = tk, X = x) ≤ bm′ but Pr(Li,k =
1|T k+1 = tk ◦ tk+1, X = x) > bm′ for some player i and some tk+1 ∈ {0, 1}. The
leakers can all compute Pr(Li,k = 1|T k+1 = tk ◦ tk+1, X = x), so the leakers know if
they should start to pretend ignorance. Eve can also compute Pr(Li,k = 1|T k+1 =
tk ◦ tk+1, X = x), so once the players pretend ignorance she does not learn any
further information. We also modify π such that when the players starts to pretend
ignorance, no one turn into leakers. We can do this, because the model is centrally
organised, so the probability of becoming a leaker can depend on X. Furthermore,
we modify π such that if the partial transcript tk satisfy Pr(Li,k−1 = 1|T k = tk, X =
x) ≤ bm′ but Pr(Li,k = 1|T k = tk, X = x) > bm′ for some i, then no one becomes
leakers at round k or any later rounds, and everyone starts to pretend ignorance.
By induction on k, these modifications ensure that Pr(Li = 1|T = t,X = x) ≤ bm′.
The protocol is also defined in Figure 3.9.
Next we need to define the function G′ that takes transcripts of π′ to guesses
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Parameters:
n : number of players
h : number of bits being leaked
L : distribution of leakers
b′m > bm : thresholds of reasonable doubt for the safe respectively the risky protocol
ε : acceptable probability of error
π : a risky (n, h,MbL , bm, ε)-protocol where the players send one bit at a time and
the probability a non-leaker sending 1 is always in [1/3, 2/3]
Input distribution: X uniformly distributed on {0, 1}h, Li,0 = 0 for all i. If
Li,k = 1 then plri learns X after message k.
Protocol:
1. While the players have not reach the end of π and the leakers are not pretending
ignorance:
2. Each leaker decides if for some i and some possible next messages tk+1 we
have Pr(Li,k = 1|X = x, T k+1 = tk+1) > bm′. If yes they start to pretend
ignorance
3. If the leaker are not pretending ignorance, the next player in π sends a
message as if following π.
4. If the leakers are pretending ignorance, everyone follows π but as if they where
non-leakers and no more players become leakers.
Figure 3.9: Protocol from the proof of Proposition 3.23.
of the value X. This is simply defined to be the same as the function G for π. To
show that π′ is a (n′, Rn′,Mbl , bm
′, ε′)-protocol, we need to show that for each x the
probability Pr(G′(T ) 6= x|X = x) is at most ε′. We define Epar,>bm′ to be the event
that for transcript T from the execution of π, we can find some k and some i such that
we have Pr(Li,k−1 = 1|T k = tk, X = x) > bm′ or Pr(Li,k = 1|T k = tk, X = x) > bm′,
Etot,>bm to be that event that for the total transcript there is some i such that
Pr(Li = 1|T = t,X = x) > bm, and Eig to be the event that the players starts to
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pretend ignorance. The only situation where the players starts to pretend ignorance
are when there is a possible message tk+1 that would give Pr(Li,k−1 = 1|T k = tk, X =
x) > bm
′ (as in the proof of Lemma 3.17) or if we would otherwise have increase
some player i’s probability of being a leaker Pr(Li,k−1 = 1|T k = tk, X = x) to a
probability greater than bm
′. In the first case there is still probability at least 1−bm
′
3
that Epar,>bm′ would have happened if the players did not pretend ignorance, and in
the second case there is probability 1 that Epar,>bm′ would have happened. So we
still have
Pr(Eig|X = x) ≤
3
1− bm′
Pr(Epar,>bm′ |X = x).
All other computations and arguments are exactly as in the proof of Lemma 3.17.
This gives us
Pr(Eig|X = x) ≤ 3ε
(1− bm)
(bm
′ − bm)(1− bm′)
.
Now we get
Pr(G′(T ) 6= x|X = x) ≤Pr(G(T ) 6= x|X = x) + Pr(G′(T ′) 6= G(T )|X = x)
≤ε+ Pr(Eig|X = x)
≤ε+ 3ε (1− bm)
(bm
′ − bm)(1− bm′)
.
For sufficiently small ε, depending on ε′, bm and bm
′, this is less than ε′.
Proposition 3.24. For any bl ≤ bm and any model Mbl the risky bm-capacity for




Proof. As “bl-threshold centrally organised” is the most general model, we can as-
sume that Mbl is this model. By continuity of bm 7→ −bl log(1−bm)bm − bl log(e) the result
follows from Theorem 3.22 and Proposition 3.23.
Proposition 3.25. For any bl ≥ bm and any adaptive model Mbl the risky bm-
capacity is at most −bm log(1−bm)
bm
− bm log(e) = log(1− bm)− bm log(e).
Proof. Let π be a risky (n, h,Mbl , bm, ε)-protocol. Then we must have Pr(Li = 1) ≤
bm, so it is also a risky (n, h, “bl − threshold centrally organised”, bm, ε)-protocol.
The Proposition now follows from Proposition 3.24.
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We now show that the upper bounds are tight in two of the models. The proof
relies on Theorem 3.9, so it is not constructive.
Proposition 3.26. Let bl < bm. If Mbl is “bl-threshold centrally organised” or “bl-





Proof. As “bl-threshold informed choice” is the most restrictive of the two models,
we can assume that Mbl is this model.
Let bl and bm be fixed, let n and ε > 0 be given and choose some large integer
m. We will define a protocol π for the model Mbl that works in m stages. At the
beginning everyone are available and after each stage some players be unavailable,
meaning that they will not send any more messages. Before each stage starts,
everyone, even an observer who does not know X will be able to compute who should












∣∣∣∣∣∣ b′l(1−bm)(bm(1−b′l)))−m−2)n′⌋ and let X be uniformly
distributed over {1, . . . , 2h}m.
If there is less than n′ players available at the beginning of stage j, the protocol
halts. Otherwise, each of the first n′ players who are available, choose whether to
become leaker independently with probability bl
′. Assuming that n and hence n′ is
sufficiently big (given bl, bm, ε and m), we know from the proof of Theorem 3.9 that
there exists a safe (n′, h, Indepbl′(n
′), bm, ε/(2m))-protocol π. We let the n
′ players
follow this protocol to leak Xj. According to Definition 3.4 there is a function
G of the communication, that with high probability guesses the value the leakers
tried to leak. Let X̂j be G of the communication of the j’th stage. If xj 6= X̂j
we let all the leakers pretend ignorance for the rest of the entire protocol, and the
non-leakers stay non-leakers. At the end of the j’th stage some players will have
Pr(Li,(j) = 1|T (j) = t(j), Xj = X̂j) > 0, where (j) denotes the round where stage j
finishes. We let these players be unavailable for all the following stages, and all other
available players stay available. In particular we see that all players who are leaking
in a given stage, will be unavailable in all the following stages, unless Xj 6= X̂j, in
which case they will pretend ignorance.
Eve can compute X̂j, so she can determine if the players are pretending ignorance.
Hence, once they pretend ignorance, Eve will not get any further information, so we
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Parameters:
n : number of players
bl : probability of each player being leaker
bm : threshold of reasonable doubt
ε : acceptable probability of error
m : number of stages
π : a safe (n′, h, Indepbl′(n
′), bm, ε/(2m))-protocol π, where n












Input distribution: X uniformly distributed on {0, 1}hm, Li,0 = 0 for all i. If
Li,k = 1 then plri learns X after message k.
Protocol:
1. Parse X as (X1, . . . , Xm) with ∀j : Xj ∈ {0, 1}h
2. Set all n players to available
3. For j from 1 to m
4. If less than n′ players are available, terminate the protocol
5. If the leakers are not pretending ignorance, each of the first n′ available
players become a leaker with probability b′l independently of each other
6. The first n′ available players follow π to leak Xj. Let X̂j denote the output
7. If X̂j 6= Xj all leakers start to pretend ignorance
8. Every player i with Pr(Li,(j) = 1|T (j) = t(j), Xj = X̂j) > 0 becomes unavail-
able
Figure 3.10: Protocol from the proof of Proposition 3.26.
only need to prove that until they pretend ignorance, they have reasonable doubt.
Let j be the last stage in which player i send a message where he did not pretend
ignorance. As he did not pretend ignorance, we must have Xj−1 = X̂j−1, and he
must have been available in stage j, otherwise he would not have sent a message in
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that stage. That means that Pr(Li,(j−1) = 1|T (j−1) = t(j−1), Xj−1 = xj−1) = 0 so Eve
would know that he did not leak in earlier rounds. As he had probability bl
′ of be-
coming a leaker at stage j and the players used a safe (n′, h, Indepbl′(n
′), bm, ε/(2m))-
protocol in round j, we must have Pr(Li,(j) = 1|T (j) = t(j), X = x) ≤ bm, and no
further message will change this probability. Thus, the protocol ensures reasonable
doubt.
Next we want to compute the rate for the protocol we have defined. In the limit,










































































































Finally, we want to compute the probability of error. We divide the errors into
two types. A type one error is an error where X̂j 6= Xj for some j. A type two error
is the case where the protocol halts because there are less than n′ available players
left.
By construction, the probability of getting a type one error in stage j is at most
ε
2m
. From the proof of Theorem 3.9, we see that if the players never pretend igno-
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rance the number of players who would become unavailable in stage j is binomially
distributed with parameters n′ and bl
′ + (1 − bl′)ad where a and d are parameters







′ + (1− bl′)
a
d















Thus, the total number of players who would become unavailable if there were
enough players and they never pretended ignorance would be binomially distributed
with parameters mn′ and p ≤ bl′
bm
+ δ = 2bl
(bm−bl)m






















By choosing δ to be sufficiently small depending on m, and n sufficiently big Cheby-
shev’s inequality shows that with probability greater than 1 − ε
2
the total number
of player who become unavailable is at most bm+bl
2bm
n ≤ n−b bm−bl
2bm
nc and hence there
will be n′ available players left for the last stage. Thus, the probability of a type
two error would be less than ε
2
so the total probability of error is less than ε.
Theorem 3.27. If Mbl is “bl-threshold centrally organised” or “bl-threshold in-





Proof. For bl < bm is follows from Proposition 3.24, Proposition 3.26 and the fact
that the risky capacity must be at least the same as the safe. For bl ≥ bm is follows
from the case bl < bm, Proposition 3.25 and the fact that the bm-capacity must be
non-decreasing in bm.
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bl = 0.5 bm = 0.95
Figure 3.11: This figure illustrates the advantage of the adaptive models “bl-
threshold centrally organised” and “bl-threshold informed choice” compared to the
non-adaptive model. Most of the figure is as Figure 3.2. The new line is the tangent
to p 7→ − log(1 − p) at p = 0. For bl ≤ bm the safe/risky bm-capacity for Mbl is
given as the length of the dotted line. In this case, the advantage in using these two
adaptive models over the static one, is given by the difference between the lower
line and the curve. When bl > bm in the static model, there is not even reasonable
doubt from the beginning, and the capacity is −∞. In these two adaptive models,
the capacity is the same as for bl = bm.
Notice that while our upper bounds for the six models are the same and are the
same for the safe and risky case, the bm-capacities might be different between the
models, and the safe bm-capacity might even be different from the risky bm-capacity
for some models. Similarly, even though our upper bound for all the models does
not depend on bl as long as bl ≥ bm, we conjecture that in the bl-dormant models




In the previous chapter we considered a model for cryptogenography where all the
communicating parties were collaborating in revealing some information: some play-
ers were sending messages that were correlated with a secret, and some players were
sending messages that were not, but everyone were following the same protocol. In
this chapter we will see what happens when some players, censors, try to obstruct
a protocol by sending misleading messages.
We will see that if the probability, bc, that each player is a censor is at least bm−bl,
then the censors can completely prevent the leakers from sending any information.
When bl + bc < bm, the censors can have two effects on the leakers ability to leak
information. First, if bc ≥ bl the censors can “spread false stories”, that is, they
pretend that they are leakers and that X is some value x′. Similarly, if there are
more censors than leakers, they can split into b bc
bl
c groups that each pretend that
they are the true leakers, and that X = xi. Hence, the best the leakers can hope
for is that after the communication an observer can write down a list of 1 + b bc
bl
c
elements that contains the true value x. To capture this, we need to redefine reliable
leakage, to allow the observer output a list of fixed length of guesses about x and
only require that x is on the list with probability 1 − ε. Corollary 4.17 shows that
the leakers can achieve this for list of length 1+b bc
bl
c but no shorter. Secondly, as we
will see in Corollary 4.23, the censors can lower the number of bits that the leaker







per player. The main theorem of this chapter is
Theorem 4.26, which shows that asymptotically as number of people tend to infinity,
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person, and still get down to a list of size 1 + b bc
bl
c.
We will also consider the case where both the fraction of leakers and the fraction
of censors are close to 0. In this case we will see that even if there are many more
censors than leakers, say bc = 10
−3 and bl = 10
−6, the censors have almost no effect
on the rate. All the positive results in this chapter are existential, so we do not
construct good leaker protocols. However, the negative results are constructive: we
give algorithms that given a leaker protocol construct good censor protocols.
In a censor/leaker game each player can have one of three different alignments.
She can be leaker (denoted by 1), censor (−1) or neutral (0). We let Li be the
random variable that gives the alignment of player i and let L = (L1, . . . , Ln). A
leaker protocol π is a communication protocol that for each possible value tk of
previous transcript specifies
1. Does the protocol terminate here, and if not:
2. who should send the next message, say player i, and
3. if Li = 0 what distribution with support Utk , should player i use to send the
next message, and
4. for each x ∈ X , if Li = 1, what distribution over Utk should player Li use to
send her next message.
Notice that requirements 3 and 4 together imply that the protocol is non-revealing,
that is, any message that can be sent by someone, when the partial transcript is
tk, can be sent by a neutral, when the transcript is tk. In this definition we are
assuming that the neutral people are willing to follow any leaker protocol π that
we might specify. This is of course not realistic, but if the neutral players send out
some randomness, for example by the exact time they post something online, we can
model this as an innocent communication protocol ι. In Chapter 6 we will see that
for any ι that contains sufficiently much randomness and any protocol π as defined
above, we can build a protocol ιπ that implements π but where the neutral people
simply follow ι (Theorem 6.3). Hence, to not be a neutral player in ιπ you would
have to change your behavior.
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We assume that the censors follow a secret censor protocol σ, which is chosen
after they learn the protocol π. The censor protocol specifies for each possible partial
transcript tk, secret value x and set of censors, which probability distribution over
Utk a censor should use to choose her next message, if she is next to send a message.
If the distribution never depends on who the other censors are, we say that the
protocol is autonomous. We assume that the censors only send messages when π
says that they are the next person to send a message, and we assume that they
can only send messages from Utk , that is, messages that could be sent according
to π. This assumption will make the formal setup simpler, and it does not change
the power of the censors: if a censor did send a message at a time when they are
not supposed to send a message, or if they sent a message that a neutral player
or a leaker would never send, everyone would know that this person was a censor.
Everyone could then ignore the messages sent by that person. If a player does not
send a message, when it is his turn, everyone would also know that he is a censor,
and we could simply pretend that he sent the lexicographically first message in Utk .
The only advantage a censor could have in not respecting when to send messages
or not choosing his messages from Utk is to communicate with other censors or an
observer. However, all the censors have the same information available when sending
messages, and Eve also has the same information, so this would not be useful for
the censors.1 We assume that π is known to everyone, but that only the censors
know σ, that is, G will not depend on σ.
We have a parameter b = (bl, bc, bm) that determines the distribution of the
alignments L, and how suspicious they are willing to look to Eve: We assume that
the players’ alignments are chosen independently at random, that each player is a
leaker with probability bl, a censor with probability bc and that no leaker wants to
look like they are a leaker with probability greater than bm.
2
Can the leakers still reveal some information? If bl = bc, the censors can simply
pretend to be leakers and pretend that the secret is some x′ rather than the true
1The censors could use communication to get some shared randomness, however this will not
give them any advantage: See the proof of Theorem 4.14 and the remarks after the proof.
2If the leakers follow a protocol that ensures that they never look like they are a leaker with
probability above bm, then no one will ever look like they are a leaker with probability above bm:
Suppose for contradiction that Alice looks like she is a leaker with probability above bm, after
running such a protocol. Then by assumption Alice cannot be a leaker, and hence her probability
of being a leaker is 0.
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value x. Thus, no matter what protocol π we use, it will always be possible for
the censors to create some doubt about what the secret is. However, if the set of
possible secrets X is huge, reducing the set of possible secret to just two values,
or even some constant number, L, of values, might be useful. Thus, we have two
different parameters in how effectively we can leak information: How small a set can
an observer confidently say that X belongs to, and the number 2dhe of elements in
the prior set of possible secrets X . We also allow for some probability of at most ε,
that x is not on the list of L elements.
Definition 4.1. Let h ∈ R+, bl, bm, bc ∈ [0, 1), ε ∈ (0, 1), n,L ∈ N with bl1−bc < bm be
given. Let b = (bl, bc, bm). We say that player i’s alignment is given by b and write
Li ∼ b if Li is a random variable that is 1 with probability bl, is−1 with probability bc
and is 0 otherwise. We say that the alignments are given by b and write L ∼ b if Li ∼
b for all i and all the Li are independent. Let L− = (min(L1, 0), . . . ,min(Ln, 0)),
that is, L− specifies the set of censors. A (n, h,L, ε, b)-protocol π is a protocol for n
players such that when L ∼ b, and when the secret is distributed uniformly on [2dhe]
independently from L then no matter what protocol σ the censors use, we have:
Reasonable doubt: For all players i, secrets x, transcript t and set of censors l−,
such that t occurs with positive probability for X = x and L− = l− when the
censors follow σ, we have Pr(Li = 1|X = x, L− = l−, T = t) ≤ bm.
Reliable leakage: There is a function G sending transcripts T to subsets of X of
size at most L, such that for any strategy for the censors and any x ∈ X we
have Pr(x ∈ G(T )|X = x) ≥ 1− ε.
For b = (bl, bc, bm) a b-leaker protocol is a leaker protocol, π, such that for any
censor protocol, σ, the requirement of reasonable doubt is satisfied.
The inequality bl
1−bc < bm together with bm < 1 implies that bl + bc < 1, so the
described distribution on Li is possible, and it also implies Pr(Li = 1|L− = l−) < bm,
so there is reasonable doubt about each player, before they start communicating.
In the following we will always assume that bl, bm, bc ∈ [0, 1) and that they satisfy
bl
1−bc < bm. Because we are assuming the Lis to be independent, there is no reason
to consider risky protocols.
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In the “reasonable doubt” requirement, the probability Pr(Li = 1|X = x, L− =
l−, T = t) refers to the joint distribution of (X,L, T ). This distribution depends on
b, π and σ. However, we will see that the probability Pr(Li = 1|X = x, L− = l−, T =
t) does not depend on σ. Notice that the probability is given L−, that is, we assume
that Eve knows who the censors are. If we did not have this assumption and allowed
Pr(Li = 1|X = x, L− = l−, T = t) > bm, the censors could just reveal themselves
after the execution of the protocol. Then Eve would know L− and there would no
longer be reasonable doubt about player i. The assumption that Eve knows L− also
implies that the reasonable doubt requirement is always satisfied for the censors.
Definition 4.2. For b = (bl, bc, bm) we define
r(b) =
bm(1− bl − bc)
bl(1− bm)
.








bl − bcr(b)−1 , 0
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The following theorem will be useful for proving upper bounds on the amount of
information the leakers can reveal. Intuitively, it says that the censors can choose a
strategy that “neutralizes” some of the leakers, so for an observer who knows π but
does not know that some of the players are censors, it will look as if there are fewer
leakers and that the leakers are only willing to look less suspicious than they really
are. When the alignments and requirement of reasonable doubt are given by b the
censors can make it look like they are given by b′ as defined above.
Theorem 4.1. Let b = (bl, bc, bm) and b
′ be as given by Definition 4.2. If π is a
b-leaker protocol it is also a b′-leaker protocol, and there is a censor protocol σ such
that the distribution of (X,T ) is the same when L ∼ b as when L ∼ b′.
The rest of this section will build up to the proof of this theorem.
Proposition 4.2. Let b = (bl, bc, bm). If b
′
l > 0, then r(b) = r(b
′).
Proof. Assume b′l > 0 and define r = r(b). Then we must have 0 < b
′







so 1 − bc
bl(r−1)













We want to show that r(b) = r(b′). That is














By assumption bm ≥ bl ≥ b′l > 0, so we can divide through by bmbl , giving us
1− bl − bc
1− bm
=
























r − 1 − bm + bmbl −
bcbm
r − 1




















If bc = 0 it is clearly true. Otherwise, we can divide through by bc and rearrange to
get
bl − bm + bcbm
bl(r − 1)
= −1 + bm.
We assume bm < 1 so we can divide through by −1−bmr−1 to get
bm − bl − bcbm
bl(1− bm)
= r − 1.
All the operations we used can be inverted, so this equation is equivalent to r(b) =
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r(b′). We see that indeed
r − 1 = bm(1− bl − bc)
bl(1− bm)
− 1 = bm − bl − bcbm
bl(1− bm)
.
Thus, r(b) = r(b′).
Just after Definition 4.1 we decided to always assume bl
1−bc < bm. The following
shows that this assumption is equivalent to r(b) > 1.
Proposition 4.3. For bl ∈ (0, 1), bc, bm ∈ [0, 1) we have bl1−bc < bm ⇔ r(b) > 1.
Proof. Notice that
r(b) =










1− bl − bc




For bl, bc, bm ∈ [0, 1) the assumption bl1−bc < bm is equivalent to bm−
bl
1−bc > 0 and to
bm(1−bc)
bl
> 1, so bl
1−bc < bm implies that each of the two factors in the last line, and
hence r(b), is greater than 1. Conversely, if r(b) > 1 and bl ∈ (0, 1), bc, bm ∈ [0, 1)
then at least one of the two factors must be greater than 1 and hence bl
1−bc < bm.
The following concept turns out to be useful when analyzing whether a protocol
satisfies the requirement of reasonable doubt. Specifically, we will see that a leaker
protocol π is a b-protocol if and only if ri,t ≤ r(b) for all i, t.
Definition 4.3. For a leaker protocol π, censor protocol σ, a player i and a tran-
script t the likelihood ratio ri,t is given by
ri,t =
Pr(T = t|X = x, Li = 1)
Pr(T = t|X = x, Li = 0)
.
The likelihood ratio for player i is ri = maxt ri,t, the likelihood ratio for protocols π
and σ is maxi,t ri,t, and the likelihood ratio for π is the maximum of likelihood ratios
for π and σ over all leaker protocols σ.
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The likelihood ratio corresponds to what Evfimievski, Gehrke and Srikant call
amplification [25]. It also plays the same role as eε in differential privacy. However,
unlike for differential privacy, the guarantee we give in this thesis is one-sided: we
assume that players do not want to be revealed as leakers but also that they do not
mind being revealed as non-leakers.
We will now see that only player is message can affect ri,t: it does not matter
who the censors are or what protocol they follow.
Proposition 4.4. Let π be a leaker protocol, σ a censor protocol, t a transcript and
let K(i, t) be the set of rounds where player i sent a message in t. Let l− be an





Pr(Tk = tk|X = x, Li = 1, T k−1 = tk−1)




Pr(Tk = tk|X = x, Li = 1, L− = l−, T k−1 = tk−1)
Pr(Tk = tk|X = x, Li = 0, L− = l−, T k−1 = tk−1)
=
Pr(T = t|X = x, Li = 1, L− = l−)
Pr(T = t|X = x, Li = 0, L− = l−)
.
In particular the likelihood ratio ri,t of π and σ does not depend on σ.
In the proof of this and later proposition, we will sometime shorten the notation
for probabilities, by omitting the random variables and just write the value. For
example we write Pr(li|x, l−, tk) instead of
Pr(Li = li|X = x, L− = l−, T k = tk).
We will only do this when the random variable is the capital version of the letter
used to represent the values it takes, so the notation is well-defined.
In order to prove Proposition 4.4 we need the following proposition, which will
also be useful later. Recall that a censor protocol is said to be autonomous if a
censor’s message never depends on who the other censors are.
Proposition 4.5. Let the alignments L1, . . . , Ln and the secret X be independent
random variables. For fixed π, σ and integer k, the alignments L1, . . . , Ln are inde-
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pendent given X,L− and T
k. If σ is an autonomous censor protocol, then L1, . . . , Ln
are independent given X and T k.
Proof. First we show that L1, . . . , Ln are independent given X,L− and T
k. Let π
and σ be fixed. We prove the statement by induction on k. For k = 0 it is true by
assumption.
For the induction step, assume that the statement holds for k. That is, for all
n-tuples l of alignments, and all x and t such that Pr(X = x, L− = l−, T
k = tk) > 0
we have
Pr(L = l|X = x, L− = l−, T k = tk) =
∏
i
Pr(Li = li|X = x, L− = l−, T k = tk).
By multiplying by Pr(X = x, L− = l−, T
k = tk) (or dividing to go in the other
direction) and using that L− is a function of L, we see that this is equivalent to
saying that for all x, l and t we have




Pr(li|x, l−, tk). (4.1)
We want to show that if this is true, then the same statement holds for k + 1.
Assume that after transcript tk, the next person to send a message is player j.
We have
Pr(X = x, L = l, T k+1 = tk+1)
= Pr(Tk+1 = tk+1|X = x, L = l, T k = tk) Pr(X = x, L = l, T k = tk)
= Pr(Tk+1 = tk+1|x, lj, l−, tk) Pr(X = x, L = l, T k = tk). (4.2)
Here the second equality follows from the fact that a message only depends on the
secret X, the alignment Lj of the sender, the previous transcript T
k and (if j is a
censor) on L−.
If li = −1 then this information follows from l−, so Pr(Tk+1 = tk+1|X = x, Li =
li, L− = l−, T
k = tk) = Pr(Tk+1 = tk+1|X = x, L− = l−, T k = tk). If li 6= −1, and
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player j 6= i sends the k + 1’th message we also have








Pr(Tk+1 = tk+1|x, Lj = a, l−, tk) Pr(Lj = a|x, l−, tk)
= Pr(Tk+1 = tk+1|X = x, L− = l−, T k = tk). (4.3)
In the first equality we are using the assumption that a message only depends on
the secret X, alignment of the sender, previous transcript, and possibly L− (if the
sender is censor). In the second equality we use the induction hypothesis which says
that the Li’s are independent given X,L− and T
k. Now for i 6= j we get
Pr(Li = li|X = x, L− = l−, T k+1 = tk+1)
=
Pr(X = x, Li = li, L− = l−, T
k+1 = tk+1)
Pr(X = x, L− = l−, T k+1 = tk+1)
=
Pr(Tk+1 = tk+1|x, li, l−, tk) Pr(X = x, Li = li, L− = l−, T k = tk)
Pr(Tk+1 = tk+1|x, l−, tk) Pr(X = x, L− = l−, T k = tk)
=
Pr(X = x, Li = li, L− = l−, T
k = tk)
Pr(X = x, L− = l−, T k = tk)
= Pr(Li = li|X = x, L− = l−, T k = tk), (4.4)
Here we use (4.3) in the third equality.















= Pr(tk+1|x, lj, l−, tk) Pr(x, l−, tk) ·
∏
i
Pr(li|x, l−, tk). (4.5)
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In the second equality we use (4.4) to get from Pr(li|x, l−, tk+1) to Pr(li|x, l−, tk),
and in the last equality we use Pr(x, lj, l−, t
k) = Pr(x, l−, t
k) Pr(lj|x, l−, tk).
Now equations (4.2) and (4.5) show that if we multiply both sides of (4.1) by
Pr(tk+1|x, lj, l−, tk) we get (4.1) with k+ 1 instead of k. Hence, the result follows by
induction.
To prove that if σ is autonomous then L1, . . . Ln are independent given X and
T k simply remove all occurrences of L− = l− in the above proof and note that then
(4.3) also holds in the case li = −1.
We are now ready to prove Proposition 4.4.
Proposition 4.4 (repeated). Let π be a leaker protocol, σ a censor protocol, t a
transcript and let K(i, t) be the set of rounds where player i sent a message in t.
Let l− be an n-tuple taking values in {0,−1}, with (l−)i = 0. The likelihood ratio




Pr(Tk = tk|X = x, Li = 1, T k−1 = tk−1)




Pr(Tk = tk|X = x, Li = 1, L− = l−, T k−1 = tk−1)
Pr(Tk = tk|X = x, Li = 0, L− = l−, T k−1 = tk−1)
=
Pr(T = t|X = x, Li = 1, L− = l−)
Pr(T = t|X = x, Li = 0, L− = l−)
.
In particular the likelihood ratio ri,t of π and σ does not depend on σ.
Proof. By repeated use of the definition of conditional probability we have
Pr(T = t|x, Li = ai, l−) =
∏
k
Pr(Tk = tk|x, Li = ai, l−, tk−1). (4.6)
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If player j 6= i sends the k’th message, we have








Pr(Tk = tk|x, Lj = a, l−, tk−1) Pr(Lj = a|x, Li = 0, l−, tk−1)
= Pr(Tk = tk|X = x, Li = 0, L− = l−, T k−1 = tk−1). (4.7)
In the first and the last inequality we are using the assumption that a message only
depends on the secret X, alignment of the sender, previous transcript and possibly
L− (if the sender is censor). In the second equality we use Proposition 4.5.
By combining (4.6) and (4.7) we get
Pr(T = t|X = x, Li = 1, L− = l−)




Pr(Tk = tk|X = x, Li = 1, L− = l−, T k−1 = tk−1)




Pr(Tk = tk|X = x, Li = 1, L− = l−, T k−1 = tk−1)




Pr(Tk = tk|X = x, Li = 1, T k−1 = tk−1)
Pr(Tk = tk|X = x, Li = 0, T k−1 = tk−1)
. (4.8)
First equality follows from (4.6) and the second from (4.7). In the last equation we
used the fact that when a message is sent by a non-censor, it only depends on X,
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alignment of the sender and on previous transcript. Now
ri,t =
Pr(T = t|X = x, Li = 1)




Pr(T = t|X = x, Li = 1, L− = l−) Pr(L− = l−|X = x, Li = 1)∑
l−




Pr(T = t|X = x, Li = 1, L− = l−) Pr(L− = l−|X = x, Li = 1)∑
l−




Pr(Tk = tk|X = x, Li = 1, T k−1 = tk−1)
Pr(Tk = tk|X = x, Li = 0, T k−1 = tk−1)
Here the sums are over all possible l−. The third equality follows from the fact that
the Li’s are independent given X. To see the fourth equality, notice that the third






















= c. Now the theorem
follows from equation (4.8).
Proposition 4.6. The likelihood ratio for π and σ does not depend on σ.
Proof. The likelihood ratio for π and σ is maxi,t ri,t, where i ranges over all the
players and t over all transcripts that are possible when leakers and neutrals follow
π and censors follow σ. By Proposition 4.4 ri,t does not depend on σ and by
assumption, all messages sent in σ can also be sent by non-leakers who follow π,
and it is always possible that all players are non-leakers. Thus, the set of transcripts
t that can occur when following π and σ is the same as the set of transcripts that
can occur when following π and some other censor protocol σ′. This shows that
maxi,t ri,t does not depend on σ.
We are now ready to prove the previously mentioned characterization of b-leaker
protocols.
Proposition 4.7. Let b = (bl, bc, bm) with bl > 0. A protocol π is a b-leaker protocol
if and only if its likelihood ratio r satisfies
r ≤ r(b).
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Proof. When li = −1 we have Pr(Li = 1|X = x, L− = l−, T = t) = 0 ≤ bm.
Otherwise,
Pr(Li = 1|X = x, L− = l−, T = t)
=
Pr(T = t|X = x, Li = 1, L− = l−) Pr(Li = 1|X = x, L− = l−)
Pr(T = t|X = x, L− = l−)
=
Pr(T = t|X = x, Li = 1, L− = l−) bl1−bc





ri,tbl + 1− bc − bl
.
Here the first equality is Bayes’ formula given X and L−. In the last equality
we multiply through by 1−bc
Pr(T=t|x,Li=0,l−) , and use Proposition 4.4. We see that the
resulting formula is increasing in ri,t and for ri,t =
bm(1−bl−bc)
bl(1−bm)
we get bm. Thus,
ri,t ≤ bm(1−bl−bc)bl(1−bm) is equivalent to Pr(Li = 1|X = x, L− = l−, T = t) ≤ bm.
Intuitively the following lemma says that the probability that player i is a censor
can be used to “neutralize” some of the probability that he could be a leaker: if
player i is a leaker, his distribution would differ from the neutral distribution, and
if he is a censor it would differ. But when the observer does not know what he is,
the resulting distribution would be as if there was only probability b′l (as defined in
Definition 4.2) that he was leaking, and that he was otherwise neutral. This will be
used to prove Theorem 4.1, which is similar, but about all players rather than just
a single player. Both proofs are constructive.
Lemma 4.8. Let b = (bl, bc, bm) and let π be a b-leaker protocol. Let i be a player
and let L have a distribution where all the Lj are independent and Li ∼ b. If σ is an
autonomous censor protocol then there is an autonomous censor protocol σ′, which
is identical to σ for all players except i, such that
Pr(T = t|x) = b′l Pr(T = t|x, Li = 1) + (1− b′l) Pr(T = t|x, Li = 0) (4.9)
for all transcripts t. Furthermore, σ′ does not depend on the distribution of L−i,





give the same distributions for player i.
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Proof. First we argue that the case bl(r(b)− 1) < bc follows from the case bl(r(b)−
1) = bc. To see this, notice that when bl(r(b)− 1) < bc we have b′m = b′l = 0. As r is
continuous in bc and r(bl, 0, bm) ≥ 1 (because bl ≤ bm), we can find a value βc with
0 ≤ βc < bc such that bl(r(bl, βc, bm) − 1) = βc. Now let β = (bl, βc, bm) and define
β′ by the same formula as b′. We see that β′l = β
′
m = 0. Let π, σ and i satisfy the
assumptions in the lemma. As π is a b-leaker protocol and βc < bc it must also be a
β-leaker protocol. Assuming the lemma is true in the case bl(r(b)− 1) = bc we will
use the lemma for β to get an autonomous censor protocol σ′ such that when Li ∼ β
and the players follow π and σ′ we get Pr(T k = tk|x) = Pr(T k = tk|x, Li = 0). Now
we define a protocol σ′′ that achieves the same when Li ∼ b: When player i is censor
he will with probability βc
bc
follow σ′ as if he is censor and otherwise he will follow π
as if he is neutral. As σ′ is autonomous, the distribution of (X,T ) when Li ∼ β and
the players follow π and σ′ is the same as the distribution of (X,T ) when Li ∼ b and
the players follow π and σ′′. It is clear that if σ′ does not depend on the distribution
of L−i and on what the other censors do in σ, then the same holds for σ
′′. This show
that the case bl(r(b)− 1) < bc follows from the case bl(r(b)− 1) = bc
Thus, in the following we will assume that bl(r(b) − 1) ≥ bc and hence b′l =
bl − bcr(b)−1 ≥ 0. We can now rewrite the left hand side of (4.9).
Pr(T = t|X = x)
=bl Pr(T = t|X = x, Li = 1)
+ (1− bl − bc) Pr(T = t|X = x, Li = 0)
+ bc Pr(T = t|X = x, Li = −1)
=b′l Pr(T = t|X = x, Li = 1)
+ (1− bl − bc) Pr(T = t|X = x, Li = 0)
+ bc
Pr(T = t|X = x, Li = 1) + (r(b)− 1) Pr(T = t|X = x, Li = −1)
r(b)− 1 . (4.10)
Thus, equation (4.9) is equivalent to the right hand side of (4.9) being equal to the
right hand side of (4.10). By subtracting the first two terms of right hand side of





r(b) Pr(T = t|X = x, Li = 0)
= Pr(T = t|x, Li = 1) + (r(b)− 1) Pr(T = t|x, Li = −1). (4.11)
Thus, (4.9) is equivalent to (4.11), so instead of showing that we can obtain (4.9)
we will show that we can obtain (4.11).
For each secret value x and each partial transcript tk, where player i is next to
send a message, we want to define a probability distribution that player i should use
to send his next message if he is a censor. We want to ensure that for each partial
transcript tk and each i we have
r(b) Pr(T k = tk|X = x, Li = 0)
= Pr(T k = tk|X = x, Li = 1) + (r(b)− 1) Pr(T k = tk|X = x, Li = −1). (4.12)
We will show this by induction on k for fixed t. The equation clearly holds for
k = 0. Furthermore, if it holds for k − 1 and the k’th message is sent by player
j 6= i we know from Proposition 4.5 that Li and Lj are independent given X and
T k−1 and hence equation (4.12) also holds for k. Finally, assume that the equality
(4.12) holds for k − 1 and that player i is next to send a message. By substituting
Pr(T k = tk|X = x, Li = −1) = Pr(Tk = tk|X = x, Li = −1, T k−1 = tk−1) Pr(T k−1 =
tk−1|X = x, Li = −1) into equation (4.12) and isolating Pr(Tk = tk|X = x, Li =
−1, T k−1 = tk−1), we see that equation (4.12) is equivalent to
Pr(Tk = tk|X = x, Li = −1, T k−1 = tk−1)
=
r(b) Pr(T k = tk|X = x, Li = 0)− Pr(T k = tk|X = x, Li = 1)
(r(b)− 1) Pr(T k−1 = tk−1|X = x, Li = −1)
. (4.13)
We know from Proposition 4.7 that r(b) is greater than or equal to the likelihood
ratio of π, so it follows that the right hand side is non-negative. If we keep tk−1
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Parameters:
b = (bl, bc, bm) : probability of being leaker respectively censor and threshold of
reasonable doubt
π : a b-leaker protocol
σ : a censor protocol
Input distribution: X,L1, . . . , Ln are independently distributed and for each j:
Pr(Lj = 1) = bl and Pr(Lj = −1) = bc. Each plrj learns Lj and if |Lj| = 1 she also
learns X and if Lj = −1 she also learns L− = (min(L1, 0), . . . ,min(Ln, 0)). She will
follow π if Lj 6= −1 and otherwise she will follow the censor protocol given here.
Protocol:
1. All censors plrj for j 6= i follow σ.
2. If the transcript is tk−1 and plri is a censor who, accordion to π, should send
a message, she chooses message tk according to the distribution
Pr(Tk = tk|X = x, Li = −1, T k−1 = tk−1)
=
r(b) Pr(T k = tk|X = x, Li = 0)− Pr(T k = tk|X = x, Li = 1)
(r(b)− 1) Pr(T k−1 = tk−1|X = x, Li = −1)
.
Figure 4.1: Censor protocol from proof of Lemma 4.8.
fixed and sum the right hand side over all tk we get
r(b) Pr(T k−1 = tk−1|X = x, Li = 0)− Pr(T k−1 = tk−1|X = x, Li = 1)
(r(b)− 1) Pr(T k−1 = tk−1|X = x, Li = −1)
=
(r(b)− 1) Pr(T k−1 = tk−1|X = x, Li = −1)
(r(b)− 1) Pr(T k−1 = tk−1|X = x, Li = −1)
= 1.
Here the first equality follows from equation (4.12) for k − 1. Thus, for fixed tk−1,
equation (4.13) defines a probability distribution over the possible tk, and if player
i follows this distribution when he is a censor, we get (4.12) and hence (4.9). The
protocol is also defined in Figure 4.1.
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Finally, we are ready to prove the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 4.1 (repeated). Let b = (bl, bc, bm) and b
′ be as given by Definition 4.2.
If π is a b-leaker protocol it is also a b′-leaker protocol, and there is a censor protocol
σ such that the distribution of (X,T ) is the same when L ∼ b as when L ∼ b′.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. If b′l = 0 then clearly any leaker protocol satisfy the reason-
able doubt requirement when L ∼ b′, and hence is a b′-leaker protocol. If b′l > 0 we
know from Proposition 4.2 that r(b) = r(b′) so by Proposition 4.7 we know that if
π is a b-leaker protocol, then π is also a b′-leaker protocol.
For the second part of the theorem, let σ0 be the autonomous censor protocol
where any censor always sends the lexicographically first possible message, and let
σi be the censor protocol we get when using Lemma 4.8 to change player i’s part of
σi−1. Because this construction only affects the probability distributions for player
i we see that in σn player i chooses his messages using the same distributions as in
σi. Furthermore, as the player i part of the protocol you get out of Lemma 4.8 does
not depend on the protocol σ you put in, we see that if we put σn into the Lemma,
the resulting protocol for player i must agree with the output we get when input is
σi−1. Hence, when we give Lemma 4.8 input σn and any i we get the protocol σn
out. Thus, when L ∼ b and the players follow π and σn we must have
Pr(T k = tk|x) = b′l Pr(T k = tk|x, Li = 1) + (1− b′l) Pr(T k = tk|x, Li = 0) (4.14)
for all i.
Let σ denote the resulting protocol σn. It is also define explicitly in Figure 4.2.
We show by induction on k that when the players follow π and σ then (X,T k) have
the same distribution when L ∼ b as when L ∼ b′. In the following we write Prb to
denote probabilities when L ∼ b and Prb′ to denote probabilities when L ∼ b′. That
is, we want to show Prb(X = x, T
k = tk) = Prb′(X = x, T
k = tk).
This is clearly true for k = 0. It is now enough to show that
Pr
b
(Tk = tk|x, tk−1) = Pr
b′
(Tk = tk|x, tk−1).
Let player i be the next player to send a message when the transcript is tk−1. Then
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Parameters:
b = (bl, bc, bm) : probability of being leaker respectively censor and threshold of
reasonable doubt
π : a b-leaker protocol
Input distribution: X,L1, . . . , Ln are independently distributed and for each i:
Pr(Li = 1) = bl and Pr(Li = −1) = bc. Each plri learns Li and if |Li| = 1 she also
learns X and if Li = −1 she also learns L− = (min(L1, 0), . . . ,min(Ln, 0)). She will
follow π if Li 6= −1 and otherwise she will follow the censor protocol given here.
Protocol:
1. If the transcript is tk−1 and plri is a censor who, according to π should send
a message, she chooses message tk according to the distribution
Pr(Tk = tk|X = x, Li = −1, T k−1 = tk−1)
=
r(b) Pr(T k = tk|X = x, Li = 0)− Pr(T k = tk|X = x, Li = 1)
(r(b)− 1) Pr(T k−1 = tk−1|X = x, Li = −1)
.




(Tk = tk|X = x, T k−1 = tk−1)
=
Prb(T
k = tk|X = x)
Prb(T k−1 = tk−1|X = x)
=
b′l Prb(t
k|x, Li = 1) + (1− b′l) Prb(tk|x, Li = 0)
b′l Prb(t
k−1|x, Li = 1) + (1− b′l) Prb(tk−1|x, Li = 0)
=
Pr(T k = tk|X = x, Li ∼ b′, L−i ∼ b)
Pr(T k−1 = tk−1|X = x, Li ∼ b′, L−i ∼ b)
= Pr(T k = tk|X = x, Li ∼ b′, L−i ∼ b, T k−1 = tk−1)
= Pr
b′
(T k = tk|X = x, T k−1 = tk−1).
Here the second equality comes from (4.14) and the last equality follows from the
fact that the distribution player i uses to send tk does not depend on the alignment
of the other players.
107
4.1 Generalized list decoding
In order to study the censor/leaker game, we first need to generalize a result about
list decoding. In list decoding we usually consider a channel where input set and
output set are the same, say [m], and input i often gives output i, and when the
output is something else, it is considered to be a channel error. We then want to
find a code c ⊂ [m]n and a decoding function G that sends received strings y to
subsets of c of size at most L, such that if x ∈ [m]n and y can be the output of
the channel on input x with less than (1− q)n errors of the channel then x ∈ G(y).
A generalization of list decoding is list recoverability, which we can think of in the






one for each subset of size k of [m]. When the channel does not make an error, it will
on input i return an output corresponding to a set that contains i. Furthermore,
we still allow the channel to have up to (1− q)n errors. For an introduction to list
decoding and list recoverability, see Guruswami [38].
One disadvantage of list recoverable codes, is that they only exist for L ≥ k.
To see this, let x1, . . . , xk be k different codewords, and consider the output where
the i’th set contains x1i , . . . , x
k
i . For this output, each of the k inputs x
1, . . . , xk are
possible inputs, so we must have L ≥ k. This is a problem for us, because will need
L  k.
We want to generalize list decoding in a similar way to list recovery, but instead





subsets of size k of [m], we put
some restriction on which subsets the channel can output, even when it has an error.





consisting of m subsets of [m]. Each
S ∈ S has size k and each i ∈ [m] is contained in k such sets S. On input i the
channel can either output an S with i ∈ S ∈ S, or it can have an error and output an
S with x 6∈ S ∈ S. We call such a channel a k-regular pre-Bayesian channel, where
“pre-Bayesian” refers to the fact that it does not have a probability distribution on
its output given the input, only a set of non-error outputs. Again, we allow the
channel to make errors in up to (1− q)n usages of the channel. Restricting outputs
to S helps us, because when x1, . . . , xk are k different randomly chosen codewords,
then there will typically not be any S ∈ S which contains x1i , . . . xki .
We do not need any further assumption about the channel and all the proofs
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in this section would work for any k-regular pre-Bayesian channel. However, in the
following we will work with the pre-Bayesian channel given by
S = {{i, i+ 1, . . . i+ k − 1} mod m : i ∈ [n]}.
The following defines a channel (including probabilities) that is related to this pre-
Bayesian channel.3
Definition 4.4. For m, k ∈ N, q ∈ (0, 1) with q > k
m
, we let Cm,k,q be the channel
with input set and output set [m], where on input i there is probability q that the
output is chosen uniformly from the set {i, i+1, . . . i+k−1} mod m, and otherwise
it is chosen uniformly from the other m− k possible values.
The assumption that q > k
m
implies that on input i each of the values in {i, i+
1, . . . , i + k − 1} mod m are more likely outputs than the other possible outputs.
Similarly, for any k-regular pre-Bayesian channel, we could define a channel where
with probability q is does not have an error, and chose uniformly among the k allowed
outputs, and with probability 1 − q it choses among the other m − k outputs. We
call the resulting channel a k-regular channel.
The following definition is from Cover and Thomas [18].
Definition 4.5. For a channel C the transmission matrix is the matrix where rows
correspond to inputs and columns to outputs and the entry (i, j) gives the probability
of getting output j on input i.
A channel is symmetric if all the rows of its transmission matrix are permutations
of each other, and all the columns are permutations of each other.
We see that the channel Cm,k,q is symmetric. More generally, all regular channels
are symmetric4 In the following, any theorem stated for Cm,k,q holds in the more
3Another k-regular pre-Bayesian channel, which might be more relevant for coding theory, is
the channel that sends bits in blocks each consisting of n′ bits and is said to have an error each
time more than r bits in a block change. Formally, this channel has input alphabet {0, 1}n′ and
S = {B(x, r) : x ∈ {0, 1}n′}
where B(x, r) denote the set of strings in {0, 1}n′ that differ from x in at most r positions. This








4Notice that the definition of symmetric is weaker than what you might expect. In particular,
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general setting of k-regular channels. The next proposition is taken from Cover and
Thomas [18, Theorem 8.2.1].
Proposition 4.9. For a symmetric channel, the capacity is achieved by a uniform
distribution on the input.
In the following D(·||·) denotes the Kullback-Leibler divergence.
Proposition 4.10. The capacity of Cm,k,q is D(q|| km).
Proof. As Cm,k,q is symmetric, its capacity attained for uniformly distributed input.
Let X denote the uniform input and Y the corresponding output. Then the capacity
is given by
I(X;Y ) =H(Y )−H(Y |X)

























We want to show the existence of a code c ⊂ [m]n for the channel Cm,k,q, such
that for each possible output y, the set of possible inputs x ∈ c for which y is a likely
output has size at most L. To make this precise, we use the following definition.
Definition 4.6. For m, k, n ∈ N, r ∈ N0 with m > k, n ≥ r and y ∈ [m]n we define
B̃m,k(y, r) = {x ∈ [m]n : |{i : yi ∈ {xi, xi + 1, . . . xi + k − 1} mod m}| ≥ n− r}.
That is, if we assume that in at least n − r of the usages of the channel, the
output was among the most likely outputs given the input, then B̃m,k(y, r) denotes
the set of possible inputs, when the output is y. In the case where k = 1, B̃m,k(y, r)
is a ball in the Hamming metric of [m]n, hence the notation B̃. Now the goal is to
show the existence a code c such that c ∩ B̃m,k(y, n(1 − q)) is small for all outputs
y. First we will get an estimate of the size of |B̃m,k(0n, n(1− q))|.
a symmetric channel can have inputs i1 and i2 such that no “isomorphism” acting on both inputs
and outputs sends i1 to i2.
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Notice that |B̃m,k(y, n(1− q))| does not depend on y as long as y ∈ [m]n.
Proof. Let B̃′m,k(y, r) be the set of strings where exactly r positions are from the
unlikely set:
B̃′m,k(y, r) = {x ∈ [m]n : |{i : yi ∈ {xi, xi + 1, . . . xi + k − 1} mod m}| = n− r}.
Clearly
B̃m,k(0






∣∣∣B̃m,k(0n, n(1− q))∣∣∣ = bn(1−q)c∑
r=0
∣∣∣B̃′m,k(0n, r)∣∣∣ . (4.15)
To specify an element x ∈ B̃′m,k(0n, r) you need to specify the r positions i where
xi is not the likely set, for each of these r you need to specify which of the n − k
possible values xi takes, and for each of the n − r other positions i, you need to








Using Stirling’s formula, log(n!) = n log(n)− n log(e) +O(log(n)) we get
log|B̃′m,k(0n, r)|
= log(n!)− log(r!)− log((n− r)!) + r log(m− k) + (n− r) log(k)
=n log(n)− r log(r)− (n− r) log(n− r)− log(e)(n− r − (n− r))



































































∣∣∣∣∣∣ km) = nD (q∣∣∣∣∣∣ km) + O(1).




= 1 and as B̃′m,k(0
n, bn(1 − q)c) ⊂
B̃m,k(0
n, n(1− q)) we have
lim inf
n→∞
























(n− r + 1)(m− k)
rk
.
For r with n−r ≥ qn we have n−r
n










that the above ratio is > 1. Thus, the biggest contribution to B̃m,k(0
n, n(1− q)) in
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equation (4.15) comes from B̃′m,k(0
n, bn(1− q)c). Hence,
lim sup
n→∞







)) ≤ lim sup
n→∞









Until now, we have thought of a code c as a subset of some [m]n. However, in
the proof of the following theorem we need to take a random code, and it will be
more useful to define a code to be a list c1, . . . , c2
dRne
of codewords. We will allow
elements in the list to be identical, so the codewords do not form a set but a multi-
set. However, this distinction between lists and sets is not important for us, and we
will sometimes think of codes as lists, sometimes as functions i 7→ ci and sometimes
as (multi-)sets.
Theorem 4.12. If D(q|| k
m
) − R > log(m)L+1 , then for sufficiently large n there exists
a code c ⊂ [m]n of size 2dRne such that for all possible outputs y ∈ [m]k we have
|c ∩ B̃m,k(y, n(1− q))| ≤ L.
Proof. We prove this using the probabilistic method, in particular the proof is not
constructive. Let C be the random variable where each instance c of C is a list
of 2dnRe elements from [m]n, and each of these elements is chosen uniformly and
independently. We use Ci to denote the i’th element in C. The probability that for




. There are mn choices of y and less that 2dnRe(L+1) choices of
i0, . . . il. By the union bound, the probability Pe that there exists y, i0, . . . , iL with






By taking logarithm and using Proposition 4.11 we get
log(Pe) ≤(L+ 1)
(
log(|B̃m,k(y, n(1− q))|) + dnRe
)
− nL log(m)
























By assumption, log(m)− (L+ 1)(D(q|| k
m
)−R) < 0, so this tends to −∞. Thus, Pe
tends to 0. That is, with high probability C does not have any B̃m,k(y, n(1−q)) with
more than L elements. In particular, we can choose a c such that no c∩B̃m,k(y, n(1−
q)) has more than L elements.
Here c might contain the same codeword more than once, but as no B̃m,k(y, n(1−
q)) contains more that L elements from c, it contains each element at most L times.
If we do not want to allow a code to contain the same element more than once, we
simply get a code for a slightly higher rate R′ > R to get a code c′ and then let c
be the set of all codewords that occur in c′ (now without multiplicity).
The above theorem says that even if the channel’s errors are chosen by an ad-
versary who will know our code, there is a code c that ensures that we can decode
to get a list of L elements containing x. But even if the code is designed to work
against an adversary who knows the code, it is useful to know what happens when
there is no such adversary. To get the most general result, we will assume that there
is an adversary who completely controls the channel, but does not know our code.
Here the adversary is not meant to model an actual intelligent adversary - such
an adversary is modelled by the censors - but instead to model the worst possible
thing that could happen if our model is wrong - if non-leakers do not follow π, if
the fraction of leakers is not bl or if there is some pattern in who becomes leakers -
but no one is actively trying to make the leakage fail. For this purpose, it is natural
to assume that the adversary does not know the code, even if we are not trying to
keep the code a secret.
We would like to ensure that if we input x ∈ [m]n to some channel controlled by
an adversary who does not know our code c and we get output y ∈ [m]n, then there
is only small probability that there exists x′ 6= x with x′ ∈ c∩B̃m,k(y, n(1−q)). That
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is, we do not require that the output list will contain the input x, but we want to
ensure that there is only small probability that it contains anything else. Of course
for any fixed code c the adversary could choose to always output some fixed y ∈ c,
so we need to use a randomly generated code. The only information the adversary
learns about c is one input value x = cj. We still want any code we use to satisfy
|c ∩ B̃m,k(y, n(1− q))| ≤ L as in Theorem 4.12.
Theorem 4.13. Let q, k,m,R be as in Theorem 4.12 and let ε ∈ (0, 1) be given.
Then for sufficiently large n there exists a random variable C which as values takes




if Y is a random variable independent from all Ci given Cj then
Pr(∃i 6= j : Ci ∈ B̃m,k(Y, n(1− q))) ≤ ε
where the probability is over C and Y .
Proof. First we choose a random variable C′ where each C′i is chosen randomly and
independently as in the proof of Theorem 4.12. Let E = 1 if ∀y : |C′∩ B̃m,k(y, n(1−
q))| ≤ L and E = 0 otherwise. The proof of Theorem 4.12 shows that for sufficiently
large n, we have Pr(E = 1) ≥ 1− ε.
As each C′i with i 6= j is chosen uniformly from [m]n and independent of Y we
get




for each i 6= j and hence
Pr(∃i 6= j : C′i ∈ B̃m,k(Y, n(1− q))) ≤




Using Proposition 4.11 we get
log( Pr(∃i 6= j : C′i ∈ B̃m,k(Y, n(1− q))))
≤ log(|B̃m,k(Y, n(1− q))|) + n(R− log(m))



















By assumption R < D(q
∣∣∣∣ k
m
), so this expression tends to −∞ and hence for suffi-
ciently large n the probability is at most ε(1 − ε). We now let C = C′|E=1. This
ensures
Pr(∃i 6= j : Ci ∈ B̃m,k(Y, n(1− q))) ≤
ε(1− ε)
1− ε ≤ ε.
4.2 Minimal list size
For specific values of b = (bl, bc, bm) we want to measure how much information a
censor/leaker protocol can reveal. However, just defining this is more complicated
than defining the capacity of a channel, because we have two parameters: the rate
R and the list size L. As we will see in Theorem 4.26, for fixed b the closure of the
set of combinations (L, R) with R > 0 that can be achieved is a product set, and
hence can be described by two numbers: the maximal rate and the minimal list size.
However, in order to prove Theorem 4.26 we first need a definition that does not
assume anything about the set of achievable (L, R). Recall from Definition 4.1 that
a (n, h,L, ε, b)-protocol is a b-protocol where the number of people is n, the secret
is chosen from [2dhe] and given transcript an observer is able to compute a list of
length L that for a random transcript contains the secret with probability at least
1− ε.
Definition 4.7. The rate of an (n, h,L, ε, b)-protocol π is h
n
, and L is its list size.
For L ∈ N and R > 0 we say that (L, R) is b-achievable if for all ε > 0 and all
n0 there exists n > n0 and an (n, nR,L, ε, b)-protocol.
The (L, b)-capacity is the supremum over all rates R such that (L, R) is b-
achievable.
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The b-capacity is the supremum over all rates R such that (LR, R) is b-achievable
for some LR.
The b-minimal list size is the smallest L such that for all h, ε > 0 there is an
(n, h,L, ε, b)-protocol for some n.
In this section we will focus on minimal list size and ignore the rate. First we
give a lower bound and later a matching upper bound on the minimal list size.












, h > log(L + 1) and ε > 0. We now define a censor protocol σ′ where
the censors have access to shared randomness, which is unknown to G and the
leakers. This shared randomness is not allowed according to our definition of a
censor protocol, but a protocol with shared randomness can be considered to be a
probability distribution over protocols without randomness. Now if the censors can
ensure Pr(X ∈ G(T )) ≤ 1− ε using a random protocol, there must exists a protocol
σ without shared randomness that ensures Pr(X ∈ G(T )) ≤ 1 − ε. Thus, we can
allow the censors to have shared randomness.
Each censor chooses a number from {0, 1, . . . ,L} independently at random. Any
number i > 0 is chosen with probability bl
bc
, and otherwise 0 is chosen. This way,
the probability that a person is censor and choose a particular i > 0, is the same
as the probability that he is leaker. Now the shared randomness is used to choose
x1, . . . , xL ∈ X , uniformly under the condition that they are all different and dif-
ferent from the true value x of X. Then any censor who chose i > 0 will follow
protocol π as if he was leaker and the true value of X is xi. The censors who chose 0
behaves as if they were neutral. Given that the L+1 values x, x1, . . . , xL form the set
X ′ = {x, x1, . . . , xL} the transcript T is independent of which of the L+ 1 elements
in X ′ that is the true value x. Furthermore, given that {x, x1, . . . , xL} = X ′, each of
the L+ 1 values in X ′ are equally likely to be the true value x. As G(T ) contains at
most L elements, and x, x1, . . . xL are L+1 different elements, Pr(X ∈ G(T )) ≤ LL+1 .






Notice that the above impossibility result holds much more generally. All we
need is that the censors can pretend to be leakers. In particular, as long as each
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leaker do not know who the other leakers are, each censor do not need to know who
the other censors are, they only need to know x1, . . . xL. Similarly, the censors will
not need any more computational power than the leakers.
In the above proof, the censor protocol σ without shared randomness, will have to
depend on G. In other words, if the recipient knows the censors’ strategy, including
x1, . . . , xl, the recipient might still be able to find x. The easiest way to avoid this,
is to modify the model to allow the censor to use shared randomness. This would
arguably make the model more natural.
Alternatively, we can use a different way of getting a protocol σ without shared
randomness from a protocol σ′ with shared randomness: in σ the censors pretend
to follow σ′. Each time a censor is about to send a message he computes the
distribution of the shared randomness given previous messages, samples from this
distribution and send his next message accordingly. This way, following σ gives
the same distribution as following σ′. The method works in our model, but not
as generally as the above proof. This method uses the assumptions that messages
are sent one by one and that the censors know who each other are. Furthermore,
in general the censors would not be able to follow this strategy if they have only
polynomial computational power.
Theorem 4.15. If bl + bc ≥ bm the b-minimal list size is ∞.



































Here the first inequality follows from r(b) ≤ bm
bl
and the second from bl + bc ≥ bm.
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By Theorem 4.1 for any b-leaker protocol π there is a censor protocol σ, such
that the distribution of (X,T ) is the same when L ∼ b and L ∼ (0, 0, b′m). But for
L ∼ (0, 0, b′m) everyone are sending messages independent of X, so X and T are
independent. Thus, it is possible for the censors to follow a strategy that makes




The following theorem shows an upper bound on the b-minimal list size. The





+ 1 you can
get down to a list size of L − 1. This part of the proof is constructive, and could
be combined with induction to get an extremely inefficient constructive proof of the
theorem. It is possible to construct more efficient protocols that achieve a minimal
list size, but in the proof we prioritized simplicity of the proof over efficiency of the
resulting protocol.






Proof. Let b be given. Fix a value h, and let L be the smallest value such that for
any ε > 0 there is an n′ and an (n′, h,L, ε, b)-protocol (there exists a number L that
satisfy this, namely 2dhe, so there must be a smallest integer satisfying it). Assume





+ 1. As L is an integer, this implies L > bc
bl
+ 1 and
hence (L − 1)bl > bc.
Let ε > 0 be given. We want to show that there exists an (n, h,L−1, ε, b)-protocol
for some value n. By assumption there exists an (n′, h,L, ε/2, b)-protocol π′. Now
π starts by letting the first n′ players simulate π′, so we get a set G′(T ′) of size L.
Then we let each of the n−n′ remaining players send a message from G′(T ′). Each of
the neutral players chose their message uniformly and independently. If x 6∈ G′(T ′)
the leakers also chose their message uniformly, otherwise, if L ≤ bm(1−bc−bl)
bl(1−bm)
, all the
leakers send the message x. If L > bm(1−bc−bl)
bl(1−bm)
, each leaker sends the message x with
probability bm(1−bc−bl)Lbl(1−bm) , and otherwise he chooses a message G
′(T ′) \ {x} uniformly
at random. For a more formal definition of this protocol see Figure 4.3.
Let Ej denote the events “player j is either leaker or neutral and player j sent
the message x”. If L ≤ bm(1−bc−bl)
bl(1−bm)
then given x ∈ G′(T ′) the event Ej happens with
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Parameters:
n : number of players
b = (bl, bc, bm) : probability of being leaker respectively censor and threshold of
reasonable doubt






+ 1 : list size known to be achievable for this value of h
ε : acceptable probability of error
n′ : number of players in previous protocol
π′ : an (n′, h,L, ε/2, b)-protocol
Input distribution: X,L1, . . . , Ln are independently distributed, X is uniformly
distributed on {0, 1}h and for each i: Pr(Li = 1) = bl and Pr(Li = −1) = bc.
Each plri learns Li and if |Li| = 1 she also learns X and if Li = −1 she also
learns L− = (min(L1, 0), . . . ,min(Ln, 0)). She will follow the protocol given here if
Li 6= −1 and otherwise she might follow any censor protocol σ.
Protocol:
1. Let plr1, . . . ,plrn′ follow π
′ to reveal X. Let G′(T ′) denote the output: an
list of length L that will typically contain x.
2. For each i from n′ + 1 to n
3. If plri is a non-leaker or x /∈ G′(T ′) choose Ti uniformly from G′(T ′),
otherwise





choose uniformly from G′(T ′) \ {x}
5. plri sends Ti
Figure 4.3: Protocol from proof of Theorem 4.16.
probability
bl +
1− bl − bc
L =





Here the inequality follows from (L − 1)bl > bc. If L > bm(1−bc−bl)bl(1−bm) then Ej happens
with probability
bl
bm(1− bc − bl)
Lbl(1− bm)
+






bm(1− bc − bl)
1− bm

















Here each of the two inequalities follows from bm > bl + bc. We see that the Ej’s
are independent. Hence, for sufficiently large value of n, the probability that more
than n−n
′
L of the n − n′ events Ej happens is at least 1 − ε/2. In particular, the
probability that more than n−n
′
L of the n− n′ messages is i is at least 1− ε/2. Now
we take G(T ) to be the set of all messages sent more than n−n
′
L times in the last
n−n′ messages. Clearly, this set contains at most L−1 elements. Furthermore, the
only ways we can have x 6∈ G(T ) are if x 6∈ G′(T ′) or if x ∈ G′(T ′) but x 6∈ G(T ).
For each x ∈ X each of these happens with probability at most ε
2
, so by the union
bound the error probability is at most ε. If L ≤ bm(1−bc−bl)
bl(1−bm)
the likelihood ratio for
each of the n−n′ players is 1L−1 = L ≤
bm(1−bc−bl)
bl(1−bm)









= r(b). As the n′ first players only sent
the messages from a b-leaker protocol, by Proposition 4.4 and Proposition 4.7 they
most have likelihood ratio at most r(b). Thus, all players in π have likelihood ratio
at most r(b), so Proposition 4.7 shows that π preserves reasonable doubt. Thus, π
is an (n, h,L, ε, b)-protocol.






Proof. Follows immediately from the above theorems.
4.3 Capacity
In the previous section we focused on optimizing one parameter, the list size, without
thinking about how many people were needed. In this section we do the opposite:
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we ask how many bits can we leak per person, when the list size is only required to
be bounded. In the next section we will show that asymptotically we can get the
optimal value of both parameters at the same time.
Theorem 4.18. Let b be given. If bm ≤ bc+bl no (L, R) with R > 0 is b-achievable.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 4.15.
In order to show an upper bound on the capacity for b, we will need a general-
ization of Fano’s inequality.
Lemma 4.19 (Generalisation of Fano’s inequality). Let X be a random variable
taking values in X and let Y be a random variable that takes subsets of X of size at
most L as values. The probability Pe = Pr(X 6∈ Y ) satisfies
Pe ≥
H(X|Y )− 1− log(L)
log(|X |) .
Proof. Let X, Y and Pe be as above. We have a joint distribution of (X, Y ), and
we use this to define a joint distribution of (X, Y, (Z1, Z2)): If X ∈ Y we set Z1 = 1
otherwise Z1 = 0. If X ∈ Y we let Z2 be a number such that X is the Z2’th smallest
element in Y (according to some fixed order on X ) otherwise we let Z2 be the number
such that X is the Z2th smallest element in X . We have H(Z2|Z1 = 1) ≤ log(L),
H(Z2|Z1 = 0) ≤ log(|X |) and hence
H(Z2|Z1) = Pr(Z1 = 1)H(Z2|Z1 = 1) + Pr(Z1 = 0)H(Z2|Z1 = 0)
≤ log(L) + Pe log(|X |).
Furthermore, H(Z1) ≤ 1 and X can be written as a function of Y and (Z1, Z2) so
we have
H(X|Y ) ≤ H(Z1, Z2) = H(Z1) +H(Z2|Z1) ≤ 1 + log(L) + Pe log(|X |).
Rewriting this inequality gives us the lemma.
We now show an upper bound on how much information the leakers can reveal.
Such a bound correspond to a good censor protocol. We use the protocol from
Theorem 4.1, so the proof is constructive.
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Figure 4.4: These two plots show the number of bits that the leakers can leak per
expected leaker when there are no censors, that is, the (bl, 0, bm)-capacity divided
by bl. The left plot is for bm = 0.3 and the right is for bm = 0.95
Proposition 4.20. Let b be given. If bm > bc + bl and π is a b-leaker protocol for n
players, there is a censor protocol σ, such that when L ∼ b and leakers and neutrals
are following π and censors are following σ, we have




∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ bl(1− bm)bm(1− bl − bc)
)
Proof. Let b with bm > bc + bl be given, and let b
′ be as in Defintion 4.2. Then by
Theorem 4.1 π is also a b′-protocol, and there is a censor protocol σ such that the
distribution of (X,T ) when following π and σ on L ∼ b is the same as following
π on distribution L ∼ b′ (here no censor protocol is needed as b′c = 0). A simple
computation shows that if bm = bl + bc then bl =
bc
r(b)−1 . As r is increasing in bm this




bl − bcr(b)−1 , 0
)
> 0, and similarly











∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ bl(1− bm)bm(1− bl − bc)
)
.
The inequality follows from Theorem 3.5. To get the equality we use the definition of
b′ to simplify the first input to D(·||·) and r(b) = r(b′) which follows from Proposition
4.2 to simplify the second input.
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Now we can prove an upper bound on the capacity. This proof is similar to that
of Proposition 3.8 and Proposition 3.11.











∣∣∣∣∣∣ bl(1−bm)bm(1−bc−bl)) is b-achievable. Then for arbitrarily large n and arbitrarily





∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ bl(1− bm)bm(1− bc − bl)
)
> 0.
By Proposition 4.20 there is a censor protocol that ensures




∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ bl(1− bm)bm(1− bl − bc)
)
.
By the definition of a (n, nR,L, ε, b)-protocol, even if the censors follow this protocol
we should have Pr(X ∈ G(T )) ≥ 1 − ε. Using the data processing inequality (1.2)
for mutual information we get
H(X|G(T )) = H(X)− I(X;G(T ))







∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ bl(1− bm)bm(1− bc − bl)
))
= nδ.
Now Lemma 4.19 gives us
ε ≥H(X|G(T ))− 1− log(L)
log(|X |)
≥nδ − 1− log(L)
nR
.
For fixed (L, R) and suffciently large n this is bounded away from 0. Hence, such
(L, R) is not b-achievable.
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Next we want to find matching lower bounds on the capacity, that is, show that
there exists good leaker protocols. The proofs will not be constructive.
Definition 4.8. For a code c ⊂ [m]n let πc be the protocol where each player sends
one message: player i sends her message in round i. If player i is neutral, she sends a
message from [m] chosen uniformly at random. If player i is a leaker and X = x, she
chooses a message from Ai = {ci(x), ci(x)+1, . . . , ci(x)+k−1} mod m uniformly at
random, where ci(x) denotes the i’th element in the codeword for x. The protocol
is also defined in Figure 4.5.
Parameters:
n : number of players
m > k : natural numbers
c : an error correcting code
Input distribution: X,L1, . . . , Ln are independently distributed, X is uniformly
distributed on {0, 1}h are for each i: Pr(Li = 1) = bl and Pr(Li = −1) = bc.
Each plri learns Li and if |Li| = 1 she also learns X, and if Li = −1 she also
learns L− = (min(L1, 0), . . . ,min(Ln, 0)). She will follow the protocol given here if
Li 6= −1 and otherwise she might follow any censor protocol σ.
Protocol:
1. For i from 1 to n:
2. If Li = 1 then Ti ← c(x)i + [k]− 1 mod m, if Li = 0, then Ti ← [m]
3. Player i sends Ti
Figure 4.5: Protocol πc defined in Definition 4.8





there is an L such that (L, R) is achievable.
Proof. Let b and R satisfy the assumptions in the statement of the theorem. As































− R > log(m)L+1 . From
Theorem 4.12 we know that for sufficiently large n there is a code c ⊂ [m]n with
d2nRe elements and such that for all y ∈ [m]n we have |c ∩ B̃m,k(y, n(1 − q))| ≤ L.
We now let the players use πc.
Let Ti be the message sent by player i, and Ei be the event “player i is either
leaker or neutral and player i sent a message from Ai”. We have
Pr(Ei) =bl · Pr(Ti ∈ Ai|Li = 1) + (1− bc − bl) · Pr(Ti ∈ Ai|Li = 0)
=bl + (1− bc − bl)
k
m
≥bl + (1− bc − bl)
bl(1− bm)




We now define G(T ) = c−1(c ∩ B̃m,k(T, n(1 − q))), that is, G(T ) gives the set of
messages whose codeword belongs to c ∩ B̃m,k(T, n(1− q)). By assumption about c
this set will have size at most L for all possible transcripts T .




the probability that at least nq of them happen is at least 1 − ε for sufficiently
large n. In particular, the probability that we have Ti ∈ Ai for at least nq values
of i is at least 1 − ε, no matter what the censors do. This means that Pr(C(x) ∈
B̃m,k(T, n(1− q))|X = x) ≥ 1− ε, so Pr(X ∈ G(T )|X = x) ≥ 1− ε.
Finally, we need to check that there is reasonable doubt. Each leaker chooses
her message uniformly from a set of size k and each neutral from superset of size m.




= r(b) so by Proposition 4.7 we have
reasonable doubt.








Proof. Follows immediately from the above theorems.
In Figure 4.6 we see a plot of the (bl, bc, bm)-capacities divided by bl for some
values of bc and bm (we divide by bl to get capacity measured in bit per expected
leaker instead of bits per player). For bm = 0.95 and small values of bl a large
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Figure 4.6: These two figures show the effect the censors have on the rate. The left
figure is for bm = 0.3 and the right for bm = 0.95. The black (top) lines are the
same as in Figure 4.4 and show the number of bits the leakers can leak per expected
leaker when there are no censors. The brown (second from above) lines shown the
same for bc = 0.05, the red (second from below) for bc = 0.15 and blue (bottom) for
bc = 0.5.
number of censors does not have much effect on the capacity. Even for bc = 0.5 the
censors lowers the rate with less than 32%. For bm = 0.3 and bc = 0.15 the censors
have a larger effect on the capacity. In Section 4.5 we will consider the case where
bl is small in more detail.
Theorem 4.14 tells us that in order to make cryptogenography resilient to cen-
sors, we will have to accept that an observer cannot with high probability identify
x, but only find a list with bounded length containing x. However, the following
theorem shows that if we apply our randomly generated censor-resilient leaker pro-
tocol designed for some distribution b with censors to a situation where there are
no censors, the list will most likely not contain any false secrets. This holds even
if the fraction of leakers is not close to bl. For example, if there are no censors and
no leakers the list will most likely be empty. The theorem also holds, even if the
neutral players and the leakers are not following π! Our only assumption about
the communication is that it does not depend on the codewords of any false inputs
x′ 6= x.





and ε > 0. For sufficiently large n there exists a random variable C that takes
codes c as values such that πc is always an (n, nR,L, ε, b)-protocol and furthermore
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if x ∈ {0, 1}dnRe and π′ is any communication protocol where each of the n players
only get the codeword C(x) for x as input then
Pr(∃x′ 6= x : x′ ∈ GC(T ′)) < ε,
where T ′ is the transcript of π′ on input C(x), and GC is the decoding function
corresponding to πC. The probability is over C and randomness in π
′.
Proof. Choose q, k,m as in the proof of Theorem 4.22 and let C be the random vari-
able obtained in Theorem 4.13. As each particular code c satisfies the requirements
of Theorem 4.12, it follows from the proof of Theorem 4.22 that if n is sufficiently
large πc is always an (n, nR,L, ε, b)-protocol.
To show the second part, we can consider T ′ to be the output Y of a channel
that takes C(x) as input. Now the statement follows from Theorem 4.13.
This could be generalized from just one value x to any set of values. This tells
us that even without any assumptions on bl and bc or on the distribution on the
messages send by neutral players, if a value x′ is on the list, we can conclude that a
group of people knew cx
′
and actively tried to put x′ on the list (or a very unlikely
event happened). Of course we have no way of knowing if these people were truthful
(in which case we would call them leakers) or not (in which case we would call them
censors).
4.4 Getting the best of both
Now that we have determined how small a list size we can have, and how high a
rate we can achieve, we will see that asymptotically we can get the best of both
parameters at the same time. The proof that you can get the best of both is
constructive: given a family of protocols with small list size and a family of protocols
with large rate, we give a construction that combines the two families to a family
that has both a small list size and a large rate. However, as we do not have a
construction that gives the optimal rate, the proof of the theorem below is not
constructive.
128














Proof. The upper bound follows directly from Theorem 4.21. To show the lower







and let ε > 0 and n0 be given. We only need to
find an (n, nR,L, ε, b)-protocol with n ≥ n0.







. By Theorem 4.22 there is an L′ such that
(R′,L′) is b-achievable, and by Theorem 4.16 the b-minimal list size is at most L0.






. As (R′,L′) is b-achievable we can find an (n′, n′R′,L′, ε/2, b)-
protocol π′ for some n′ ≥ n′0. Define n = n′+n′′. We will now give an (n, nR,L0, ε, b)-
protocol π.
π starts by running π′ on the first n′ players, giving a set G′(T ′) of size L′ such
that for each x, we have Pr(x ∈ G′(T ′)|X = x) ≥ 1 − ε/2. Next π uses the last n′′
players to simulate π′′ as if X could only take values in G′(T ′). If x 6∈ G′(T ′) the
leakers will just behave as if they were non-leakers. The protocol is defined more
formally in Figure 4.7.
As both π′ and π′′ are b-leaker protocols, they have likelihood ratio at most r(b).
In π each player only participates in one of the two subprotocols, so the likelihood
ratio of π is also at most r(b), so π is a b-leaker protocol. It only fails if either π′ or
















Rn′′ +R′n′′ −Rn′′ = R.
Here the inequality comes from the fact that n
′R′
n′+n′′
is increasing in n′ and n′ ≥ n′0 ≥
Rn′′
R′−R .
Putting the above results together, we get our main theorem which (except for
the null-set where R = C) determines which (L, R) are b-achievable.
Theorem 4.26. Let b = (bl, bm, bc) with bl + bc < bm be given, and let L0 = b bcbl c+ 1







. If 0 < R 6= C then (L, R) is b-achievable if and only
if both L ≥ L0 and R < C.
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Parameters:
b : probability of being leaker respectively censor and threshold of reasonable doubt







L′ : a list length such that (R′,L′) is b-achievable
ε : acceptable probability of error
π′, n′ : an (n′, n′R′,L′, ε/2, b)-protocol for some n′
π′′, n′′ : an (n′′, log(L′),L, ε/2, b)-protocol for some n′′
n = n′ + n′′ : total number of players needed
Input distribution: X,L1, . . . , Ln are independently distributed, X is uniformly
distributed on {0, 1}h and for each i: Pr(Li = 1) = bl and Pr(Li = −1) = bc.
Each plri learns Li and if |Li| = 1 she also learns X, and if Li = −1 she also
learns L− = (min(L1, 0), . . . ,min(Ln, 0)). She will follow the protocol given here if
Li 6= −1 and otherwise she might follow any censor protocol σ.
Protocol:
1. Let plr1, . . . ,plrn′ follow protocol π
′ to reveal X, and let G′(T ′) denote the
resulting list
2. Let player plrn′ + 1, . . . ,plrn follow π
′′. If X ∈ G′(T ′), the secret to reveal
is X’s lexicographical position in G′(T ′). If X /∈ G′(T ′), the leakers pretend
ignorance (behave as neutrals), so we do not need to specify the secret to be
leaked.
Figure 4.7: Protocol from proof of Theorem 4.25.
Proof. The “if” part follows from Theorem 4.25 and the fact that increasing L and
decreasing R only makes it easier for the leakers. The “only if” part follows from
Corollary 4.17 and 4.23.
This means that asymptotically, we can get the best rate and the best list size
at the same time. However, this only holds asymptotically (and the speed of con-
vergence is not uniform in (bl, bm, bc)): If bc = bl(2− 10−100), we can get down to a
set of 3 possible secrets with a reasonable n, but to get down to a set of 2 possible
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secrets, n would have to be big enough that the −10−100 has an effect.
4.5 Few leakers and censors
In the previous sections we have considered a situation where the probability of
being a leaker and the probability of being a censor are both constant, while the
total number of players tends to infinity. In this section we want to see what happens
when the total number of players goes to infinity faster than the expected number
of leakers. We keep both bm and bc fixed with bc < bm, and allow bl to be arbitrarily
small.
Here we will see that while the list size tends to infinity, the rate measured in
bits per expected leaker is bounded away from 0. In other words, as long as bc <
bm a small minority can reveal information without revealing themselves, and the
number of bits they can reveal, will for small bl be approximately proportional to the
expected number of leakers, and the resulting list size will be inversely proportional
to the expected number of leakers.
Definition 4.9. Let bc and bm be given. For L ∈ N and R > 0 we say that
(L, R) is (bc, bm)-achievable if for all ε > 0 and all n0 there exist bl, n and an
(n,Rnbl,L, ε, (bl, bc, bm))-protocol with nbl > n0.
We say R is (bc, bm)-achievable if (L, R) is (bc, bm)-achievable for some L.
The (bc, bm)-capacity is the supremum over all ratesR that are (bc, bm)-achievable.
Here the rate is measured in bits per expected leaker rather than bits per person.
We do not require that bl is small, but this must be the case for any protocol that
achieves a rate close to the capacity.
In order to determine the (bc, bm)-capacity, we need the following proposition.























































































































This proves the first part of the proposition. To prove the second part, we differen-










∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ bl(1− bm)bm(1− bl − bc)
))
=−





b2l (1− bc − bl)((1− bc)bm − bl)
.
(4.17)
To show the desired inequality, it is enough to show that this is non-positive for
bc + bl ≤ bm < 1. First we show this for the case bc > 0 and bm = bc + bl < 1. In
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this case denominator is positive, bm − bc − bl = 0, and
(1− bc)bm − bl =(1− bc − bl + bl)bm − bl
=(1− bm)bm + blbm − bl
=(1− bm)(bm − bl)






= 0 so the entire numerator is 0, which is non-positive.















(bm − bl)((1− bc)bm − bl)2
.
This is clearly non-positive, hence both sides of equality (4.17) are non-positive in
the case bm > bc+bl and bc > 0. This shows inequality (4.16) in the case bc+bl ≤ bm
and bc > 0. To get the case bc = 0, observe that both sides of (4.16) are continuous
in bc.







− (bm − bc) log(e)
bm(1− bc)
is (bc, bm)-achievable.














− (bm − bc) log(e)
bm(1− bc)
 .
Let π be a (n,Rnbl,L, ε, (bl, bc, bm))-protocol. If bm ≤ bc+bl, it follows from Theorem
4.1 that the censors can ensure I(X;T ) = 0 and otherwise we know from Proposition
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Here the second inequality follows from second part of Proposition 4.27.
Now as G(T ) returns sets of size at most L and contains x with probability 1−ε,
Lemma 4.19 implies
ε ≥H(X|G(T ))− 1− log(L)
Rnbl
=
H(X)− I(X;G(T ))− 1− log(L))
Rnbl
≥H(X)− I(X;T )− 1− log(L))
Rnbl
≥nblR− nbl(R− δ)− 1− log(L))
Rnbl
≥δnbl − 1− log(L)
Rnbl
.
Here the first equality follows from rules for mutual information, and the second






bm(1−bc) and for sufficiently large nbl, we have a lower bound on ε. Thus, (L, R)
is not (bc, bm)-achievable.
We are now ready for the main theorem of this section. Notice that the proof of
the lower bound uses Theorem 4.26, so it is not constructive.







− (bm − bc) log(e)
bm(1− bc)
.
Proof. The upper bound follows from Theorem 4.28.
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Figure 4.8: The plot on the left shows the (bc, 0.3)-capacity and the plot on the right
shows the (bc, 0.95)-capacity as a function of bc.




bm(1−bc) . Then by Proposition










. Choose such a bl and
let L = b bc
bl
c+ 1. We will show that (L, R) is b-achievable. To do that, let ε > 0 and
n0 be given. We need to show that there exists an (n,Rnbl,L, ε, (bl, bc, bm))-protocol








The (bc, bm)-capacity is plotted for bm = 0.95 and bm = 0.3 in Figure 4.8. We
see that especially for bm = 0.95 a large fraction of the people must be censors in
order to get a substantial reduction in the rate. From Theorem 4.29 we see that
the (bc, bm)-capacity is continuous in bc ∈ [0, 1). This implies that in the case where
both bc and bl are small the censors only have a vanishingly small effect on the rate
at which the leakers leak information, even if bc is much larger than bl. For example,
if bl = 10
−6 and bc = 10
−3, the censors will only have a small effect on the rate,




The general theme of this thesis is to figure out which trade-offs between sending
information and keeping anonymity are possible. In Chapter 3 we first found a
measure of suspicion which exactly captures the anonymity you lose when sending
information. This measure has the disadvantage of being artificial: it is unlikely
that anyone is going to care about their expected suspicion. We also considered a
more natural way of measuring the trade-off: how much information can you reveal
if you want to ensure that an observer will assign probability at most bm to the event
that you are revealing information. In this chapter, we will consider a different way
of measuring such trade-offs: if you play a game where you have to correctly send
information and ensure that an adversary does not guess a leaker in her first guess,
what is the maximal probability of winning?
This chapter has two parts. The first part is based on the first publication about
cryptogenography [9] and is using a different method than the rest of the thesis.
In this part there is only one leaker, and the secret is only one bit. The resulting
problem is very similar to problems in the area of information complexity, and we
will use a method which was independently discovered in this area. For two players,
including one leaker, we show that the leaker’s probability of winning is at least
1
3
= 0.33 . . . and at most 3
8
= 0.375. These bounds have later been improved to
0.3384 and 0.3672 [5]. For a large number of players we show that the leaker’s
probability of winning is at least 0.5644 and at most 3
4
= 0.75. Both the lower
bounds are proved by constructing protocols.
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In the second part of the chapter we consider the same problem when there are
many leakers and many bits to leak. For this problem the measure of suspicion once
again turns out to be useful. Here the main results are Theorem 5.26, which says





bits per leaker, and Theorem 5.33, which says that if there is r log(e) bits per leaker,
their probability of winning is at most log(r+1)
r log(e)
. See Figure 5.12 for an illustration
of these bounds. The lower bound is proved by a non-constructive argument that
shows the existence of a good protocol.
5.1 Model
The (n-player) cryptogenography game is formally defined as follows. There are
n players, denoted plr1, . . . ,plrn. Inputs consist of (X,L) ∼ µ, where µ is the
uniform distribution over {0, 1} × [n]. We refer to X as the secret and say that
plrL is the leaker, or that plrL knows the secret. Both X and L are given to
plrL; other players receive no input. Players communicate using a protocol π, after
which an observer can compute a guess G : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1} for the secret. We will
sometimes refer to this observer as Joe. Let Eve : {0, 1}∗ → [n] be the function
that maximizes Pr[Eve(T ) = L | G(T ) = X] for each possible value of the protocol
transcript. Notice that Eve depends on G. This function represents the best possible
guess of an adversary (whom we call Eve), who sees all communication between the
players and wants to determine the identity of the leaker. Note that G(T ) and
Eve(T ) are functions of the messages sent in π. We define the success of a protocol
as
succ(π) := Pr[G(T ) = X and Eve(T ) 6= L] .
The communication cost of π, denoted CC(π), is the maximum number of bits
sent during π, taken over all possible inputs (x, l) and all choices of randomness.
We will focus on understanding the maximum possible succ(π) of a protocol, not on
the communication cost.
The following lemma shows that one can assume without loss of generality that
players learn the secret with certainty.
Lemma 5.1. For all protocols π there exists a cryptogenography protocol π′ with
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transcript T ′ such that succ(π′) = succ(π), CC(π′) = CC(π) + n, and such that
Pr[G(T ′) = X] = 1.
Proof. The players first execute π. Then each player send one bit, which is used
to indicate whether they know G(T ) to be wrong. If a player do not know X or if
G(T ) = X the player will send the message 0. If a player knows X and G(T ) 6= X
the player will send 1. The protocol is formally defined in Figure 5.1
Parameters:
n : number of players
π : a cryptogenography protocol
Input distribution: (X,L) uniformly distributed on {0, 1}× [n]. Each plri learns
if L = i and if it is, she also learns X.
Protocol:
1. Let all the players follow π and let G(T ) denote the output
2. For i for 1 to n
3. If L = i and X /∈ G(T ) then plri sends 1 otherwise plri sends 0
Figure 5.1: Protocol from proof of Lemma 5.1.
Let T ′ be the transcript of the resulting protocol π′ and define G′(T ′) to equal
G(T ) if all players communicate a 0 in the extra round of communication; otherwise,
set G′(T ′) = 1 − G(T ). It is easy to see that G′(T ′) = X with certainty: either
π correctly computes X already, or the leaker announces that G(T ) 6= X. It is
also trivial to verify that CC(π′) = CC(π) + n. Thus, it remains to show that
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succ(π′) = succ(π). This can be seen through the following chain of equalities.
succ(π′) = Pr[G′(T ′) = X ∧ Eve′(T ′) 6= L]
= Pr[Eve′(T ′) 6= L]
= Pr[Eve′(T ′) 6= L | G(T ) = X] · Pr[G(T ) = X]
+ Pr[Eve′(T ′) 6= L | G(T ) 6= X] · Pr[G(T ) 6= X]
= Pr[Eve′(T ′) 6= L | G(T ) = X] · Pr[G(T ) = X]
= Pr[Eve(T ) 6= L | G(T ) = X] · Pr[G(T ) = X]
= succ(π),
where the second equality holds because players always learn X in π′, the third
equality holds by conditioning on G(T ), the fourth equality holds because if G(T ) 6=
X then the leaker is going to reveal herself in π′, and the penultimate equality holds
because, conditioned on π correctly computing X, the eavesdropper in π′ learns
nothing new about L.
5.2 Cryptogenography game protocols
In this section, we present a series of protocols that demonstrate what is possible
for the players to achieve.
5.2.1 Two player cryptogenography game
When n = 2, we refer to players as Alice and Bob instead of plr1 and plr2.
Theorem 5.2. There is a two-player cryptogenography protocol π with succ(π) =
1/3 and CC(π) = 2.
Proof. This protocol proceeds in two rounds. In the first round of communication,
Alice decides whether to “pass” or “speak”. If she passes, then Bob speaks in the
second round; otherwise she speaks. In the second round of communication, whoever
speaks will (i) send the secret if she knows it and (ii) send a random bit otherwise.
G now outputs the second bit of communication as the guess for the secret.
139
All that remains is to complete the protocol is to specify how Alice chooses to
pass or speak in the first round. If Alice knows the secret, she passes with probability
2/3 and speaks with probability 1/3; otherwise, she passes with probability 1/3 and
speaks with probability 2/3. The protocol is also defined in Figure 5.2.
Input distribution: (X,L) uniformly distributed on {0, 1}× [2]. Each plri learns
if L = i and if it is, she also learns X.
Protocol:
1. If L = 1, Alice sends “speak” with probability 1
3
and if L 6= 1 she sends “speak”
with probability 2
3
. If she does not send “speak” she sends “pass”.
2. The Alice sent “speak” she will send the next message, if she sent “pass” Bob
will send the next message: If the sender knows X he or she sends X otherwise
he or she chooses a message uniformly at random from {0, 1}.
Figure 5.2: Protocol from proof of Theorem 5.2.
Note that Alice is more likely to speak in round 2 when she does not know
the secret. This is perhaps counterintuitive—the players output the second bit
of communication, so intuitively Alice should speak more often when she actually
knows the bit. Is there an a priori reason why Alice shouldn’t just announce the
secret if she knows it and pass otherwise? Unfortunately in this case, Eve will learn
with certainty who knows the bit. Alice’s probabilities of passing are chosen to give
Eve no information about the leaker conditioned on players successfully outputting
the secret.
Claim 5.3. Pr[G(T ) = X] = 2/3.
Proof. The leaker speaks in the second round with probability 1/3. In this case,
players output correctly with certainty. Otherwise, players output a random bit
and are correct with probability 1/2. Overall, they output the correct bit with
probability 1/3 + (2/3) · (1/2) = 2/3.
Claim 5.4. Pr[Eve(T ) = L | G(T ) = X] = 1/2.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume Alice speaks in the second round and that
she sends the message 0. Call the resulting transcript t. From Eve’s point of view,
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there are three cases:
(i) Alice is the leaker and therefore outputs the correct bit in round 2. A priori,
Alice is the leaker with probability 1
2
; given that she is the leaker she will speak
with probability 1
3
; given this, there is probability 1
2
that the secret is 0. Thus, the









(ii) Alice is not the leaker but outputs the correct bit anyway. The priori prob-
ability that Alice is not the leaker is 1
2
; given that she is not the leaker, there is
probability 2
3
that she speaks; given that, there is probability 1
2
that X = 0 and
independently probability 1
2











for this case happening.
(iii) Alice is not the leaker and outputs incorrectly in round 2. Again, the a















Thus, conditioned on the transcript being t, each of these cases has probability
1
3
. However, in the third case, the players have already failed. Thus, conditioned
on players correctly outputting the secret, Alice and Bob are equally likely to be the
leaker, and Eve can only guess at random.
In this protocol, players output the secret with probability 2/3 and given this,
Eve guesses the leaker with probability 1/2. Thus, the overall success probability is
1/3.
This lower bound on the winning probability in the two-player game was im-
proved by Doerr and Künnemann from the 1
3
proved here to 0.3384, by using com-
puter search to find a better protocol [5]. The protocol which achieves this winning
probability involves 18248 different game states.
5.2.2 Cryptogenography game protocols with many players
Next, we present a series of protocols for the general case.
The Majority-Votes Protocol. In this protocol πMAJ, there is a single round of
communication, with each player sending a single bit. plri sends X if she knows
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the secret; otherwise, plri sends a random bit. This protocol is also defined in
Figure 5.3. Let ti denote the bit communicated by plri, and define GMAJ(t) :=
MAJ(t1, . . . , tn). When n is odd, the distribution of MAJ(t1, . . . , tn) is biased slightly
towards X. This enables players to achieve success probability somewhat larger than
1/2.
Parameter:
n : number of players
Input distribution: (X,L) uniformly distributed on {0, 1}× [n]. Each plri learns
if L = i and if it is, she also learns X.
Protocol:
1. For i from 1 to n
2. If L = i then plri outputs X, otherwise plri chooses a message uniformly
from {0, 1}
Figure 5.3: Majority-Votes Protocol, πMAJ
Lemma 5.5. If n is odd, then πMAJ succeeds with probability 1/2 + Θ(1/
√
n).
Proof. The communication t1, . . . , tn consists of n − 1 random bits, along with the
secret X. It will be helpful to be more explicit about the success probability. Let zi
be an indicator variable for the event ti = X. Note that since the ti’s are uniform
and independent for i 6= L, so are the zi’s. In πMAJ, players output MAJ(t1, . . . , tn);
therefore, GMAJ(t) = X if and only if
∑
i 6=L zi ≥ n−12 . Thus, we have
























It is easy to see that the best choice for Eve is to guess a random player i whose bit
agrees with the majority. There are at least n/2 such bits; therefore, Pr[Eve(T ) =
L | GMAJ(T ) = X] = 1/2 + Θ(1/
√
n)−O(1/n) = 1/2 + Θ(1/√n).
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We can achieve a more precise analysis by conditioning on
∑





























A straightforward calculation shows that the success probability of πMAJ is max-
imized at succ(πMAJ) ≈ 0.5406 when n = 23. However, for large n, the success
probability decreases and approaches 1/2. Our next protocol handles both cases by
emulating a protocol for a smaller number of players.
A Continuous Protocol for large n. Let n > n′ be given, and fix an n′-player
protocol π′. We will now construct a protocol π for n players that achieves the same
success probability as π′. The idea is to let n− n′ people drop out of the game, but
if the protocol specifies these n− n′ players, the leaker might be among them.
To remove the n−n′ players without removing the leaker from the game, we use
what we call a continuous protocol. That is, we assume the existence of a real-valued
“clock” that all players see, or more formally, the protocol assumes that all players
have access to some η ∈ R≥0. When the protocol begins, η = 0, and η increases as the
protocol progresses. While this does not fit the usual definition of a communication
protocol, such protocols have been used with the name “protocol with a clock” in
information complexity by Braverman, Garg, Pankratov and Weinstein [8]. Later we
will see how we can turn a continuous protocol into a real communication protocol.
Each player generates a real number ri ∈ [0, 1]. The leaker plrL sets rL := 1;
for i 6= L, plri sets ri uniformly in [0, 1]. As η increases, each player announces
when η = ti. When all but n
′ players have spoken, the remaining players run π′. See
Figure 5.4 for a more formal definition of the protocol. We call the communication
before emulating π′ the continuous phase of the communication. It is easy to see
that at the end of this continuous phase, L is uniformly distributed over the n′
remaining players. Thus, π has precisely the same success probability as π′. This
gives us the following lemma.
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Parameter:
n : number of players we wish to use
n′ < n : number of players in existing protocol
π′ : a protocol for n′ players
Input distribution: (X,L) uniformly distributed on {0, 1}× [n]. Each plri learns
if L = i and if it is, she also learns X.
Protocol:
1. Each player plri choose a number ri. If L 6= i, ri is chosen uniformly at
random from [0, 1], if L = i then ri = 1
2. For time t increasing continuously from 0 to 1
3. If ri = t for some i and less than n − n′ messages have been send, player
plri sends the message “I am not a leaker”
4. If more than n−n′ players have send a message the protocol aborts, otherwise
5. The n′ players who have not sent a message now follow π′
Figure 5.4: Continuous protocol from a protocol with fewer players. The probability
that the protocol aborts because too many players revealed themself as non-leakers
is 0.
Lemma 5.6. Given any n′ player protocol π′ and any n > n′, there exists a n-player
continuous protocol π achieving succ(π) = succ(π′).
Together with Lemma 5.5, we get an efficient protocol for all large n.
Corollary 5.7. For all n ≥ 23, there is a continuous protocol π achieving succ(π) ≥
0.5406.
Proof. The corollary follows from Lemma 5.5 and Lemma 5.6. The resulting protocol
is given in Figure 5.5.
The assumption that all players have shared access to a continuous clock is
perhaps unnatural, and it is unclear how players can emulate such a protocol without
access to this clock. Nevertheless, it is a useful abstraction, and while it is hard to
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Parameter:
n ≥ 23 : number of players we wish to use
Input distribution: (X,L) uniformly distributed on {0, 1}× [n]. Each plri learns
if L = i and if it is, she also learns X.
Protocol:
1. Each player plri choose a number ri. If L 6= i, ri is chosen uniformly at
random from [0, 1], if L = i then ri = 1
2. For time t increasing continuously from 0 to 1
3. If ri = t for some i and less than n − 23 messages have been send, player
plri sends the message “I am not a leaker”
4. If more than n−23 players have send a message the protocol aborts, otherwise
5. For i from 1 to 23
6. If the i’th of the 23 players who have not sent a message is a leaker,
she sends X otherwise she sends a message chosen uniformly at random from
{0, 1}
Figure 5.5: Continuous protocol proving Corollary 5.7.
see how such protocols can be emulated, it is easy to construct a protocol that
approximates them. Our next protocol is just such a construction.
Lemma 5.8. Fix n, n′ with n > n′, and let ε > 0. For any n′-player protocol
π′, there exists an n-player protocol π with succ(π) ≥ succ(π′) − ε and CC(π) =
CC(π′) +O(n3/ε).
Proof. Given ε, let m = dn2
ε
e. Similar to the continuous protocol, each plri with
i 6= L generates ti ∈ [m] uniformly. The leaker then sets rL := m + 1. In the first
phase of communication, players proceed in rounds k = 1, 2, . . . . In the kth round,
each plri announces whether ri ≤ k. Call plri alive if ri > k. Communication in
the first phase continues until k = m or until at most n′ players remain alive. In
the second phase, the remaining alive players execute π′ if exactly n′ players remain;




n : number of players we wish to use
n′ ≤ n : number of players in existing protocol
m : number of rounds. The higher it is, the better is the resulting protocol
π : protocol for n′ players
Input distribution: (X,L) uniformly distributed on {0, 1}× [n]. Each plri learns
if L = i and if it is, she also learns X.
Protocol:
1. Each player plri choose a number ri. If L 6= i, ri is chosen uniformly at
random from [m], if L = i then ri = m+ 1
2. For time t from 1 to m
3. For i from 1 to n
4. If ri = t and less than n− n′ messages have been send, player plri sends
the message “I am not a leaker”
5. If more than n−n′ players have send a message the protocol aborts, otherwise
6. The n′ players who have not sent a message now follow π






rounds of communication in the first phase of π, and each







It is easy to see that conditioned on the communication in the first phase of π,
L is uniformly distributed over the remaining alive players. The probability that
two particular players choose the same ri is m
−1 ≤ ε
n2






of players, the union bound implies that the probability that two players have the
same ri is at most n
2 ε
n2
= ε. Thus, the probability that players do not execute π′ is
at most ε.
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The above Lemma is not optimal in terms of communication complexity. We
could easily reduce the number of rounds by improving the analysis: it does not
matter if more than one player drop out in the same round, as long as that does not
bring the number of alive players below n′. We could further decrease the number
of rounds by increasing the probability that a player drop out in the first round.
Taking the majority-votes protocol and fixing ε to be a suitably small constant
yields the following corollary.
Corollary 5.9. For all n ≥ 23, there exists a protocol π with succ(π) > 0.5406 and
CC(π) = O(n3).
Proof. The corollary follows from Lemma 5.5 and Lemma 5.8. The resulting protocol
is given in Figure 5.7.
Beating Majority-Votes. For our final protocol we show that, perhaps surpris-
ingly, one can boost success by reversing the above operations. Specifically, we
consider an n-player protocol with two phases of communication. In the first phase,
each player votes, as in πMAJ. In the second phase of communication, players com-
municate to decide one-by-one who will not participate in the vote. Call a player
dead if he has been chosen to no longer participate. Eventually, players decide to
end the second phase of communication and compute the majority of the remaining
votes. By voting first, and eliminating players from the vote one-by-one, the protocol
can adaptively decide when to stop the protocol. At a high level, the protocol ends
when the votes of the remaining players form a super-majority. Say that t1, . . . tn
form a τ -super-majority if τ of the n bits agree.
Fix a function τ : N → N. For each τ , we define a protocol πτ as follows.
First, the n players vote. Then, while there is no τ(n′)-super-majority among the
remaining n′ live players, they communicate to decide on a player to bow out of
the protocol. The protocol ends when a super-majority of the remaining votes is
achieved. The protocol is defined more formally in Figure 5.8.
Finding a closed-form expression for the optimal τ appears to be nontrivial;
however, for small n (we used n = 1200), we can compute τ and the resulting
succ(πτ ) easily using dynamic programming: let v(i, j) denote the probability of
winning if there are currently i players voting 0 and j players voting 1 left and we
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Parameter:
n ≥ 23 : number of players we wish to use
m : number of rounds. The higher it is, the better is the resulting protocol
Input distribution: (X,L) uniformly distributed on {0, 1}× [n]. Each plri learns
if L = i and if it is, she also learns X.
Protocol:
1. Each player plri choose a number ri. If L 6= i, ri is chosen uniformly at
random from [m], if L = i then ri = m+ 1
2. For time t from 1 to m
3. For i from 1 to n
4. If ri = t and less than n− 23 messages have been send, player plri sends
the message “I am not a leaker”
5. If more than n−23 players have send a message the protocol aborts, otherwise
6. For i from 1 to 23
7. If the i’th of the 23 players who have not sent a message is a leaker,
she sends X otherwise she sends a message chosen uniformly at random from
{0, 1}
Figure 5.7: Protocol proving Corollary 5.9.
stop at the optimal time. Clearly v(i, 0) = v(0, i) = 1− 1
i
. Furthermore, for i, j > 0
we can choose to stop or continue by eliminating one more person. If we stop, we
should guess that the majority is correct. This guess will be correct with probability
max(i,j)
i+j
, and when it is, Eve will guess the leaker with probability max(i, j)−1. Thus,
the probability of winning given that we stop is
max(i,j)(1− 1max(i,j))
i+j
. If we eliminate
one more player, there is probability i
i+j
that we eliminate a player voting 0, in
which case we win with probability v(i − 1, j) and there is probability j
i+j
that we
eliminate a player voting 1, in which case we win with probability v(i, j − 1). This
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Parameter:
n : number of players
τ : N→ N : function that determines when we stop eliminating players
m : number of rounds. The higher it is, the better is the resulting protocol
Input distribution: (X,L) uniformly distributed on {0, 1}× [n]. Each plri learns
if L = i and if it is, she also learns X.
Protocol:
1. For i from 1 to n
2. If L = i, plri sends X, otherwise plri sends a message chosen uniformly
from {0, 1}
3. Each player plri choose a number ri. If L 6= i, ri is chosen uniformly at
random from [m], if L = i then ri = m+ 1
4. For time t from 1 to m
5. Let n′ denote the number of people who have not send the message “I am
not a leaker”. For b ∈ {0, 1} let n′b denote the number of these player who
send b in their first message




7. For i from 1 to n
8. If ri = t player plri sends the message “I am not a leaker”
Figure 5.8: Protocol proving Theorem 5.10.
gives us a recurrence relation:








iv(i− 1, j) + jv(i, j − 1)
i+ j
 , for i, j > 0.
Together with the values for i = 0 and for j = 0 this formula can be used to compute
v(i, j) for any i, j. Once we have v(i, j) for all i, j with i + j = n we can compute
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Along with Lemma 5.8, this gives a protocol with success probability greater
than 0.5644.
Theorem 5.10. For all n ≥ 1200, there exists an n-player cryptogenography proto-
col π with succ(π) > 0.5644.
5.3 Hardness results
In this section, we give upper bounds on the best possible success probability both
in the two-player and general case. We start with a high-level description of our
approach.
In Section 5.2 we gave several protocols achieving high success probability under
the uniform distribution on inputs (X, J). In this section, it will be helpful to
consider the space of all possible input distributions. Let ∆({0, 1} × [n]) denote
the set of all possible distributions on (X,L). Given a (partial) communication
transcript t ∈ {0, 1}k of a known protocol π, define µt to be the input distribution
µ, conditioned on the first k bits of communication equaling t. Our motivation here is
two-fold: first, examining general distributions allows us to appeal to the geometry
of ∆({0, 1} × [n]). In particular, we show that the success of a protocol satisfies
certain concavity conditions when viewed as a function s : ∆({0, 1} × [n]) → [0, 1]
over the distribution space. Second, our arguments will examine how a protocol π
affects µt. We show that µ is a convex combination of {µt}. We are particularly
interested in how µ “splits” into distributions µ0 and µ1; i.e., we look at convex
combinations on conditional distributions one bit at a time. Importantly, we show
that for each player plri, the set of all possible distributions obtainable by splitting
µ forms a plane in ∆({0, 1} × [n]); we call this the plri-allowed plane through µ.
Any plane, that is an allowed plane through µ′ for some distribution µ′ is called an
allowed plane. Our first lemma characterizes the possible distribution splits made
by a cryptogenography protocol.
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Lemma 5.11. Let π be a protocol where only one message gets sent, this message is
in {0, 1}, and this message is sent by plri. If π is used with prior distribution µ, let
ν(t) denote the probability that plri sends message t and let µt be the distribution
given that plri sent message t. Then
1. µ = ν(0)µ0 + ν(1)µ1.
2. Each µt is proportional to µ on {0, 1} × ([n] \ {i}).
Proof. 1: We have













2: Let x′ ∈ {0, 1} and i′ ∈ [n] \ {i}. Then by Bayes’ theorem
µt(x
′, i′) = Pr(X = x′, L = i′|T = t)
=
Pr(T = t|X = x′, L = i′) Pr(X = x′, L = i′)
Pr(T = t)
=
Pr(T = t|X = x′, L = i′)
Pr(T = t)
µ(x′, i′)
The probability distribution plri used to choose his message only depends on his
information, and thus does not depend on (x′, i′) as long as i′ 6= i. So Pr(T=t|X=x′,L=i′)
Pr(T=t)
is a constant, and µt is indeed proportional to µ on {0, 1} × ([n] \ {i})
The next lemma is the converse of Lemma 5.11. It says that every possible
split conforming to the restrictions of Lemma 5.11 are possible in a communication
protocol.
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Lemma 5.12. Let plri be a player, let µ, µ0, µ1 be distributions over {0, 1} × [n],
and ν a distribution with support {0, 1} such that
1. µ = ν(0)µ0 + ν(1)µ1.
2. Each µt is proportional to µ on {0, 1} × ([n] \ {i}).
Then there is a protocol π where only player plri sends messages, he only sends
one message, he sends message t ∈ {0, 1} with probability ν(t), and the posterior
probability distribution given that he sends the message t is µt.
Proof. If plri has the information and it is 0, he should send the message t ∈ {0, 1}
with probability ν(t)µt(0,i)
µ(0,i)
, if he has the information and it is 1 he should send the
message t ∈ {0, 1} with probability ν(t)µt(1,i)
µ(1,i)
and if he does not have the information,
he should send message t with probability ν(t)µt({0,1}×([n]\{i}))
µ({0,1}×([n]\{i})) . By requirement 1, this
gives well-defined probability distributions. The following computation shows that
the probability of sending t is ν(t)
Pr(T = t) = Pr(T = t|(X,L) = (0, i))µ(0, i) + Pr(T = t|(X,L) = (1, i))µ(1, i)









ν(t)µt({0, 1} × ([n] \ {i}))
µ({0, 1} × ([n] \ {i})) µ({0, 1} × ([n] \ {i}))
=ν(t)µt(0, i) + ν(t)µt(1, i) + ν(t)µt({0, 1} × ([n] \ {i}))
=ν(t).
To finish the proof we need to check that the posterior distribution given tran-
script t is indeed µt. Used Bayes’ theorem we get









as wanted. Similarly, for l 6= i we have







µt({0, 1} × ([n] \ {i}))
µ({0, 1} × ([n] \ {i})) µ(x, l)
=µt(x, l).
Here the last equality follows from requirement 2.
Instead of playing the cryptogenography game starting from the uniform dis-
tribution over {0, 1} × [n], we could start from any other distribution µ (and let
all the players know that we are starting from distribution µ). Let succ(µ, π) de-
note the probability of winning, when using protocol π starting from distribution µ.
Let succ(µ) = supπ succ(µ, π) where the supremum is over all protocols π, and let
succn(µ) = supCC(π)≤n succ(µ, π).
For a distribution µ we now know that the plri-allowed plane through µ, as
defined previously, is the set of all distributions µ′ that are proportional to µ on
{0, 1} × ([n] \ {i}). We see that this is indeed a plane in the set ∆({0, 1} × [n]) of
distributions over {0, 1} × [n].
Lemma 5.13. The function succ : ∆({0, 1} × [n])→ [0, 1] satisfies:
1. succ(µ) ≥ succ(µ, π0) where π0 is the protocol where they do not communicate
at all.
2. For any allowed plane, succ restricted to that plane is concave.
Proof. 1: succ(µ) = supπ succ(µ, π) ≥ succ(µ, π0).
2: Whenever µ0, µ1 are distributions in the plri-allowed plane, and ν is a distri-
bution with support {0, 1} such that µ = ∑1t=0 ν(t)µt, Lemma 5.12 says that we can
find a protocol where plri sends one message, sends message t with probability ν(t),
and the distribution given that plri sends t is µt. For every ε > 0 we can now con-
struct a protocol πε such that succ(µ, πε) ≥
∑1
t=0 ν(t) succ(µt)− ε. The protocol πε
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starts with the one-message protocol we obtain from Lemma 5.12. If the message t
is sent, they continue from there, using a protocol πt with succ(µt, πt) ≥ succ(µt)−ε.
The existence of such a protocol follows from the definition of succ(µt). It is clear
that the resulting πε satisfies the required inequality. As we can do this for all
ε > 0 we get succ(µ) ≥∑1t=0 ν(t) succ(µt). It follows from the converse of Jensen’s
inequality that succ is concave in the plri-allowed plane.
We are now ready for a characterization of succ. This is very similar to a charac-
terization of the information cost discovered independently in the area of information
complexity [8, 57,58].
Theorem 5.14. The function succ : ∆({0, 1}× [n])→ [0, 1] is the point-wise small-
est function s : ∆({0, 1} × [n])→ [0, 1] that satisfies
1. s(µ) ≥ succ(µ, π0) where π0 is the protocol where they do not communicate at
all.
2. For any allowed plane, s restricted to that plane is concave.
Proof. We know from Lemma 5.13 that succ satisfies the two requirements. It is
clear that the point-wise infimum of a family of functions satisfying requirement
1 will itself satisfy requirement 1, and similar for requirement 2. Thus, there is a
smallest function s∗ satisfying both requirements.
Requirement 1 simply says that s∗(µ) ≥ succ0(µ). Assume for induction that
s∗(µ) ≥ succk(µ), and consider a protocol π with CC(π) ≤ k + 1. We can view the
protocol π as first sending one message t1 ∈ {0, 1} sent by plri (if he can send more
than two messages in the first round, we simply let him send one bit of the message
at a time), and for each possible message t1 calling some subsequent protocol πt1 with
CC(πt1) ≤ k. If we let ν(t1) denote the probability that plri sends t1 and let µt1
denote probability distribution given the plri sends t1, we know from Lemma 5.11




















Here the second inequality follows from induction hypothesis, and the last follows
from the fact that s∗ is concave in the i-allowed plane. As this holds for all π with
CC(π) ≤ k + 1 we get succk+1(µ) ≤ s∗(µ), and by induction we have succk ≤ s∗ for
all k.
Now s∗(µ) ≥ limk→∞ succk(µ) = succ(µ) but succ satisfies the two requirement
in the theorem, and s∗ is the smallest function satisfying the two requirements.
Thus, s∗ = succ.
This theorem gives us a way to show upper bounds on succ(µ): whenever we
have a function s satisfying the two requirements, we have s(µ) ≥ succ(µ). In the
rest of this section we will show upper bounds on succ by guessing such functions s.
A function similar to the function s we will use below was suggested by “fedja”1 and
this function was then improved to s by Wadim Zudilin, both on Mathoverflow [46].
Theorem 5.15. Let µ2 denote the uniform distribution on {0, 1} × [2]. Then
succ(µ2) ≤ 38 .
This bound was published in [9]: later Doerr and Künnemann [5] strengthened




= 0.375 to 47
128
< 0.3672.
Proof. For brevity, write xi := µ(0, i), yi := µ(1, i) for i ∈ {1, 2} being one of the
1fedja wishes to stay pseudonymous.
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players. Define








2 − 6(x1x2 + y1y2) and
s(x1, x2, y1, y2) :=
1− f(x1, x2, y1, y2)
4
.




The proof is a simple calculation.
Lemma 5.17. The function s is concave on all allowed planes.
Proof. By the symmetry of s, it is enough to show that s is concave on all plr1-
allowed planes. Let µ be a distribution and let (µv)v∈R be a line in a plr1-allowed
plane through µ (let us say we get µ at v = 0). We show that f is convex (and thus s
is concave) along this line. Since (µv)v∈R is an allowed line, the values (x2(v), y2(v))
will be proportional to (x2, y2) throughout.
First we handle the case that (x2(v), y2(v)) = (x2, y2). That is, plr1’s message
does not change the probabilities involving plr2. In words, she talks only about the
value of her bit, not about whether she knows it or not. In this case we can assume
that
µv = (x1 + v, x2, y1 − v, y2) .
Now f(µv) is a quadratic polynomial in v with leading monomial 2v
2, and thus is
convex.
From now on, we assume that (x2(v), y2(v)) 6= (x2, y2) unless v = 0. Let b :=
x2 + y2 be the probability that plr2 has the bit. Note that b > 0, because the case
b = 0 would mean (x2(t) = y2(t)) = (0, 0) throughout, and we have handled this







where c is a parameter that describes the “slope” of the line (µv)v∈R, and c̄ := 1− c.
Again, v = 0 recovers the original distribution µ. Again, f(µv) is quadratic in v,
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and the leading monomial is
(c2 + c̄2)b2 + x22 + y
2
2 + 6b(cx2 + c̄y2). (5.1)
We want to show that this is non-negative. It is quadratic in c2 with leading mono-
mial 2b2c2 (note that c̄2 = 1−2c+ c2). Thus, (5.1) is minimized when the derivative
with respect to c is 0:
∂(5.1)
∂c
= 2cb2 − 2c̄b2 + 6b(x2 − y2) = 0 ⇔
cb− (1− c)b+ 3(x2 − y2) = 0⇔
2cb− b+ 3(x2 − y2) = 0⇔
2cb+ 2x2 − 4y2 = 0⇔
cb = 2y2 − x2. (5.2)
To get to the second line we use the assumption that b > 0 and divide by 2b, and
to get to the fourth line we use b = x2 + y2. From cb + c̄b = b = x2 + y2 and (5.2)
we get c̄b = 2x2 − y2. Plugging these values of cb and c̄b into (5.1), we obtain
(c2 + c̄2)b2 + x22 + y
2
2 + 6b(cx2 + c̄y2) =
(cb)2 + (c̄b)2 + x22 + y
2
2 + 6x2(bc) + 6y2(c̄b) =
(2y2 − x2)2 + (2x2 − y2)2 + x22 + y22 + 6x2(2y2 − x2) + 6y2(2x2 − y2) = 16x2y2 ≥ 0.
This shows that f , and hence s, is convex on all allowed planes.
Lemma 5.18. Let µ ∈ ∆({0, 1} × [2]) be a distribution and let π0 be the empty
protocol, i.e., the one without any communication. Then s(µ) ≥ succ(µ, π0).
Proof. First, let us compute succ(µ, π0). Since there is no communication, G only
depends on µ. If G = 0, then Eve guesses the player j that maximizes xj. If G = 1,
she maximizes yj. Thus, succ(µ, π0) = max(min(x1, x2),min(y1, y2)). Let us show
that s(µ) ≥ min(x1, x2). The proof that s(µ) ≥ min(y1, y2) will be symmetric. We
introduce the shorthand sx := x1 + x2 and mx := max(x1, x2), and similarly for y.
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So min(x1, x2) = sx −mx.
s ≥ min(x1, x2)⇔ 1− f − 4 min(x1, x2) ≥ 0⇔ 1− 4sx + 4mx − f ≥ 0 . (5.3)
Let us bound f from above:








2 − 6(x1x2 + y1y2)






2)− 3(x1 + x2)2 − 3(y1 + y2)2






2)− 3s2x − 3s2y
≤ 4sxmx + 4symy − 3s2x − 3s2y .
Let us combine this with (5.3):
1− 4sx + 4mx − f ≥ 1− 4sx + 4mx − 4mxsx − 4symy + 3s2x + 3s2y
= (1− sx)(1− 3sx) + 4mx(1− sx)− 4mysy + 3s2y
= sy(1− 3sx + 4mx − 4my + 3sy) (note that 1− sx = sy)
≥ sy(1− 3sx + 2sx − 4sy + 3sy) (since mx ≥ sx2 and my ≤ sy)
= sy(1− sx − sy) = 0 .
This shows that s(µ) ≥ min(x1, x2). Together with s(µ) ≥ min(y1, y2), which
can be show in a similar way, this implies s(µ) ≥ max(min(x1, x2),min(y1, y2)) =
succ(µ, π0) and proves the lemma.
By Theorem 5.14 this implies that succ(µ2) ≤ s(µ2) = 38 .
This upper bound in the two player case was later improved by Doerr and Künne-
mann to 0.3672 [5].
Our final theorem generalizes the above argument to n players.
Theorem 5.19. Let µn denote the uniform distribution on {0, 1} × [n]. Then
succ(µn) ≤ 34 − 12n .
Proof. For brevity, we denote by xi the probability that player i has the bit, and it
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is 0, that is, xi := µ(0, i). Similarly, yi := µ(1, i). We define























. Second, sn(µ) ≥ succ(µ, π0),
where π0 is the “empty” protocol without any communication. Third, sn is concave
along allowed planes. This will conclude the proof.






Proof. Every (x, l) has probability 1
2n
. Therefore, ‖~x‖22 = ‖~y‖
2

































Proposition 5.21. Let µ ∈ ∆({0, 1}× [n]) be a distribution and let π0 be the empty
protocol, i.e., the one without any communication. Then sn(µ) ≥ succ(µ, π0).
Proof. What is succ(µ, π0)? The transcript of π0 is empty, thus G(T ) only depends
on µ. If G = 0, then Eve optimally guesses the player i that maximizes xi, and the
success probability for the players is µ(0, [n])−maxi µ(0, i). Similarly, if G = 1, she
chooses the i maximizing yi, and the success probability is µ(1, [n]) − maxi µ(1, i).










For brevity, we define mx := maxi xi = maxi µ(0, i), my := maxi yi = maxi µ(1, i),
sx :=
∑
i xi = µ(0, [n]), and sy :=
∑
i yi = µ(1, [n]). We want to show that sn(µ) ≥
succ(µ, π0) = max(sx − mx, sy − my). We will show that sn(µ) ≥ sx − mx. The
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inequality sm(µ) ≥ sy −my will follow analogously.
sn(µ) ≥ sx −mx ⇐⇒
1− f(~x, ~y)
2
≥ sx −mx ⇐⇒ 1− 2sx + 2mx − f(~x, ~y) ≥ 0 .
(5.4)
Let us bound f(~x, ~y) from above:






1 ≤ 2mxsx + 2mysy − s2x − s2y .
Thus, we evaluate (5.4):
1− 2sx + 2mx − f(~x, ~y) ≥ 1− 2sx + 2mx − 2mxsx − 2mysy + s2x + s2y
= 1− 2sx + s2x + s2y + 2mx(1− sx)− 2mysy
= (1− sx)2 + s2y + 2mx(1− sx)− 2mysy
= 2s2y + 2mxsy − 2mysy
= 2sy(sy +mx −my) ≥ 0 .
In the penultimate equality we use 1− sx = sy and the last inequality follows from
sy − my ≥ 0. Replacing the roles of x and y, a similar calculation shows that
sn(µ) ≥ sy −my, and thus sn(µ) ≥ max(sx −mx, sy −my) = succ(µ, π0).
Proposition 5.22. For any allowed plane, sn restricted to that plane is concave.
Proof. By symmetry, we can restrict ourselves to plr1-allowed planes. That is, all
distributions µ′ that are proportional to µ on {0, 1} × ([n] \ {1}). Let µ be any
distribution and let (µv)v∈R be a line through µ that is contained in a plr1-allowed
plane. It suffices to show that sn is concave along all such lines.
First suppose that in our line, each µv is not only proportional to µ on {0, 1} ×
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and f(µv) is quadratic in v with leading monomial 2v
2. Therefore, it is convex, and
sn is concave, along (µv)v∈R.
Suppose from now on that µv is not identical to µ on {0, 1} × ([n] \ {1}). How
does a line (µv)v∈R through µ in a plr1-allowed plane look? The probabilities
x2, . . . , xn and y2, . . . , yn get multiplied by a factor (1− v). Let b0 := x2 + · · ·+ xn,
b1 := y2 + · · · + yn, and b = b0 + b1. Note that b > 0, otherwise all µv are 0 on
{0, 1} × ([n] \ {1}), and this belongs to the above case. The distribution µv on the












xn(1− v) yn(1− v) (5.6)
where c ∈ R is some parameter specific to the line (µv)v∈R, and c̄ := 1− c. For fixed
~x, ~y, c, all µv lie on a line. It remains to show that f is convex along this line. We
evaluate f(µv), which is a quadratic polynomial in v, and analyze the coefficient of






1, evaluated at µt, the monomial
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v2 has the following coefficients:
‖~x‖22 −→ c2b2 + x22 + · · ·+ x2n ≥ c2b2
‖~y‖22 −→ c̄2b2 + y22 + · · ·+ y2n ≥ c̄2b2
‖~x‖21 −→ (cb− x2 − · · · − xn)2 = (cb− b0)2 = c2b2 − 2cbb0 + b20
‖~y‖21 −→ (c̄b− y2 − · · · − yn)2 = (c̄b− b1)2 = c̄2b2 − 2c̄bb1 + b21






1 is at least
2c2b2 + 2c̄2b2 − (c2b2 − 2cbb0 + b20)− (c̄2b2 − 2c̄bb1 + b21)
=b2(c2 + c̄2)− b20 − b21 + 2b(cb0 + c̄b1) . (5.7)
It remains to show that this is non-negative. Recall that b is the probability that
plr1 does not know the bit. Since we assume b > 0, the expression in (5.7) is
quadratic in c with leading monomial 2b2c2 (note that c̄2 = (1− c)2 = 1− 2c+ c2).
Thus, (5.7) is minimized if its derivate with respect to c is 0:
∂(5.7)
∂c
= 2b2(c− c̄) + 2b(b0 − b1) = 2b2(2c− 1) + 2b(b− 2b1) = 4b2c− 4bb1 .
This is 0 if and only if c = b1
b
. At that point, c̄ = b0
b
. In particular, c, c̄ ≥ 0. This is
not a priori clear, since c is a parameter of the line (µt), not a probability. Let us
evaluate (5.7) at c = b1
b
:
(5.7) = b2(c2 + c̄2)− b20 − b21 + 2b(cb0 + c̄b1)











− b20 − b21 = 0 .
This shows that f is convex along the line (µt)t∈R, and thus on whole plr1-allowed




We now move on to look at the problem with more than one leaker and more than
one bit of information X to be leaked. It is obvious how to generalize X to more
information, we simply take X to be uniformly distributed on {1, . . . , 2dhe}. It is
less obvious how to generalize to more leakers. When more people are leaking, it
would be unreasonable to require Eve to guess all the leakers. If this was the rule,
one of the leaking players could just reveal himself as a leaker and say what X is,
while the rest of the leakers and all the non-leakers send empty messages. Instead,
we let Eve guess at one person and if that person is leaking, she wins.
Definition 5.1. For fixed values of h, number of leakers l and number of com-
municating players n > l and a collaborating cryptogenography protocol π, we let
Succ(h, l, n, π) denote the probability that after the players communicate using pro-
tocol π, Joe will guess the correct value of X ∈ [2dhe] but Eve’s guess will not be
a leaker, assuming that Joe and Eve each guess using the strategy that maximizes
their own chance of winning and that Eve learns Joe’s guess before guessing herself.
We define
Succ(h, l, n) = sup
π
(Succ(h, l, n, π)),
where the supremum is over all collaborating cryptogenography protocols π. Finally,
we define
Succ(h, l) = lim
n→∞
Succ(h, l, n).
In this section we will investigate the asymptotic behavior of Succ(h, l) when at
least one of l and h tends to infinity. First we need some propositions. The first
proposition implies that the limit, which defines Succ(h, l), really exists.
Proposition 5.23. Succ(h, l, n) is non-decreasing in n.
Proof. We use the elimination strategy used in the proof of Lemma 5.8. Let n′ > n
and let π be a protocol for parameters h, l, n. We now construct a sequence of
protocols π′m for parameters h, l, n
′. In the protocol π′m each non-leaking player
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thinks of a uniformly chosen number in {1, . . . ,m}. First everyone who thought of
the number 1 announce that and they are out, then everyone who thought of the
number 2 and so on, until only n players are left. If two or more players thought
of the same number, we might end up with less than n players left. In that case
the leakers just announce themselves. If we are left with exactly n players, we know
that the l leakers are still among them, and we have no further information about
who they are. They then use protocol π, and win with probability Succ(h, l, n).
For a formal definition of the protocol, see Figure 5.9. As m→∞, the probability
that two players thought of the same number tends to 0, so Succ(h, l, n′, π′m) →
Succ(h, l, n, π).
Proposition 5.24. Succ(h, l, n) and Succ(h, l) are non-increasing in h.
Proof. Let h > h′ and let π be a protocol for parameters h, l, n and let the secret be
denoted X. We construct a protocol π′ with parameters h′, l, n and secret denoted
by X ′. In the first round of π′, plr1 announces h − h′ independent and uniformly
chosen bits Y , and from then on, everyone follows protocol π for X = X ′ ◦ Y . This
protocol is more formally defined in Figure 5.10. It is clear that Succ(h, l, n, π) ≤
Succ(h′, l, n, π′).
Proposition 5.25. The probability that the communicating players wins the game
does not change if Eve is told the value of X before they start to communicate.
Proof. If Joe guesses the correct value of X, Eve was going to assume that that
was the correct value anyway (as she wants to maximize the probability that she
is correct given that Joe was correct), and if Joe guesses wrong, she would win
anyway.
In the rest of this section, we will assume that Eve knows the value of X. We
can now prove a lower bound on Succ as l and h tends to infinity. The proof uses
Corollary 3.21, so it is not constructive.














n : number of players we wish to use
n′ ≤ n : number of players in existing protocol
l ≤ n′ : number of leakers
m : number of rounds. The higher it is, the better is the resulting protocol
π : protocol that allows l leakers among a total of n′ players to reveal h bits
Input distribution: X,L are independently distributed, X is uniformly dis-
tributed on {1, . . . 2dhe} and L is uniformly distributed on all vectors {0, 1}n with
exactly l 1’s. Each plri learns if Li and if it Li = 1 she also learns X.
Protocol:
1. Each player plri choose a number ri. If Li = 0, ri is chosen uniformly at
random from [m], if Li = 1 then ri = m+ 1
2. For time t from 1 to m
3. For i from 1 to n
4. If ri = t and less than n− n′ messages have been send, player plri sends
the message “I am not a leaker”
5. If more than n−n′ players have send a message the protocol aborts, otherwise
6. The n′ players who have not sent a message now follow π
Figure 5.9: Protocols from proof of Proposition 5.23.




log(e). If we let ε > 0, and use this corollary for bm = 1 − p + ε/2 we get that







there is a protocol π that
will ensure that Joe’s probability of guessing wrong is at most ε/2, and seen from
Eve’s perspective, no one is leaking with probability greater than 1 − p + ε/2. By
the union bound, the probability that Joe is wrong or Eve is correct2 is at most
2Here we assume that Joe guesses on the most likely value of X, and we allow Eve to use
any strategy. It could be that Joe could do better by taking Eve’s guess into account, but he is
guaranteed at least this probability of winning.
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Parameter:
n : number of players
l : number of leakers
h : number of bits revealed in original protocol
h′ : number of bits we wish to reveal
π : protocol that allows l leakers among a total of n′ players to reveal h bits
Input distribution: X ′, L are independently distributed, X ′ is uniformly dis-
tributed on {1, . . . 2dhe} and L is uniformly distributed on all vectors {0, 1}n with
exactly l 1’s. Each plri learns if Li and if it Li = 1 she also learns X
′.
Protocol:
1. plr1 sends a message Y chosen uniformly from {0, 1}h−h′ .
2. Everyone follows π as if the secret to be revealed is X = X ′ ◦ Y
Figure 5.10: Protocols from proof of Proposition 5.24.
ε/2 + 1 − p + ε/2, thus the communicating players win with probability at least
p− ε.
In particular we have the following corollary.
Corollary 5.27. Let l → ∞ and h = h(l) be a function of l with h = o(l). Then
Succ(h, l)→ 1.
Proof. Let h(l) = o(l) be a function. For each l, we have Succ(h(l), l) ∈ [0, 1], so we
only need to show that for any ε > 0 there exists l0 such that for all l ≥ l0 we have
































l ≥ l2. Now define l0 = max(l1, l2). For all l ≥ l0 we have










Here the first inequality uses Proposition 5.24 and l ≥ l0 ≥ l2 and the second
inequality uses that l ≥ l0 ≥ l1.
Next we want to show upper bounds on Succ(h, l). In order to do that, we will
need to be able to modify a protocol, and say that the resulting protocol is equivalent.
To do that, we will use the following definition of equivalence of protocols, which
will also be useful in the next chapter.
Definition 5.2. Let the distribution of (X,L1, . . . , Ln) be given and let π be a
protocol with transcript T and π̄ a protocol with transcript T̄ . For a transcript t of
π let µt denote the distribution (X,L1, . . . , Ln)|T=t, and similar for transcripts t̄ of
π̄. We say that π and π̄ are equivalent for (X,L1, . . . , Ln) (or just equivalent when
it is clear what the distribution of (X,L1, . . . , Ln) is) if the distribution of µT is the
same as the distribution of µT̄ .
Notice that for fixed t, µt is a distribution of (X,L1, . . . , Ln), so µT is a random
variable those values are themselves distributions over (X,L1, . . . , Ln). For π and
π′ to be equivalent, we require the probability that the posterior distribution of
(X,L1, . . . , Ln) is µ to be the same for both π and π
′. We have the following
proposition.
Proposition 5.28. If µ and µ′ are two distributions of (X,L1, . . . , Ln) with the
same support, then π and π̄ are equivalent for µ if and only if they are equivalent
for µ′.
Proof. Let (X,L) = (X,L1, . . . , Ln) be random variables with distribution given by
µ, and (X ′, L′) have the distribution given by µ′. Furthermore, let T̄ be the distri-
bution of the transcript when X,L are given by µ following protocol π̄. Similarly, we
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define T, T ′ and T̄ ′ the obvious way. By symmetry it is enough to prove one of the im-
plications in the proposition. Assume that π and π̄ are equivalent for µ. That means
that µT and µT̄ have the same distribution. As these distributions are over (X,L)
that is equivalent to the distributions (X,L, µT ) and (X,L, µT̄ ) being the same. In
particular, for any (x, l) in the domain of µ we have µT |(X,L)=(x,l) ∼ µT̄ |(X,L)=(x,l).
Thus, we have (X ′, L′, µT ′) ∼ (X ′, L′, µT̄ ′), where µT ′ denote the posterior distribu-
tion we would have over (X,L) given transcript T ′ if the prior distribution was still
given by µ. Let µ′T denote the posterior distribution given transcript T if the prior
distribution was given by µ′. What we need to show is (X ′, L′, µ′T ′) ∼ (X ′, L′, µ′T̄ ′).
We already know (X ′, L′, µT ′) ∼ (X ′, L′, µT̄ ′), so to finish the proof, we only need
to show that µ′t is a function of µt and that this function does not depend on which
protocol we use to produce T .
Using Bayes’ Theorem we have
µt(x, l) = Pr((X,L) = (x, l)|T = t) =




µ′t(x, l) = Pr((X
′, L′) = (x, l)|T ′ = t)
=
Pr(T ′ = t|(X ′, L′) = (x, l))
Pr(T ′ = t)
Pr((X ′, L′) = (x, l))
=
Pr(T = t|(X,L) = (x, l))







Pr(T ′ = t)
The last equality we use equation 5.8. This shows that given µ, µ′ and µT we can
compute µ′T up to the multiplicative constant
Pr(T=t′)
Pr(T ′=t′)
. But as µ′T is a probability
measure, it sums to 1, so it is a function of µ, µ′ and µT .
Thus, when the support of (X,L1, . . . , Ln) is clear, we can simply say equivalent.
Proposition 5.29. If π and π′ are equivalent collaborating cryptogenography pro-
tocols, then Succ(h, l, n, π) = Succ(h, l, n, π′).
Proof. The probability of winning given T = t only depends on µT . Thus, when
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µT ∼ µT ′ the probability of winning is the same for π and π′.
The next lemma shows that we can ensure that before any player crosses prob-
ability c of having the bit, seen from Eve’s perspective, that player lands on this
probability.
Lemma 5.30. Let π be any collaborating cryptogenography protocol, let (X,L1, . . . , Ln)
have any distribution and let c ∈ (0, 1). If Pr(Li = 1|X = x) < c for all i, x then
there exists an equivalent collaborating cryptogenography protocol π′ such that when
we use it on (X,L1, . . . Ln) and let T
′ denote its transcript, it satisfies: for all x ∈ X ,
all plri and all non-empty partial transcripts t
′k, if
Pr(Li = 1|T ′k = t′k, X = x) > c.
then there is a k′ < k such that




, X = x) = c
Proof. Let π, (X,L1, . . . , Ln) and c be given, and assume that (x, i) = (x0, i0) is
a counterexample to the requirement from the lemma. We will then construct a
protocol π′ such that (x0, i0) is not a counterexample for π
′, and any (x, i) that
satisfied the requirement for π also satisfy it for π′. By induction, this is enough to
prove the lemma.
We can assume that the messages in π are sent one bit at a time. We say a
partial transcript tk is problematic if
Pr(Li0 = 1|T k = tk, X = x0) < c
but
Pr(Li0 = 1|T k+1 = tk ◦m,X = x0) > c.
for some bit value m. Without loss of generality, assume that m = 1. Let p =
Pr(Tk+1 = 1|T k = t′k).
We will use the c-notation from Section 3.1, so for example
ctk,x0 = Pr(Li = 1|T k = tk, X = x0).
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Now
c > ctk,x0 = pctk◦1,x0 + (1− p)ctk◦0,x0
so ctk◦0,x0 < c. Let q ∈ (p, 1) be the number such that
c = qctk◦1,x0 + (1− q)ctk◦0,x0 .
Now we modify π. First, the player plrj, who is going to send to k + 1’th message
in π, decides if she would have sent 0 or 1 in π. If she would have sent 1 she sends
the bits 11. If she would have sent 0 she sends 10 with probability p(1−q)
q(1−p) ∈ (0, 1),
and otherwise she sends 00. In all cases she sends the bits one at a time. They
then continue the protocol π as if only the last of the two bits had been sent. The
protocol is defined more formally in Figure 5.11.
If we let T ′ denote the transcript of the protocol with this modification, we get
cT ′k+1=tk◦0,x0 = cTk+1=tk◦0,x0 < c
and
cT ′k+1=tk◦1,x0 =
pcTk+1=tk◦1,x0 + (1− p)p(1−q)q(1−p)cTk+1=tk◦0,x0
p+ (1− p)p(1−q)
q(1−p)
=qcTk+1=tk◦1,x0 + (1− q)cTk+1=tk◦0,x0
=c.
So if plrj sends 11 or 10 in the modified protocol, we land on probability c after
the first bit. Let π′ be the protocol we get from π by doing this modification for
each problematic partial transcript tk in π. It is clear that π and π′ are equivalent,
and that any (x, i) that satisfied the requirement before also does so afterwards.
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Parameters:
n : number of players
h : number of bits being leaked
(X,L) : joint distribution of secret and leakers
c : a probability
(x0, i0) : a counterexample to the requirement
π : a protocol where each message is one bit
Input distribution: (X,L) has some distribution over X × {0, 1}n. Each plri
learns Li and if Li = 1 she also learns X.
Protocol:
1. t := λ, k := 0
2. While t is not a complete transcript of π
3. Let plrj be the player to send the next bit in π when the transcript is t
4. If Pr(Li0 = 1|T k = t,X = x0) ≥ c or Pr(Li0 = 1|T k+1 = t ◦ b,X = x0) ≤ c
for both b ∈ {0, 1}
5. Player i choose and send her next message b as she would in π
6. t := t ◦ b, k := k + 1
7. else,
8. let b be the bit such that Pr(Li0 = 1|T k+1 = t ◦ b,X = x0) > c
9. p := Pr(Tk+1 = b|T k = t,X = x0)
10. let q be the number such that c = qctk◦1,x0 + (1− q)ctk◦0,x0
11. let plrj choose her next message b
′ as she would in π when the transcript
is t
12. if b′ = b she sends b′ ◦ b′
13. if b′ 6= b she sends b ◦ b′ with probability p(1−q)
q(1−p) and otherwise she sends
b′ ◦ b′
14. t := t ◦ b′, k := k + 1 (here everyone knows b′ because is always the last
bit plrj sent)
Figure 5.11: Protocol from the proof of Lemma 5.30.
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We are now ready to upper bound Succ.
Lemma 5.31. For any c ∈ (0, 1) and any h, l, n, π, we have Succ(h, l, n, π) ≤
1− ch+l log(1−c)+lc log(e)−c
h
.
Proof. As Succ(h, l, n) is non-decreasing in n, we can assume that n > l
c
, so that
Pr(Li = 1|X = x) < c at the beginning. By Lemma 5.30 and Proposition 5.29 we
can assume that π satisfies the requirement for π′ in 5.30.
Let π′ be the protocol that starts of as π, but where all the players starts to
pretend ignorance (as in the proof of Lemma 3.17) if Pr(Li = 1|T k = tk, X = x) = c
for some i, current transcript tk and the true value x of X. This ensures that
Pr(Li = 1|T ′ = t,X = x) ≤ c for all i and t. Let T ′ be the transcript of π′. From








We let Joe guess as he would if we used protocol π. By Fano’s inequality, (1.3),
















In the cases where Joe is wrong in π′ there are two possibilities: Either the players
did not pretend ignorance, in which case Joe would also be wrong if they used
protocol π, or they did pretend ignorance so Pr(Li = 1|T k = tk, X = x) = c for
some i and some smallest k. When this first happens Eve can just ignore all further
messages in π and guess that plri is leaking. This way she is wins with probability
at least c. Thus, all the situations in π′ where Joe guesses wrong, correspond to
situations in π where Eve would win with probability at least c. So Eve’s probability
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of winning when the players are using protocol π is at least
cPe ≥
ch+ l log(1− c) + lc log(e)− c
h
.
The following corollary will be strengthened in Corollary 5.34.
Corollary 5.32. For fixed l we have
lim
h→∞
Succ(h, l) = 0.
Proof. By Lemma 5.31 we have Succ(h, l) ≤ 1 − ch+l log(1−c)+lc log(e)−c
h
for each c ∈
(0, 1). Setting c = 1− ε we get
lim sup
h→∞
Succ(h, l) ≤ lim sup
h→∞
1− ch+ l log(1− c) + lc log(e)− c
h
= ε.
As Succ(h, l) ∈ [0, 1] and the above holds for all ε > 0 we have limn→∞ Succ(h, l) =
0.
We can now show an upper bound on Succ even when both l and h tend to
infinity linearly. This upper bound is illustrated in Figure 5.12
Theorem 5.33. Let r > 0 be a real number. Now
lim sup
l→∞
Succ(br log(e)lc, l) ≤ log(r + 1)
r log(e)
Proof. Set c = r
r+1
and h = br log(e)lc in Lemma 5.31. Then Eve’s probability of
winning is at least
rbr log(e)lc − l(r + 1) log(r + 1) + lr log(e)− r
br log(e)lc(r + 1)
As l tends to infinity, this tends to
r2 log(e)− (r + 1) log(r + 1) + r log(e)
r log(e)(r + 1)







0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Figure 5.12: The above graph shows our upper and lower bounds (Theorem 5.33
and Theorem 5.26) on Succ(cl, l) as a function of c for sufficiently large values of l.
We have not proved that the limit exists. Both upper and lower bounds are 1 at
c = 0 and tends to 0 for c→∞.
as wanted.
In particular we have the following corollary.
Corollary 5.34. Let h → ∞ and let l = l(h) be a function of h with l(h) = o(h).
Then Succ(h, l)→ 0.
Proof. Let l(h) = o(h) be a function. As Succ(h, l(h)) ∈ [0, 1] for all h, we only
need to show that for all ε > 0 there exists a h0 such that for all h ≥ h0 we have
Succ(h, l(h)) ≤ 2ε. We see that log(r+1)
r log(e)
→ 0 as r → ∞, so we can find a number r
such that log(r+1)
r log(e)
≤ ε. By Theorem 5.33 we have
lim sup
l→∞
Succ(br log(e)lc, l) ≤ log(r + 1)
r log(e)
≤ ε
So there exists a number l1 such that for all l ≥ l1 we have
Succ(br log(e)lc, l) ≤ 2ε.
As l(h) = o(h) there is a h1 such that for all h ≥ h1 we have h ≥ r log(e)l(h). By
Corollary 5.32 limh→∞ Succ(h, l) = 0 for each value l. So for each value l there is a
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h2(l) such that for all h ≥ h2(l) we have Succ(h, l) ≤ 2ε. Define h2 = maxl<l1 h2(l).
Now define h0 = max(h1, h2). We want to show that for any h ≥ h0 we have
Succ(h, l(h)) ≤ 2ε. If l(h) < l1, then h ≥ h0 ≥ h2 ≥ h2(l(h)), so Succ(h, l(h)) ≤ 2ε.
If l(h) ≥ l1 then
Succ(h, l(h)) ≤ Succ(br log(e)lc, l)
≤2ε.
Here the first inequality follows from h ≥ h0 ≥ h1 and Proposition 5.24, and the




Until now, we have assumed that even the players who are not trying to leak in-
formation will collaborate. In this chapter we will show that we do not need the
non-leakers to collaborate. As long as some people are communicating innocently
in a sufficiently non-deterministic way, we can use these people as if they were col-
laborating.
Formally, we model the innocent communication by an innocent communication
protocol. While protocols usually are designed to compute some function, innocent
communication protocols is a way of describing what is already going on. An inno-
cent communication protocol ι is a protocol that for each possible partial transcript
sk and each player j gives a finite set Msk,j of possible messages that that person
can send in the next round, and a probability distribution on that set. In innocent
communication protocols every person sends a message in each round. This assump-
tion is not a restriction: if we have a protocol where only one player sends messages
at a time, we can turn it into an innocent communication protocol, by requiring that
all the other players send the empty message with probability 1. Given an innocent
communication protocol ι and a cryptogenography protocol π, we will construct a
protocol ιπ which achieves the same as π, but where the non-leaker follow ι. We will
see that this is possible both for collaborative cryptogenographic protocols (The-
orem 6.1) and for the case where there are censors (Theorem 6.3), under slightly
different assumptions about ι.
To keep the theorems simple, we will only consider innocent communication
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protocols that continue for infinitely many rounds. This assumption is of course
unrealistic, but we will see that for any particular protocols ι and π and number
ε > 0 there is an integer k′ such that with probability 1− ε the first k′ messages of
ι will be enough.
In order to find the protocol ιπ you need have a description of the protocol ι.
This is a strong assumption: even if you are able to communicate innocently, it
does not mean that you are aware of the distribution you use to pick your random
messages. In steganography, the weaker assumption that you have a random oracle
that takes history and player index as input and gives a message following the
innocent distribution as output, is sometimes enough [41]. However, it is not clear
if this weaker assumption is enough for doing cryptogenography. While it may not
be possible to find ι for all kinds of innocent communications, there are situations
where we can approximate ι very well. For example, if a person posts blog posts,
we can consider the message to be only the parity of the minutes in the sending
time. This value will probably, for most people, be close to uniformly distributed
on {0, 1}.
6.1 Hiding among innocents without censors
Let S denote the random variable that is the infinite transcript we get from run-
ning ι, and let Sk denote the partial transcript of the first k rounds. We say
that ι is informative if for a random transcript S and for each player j we have∏
k∈N Pr(Sk,j = sk,j|Sk−1 = sk−1) = 0 with probability 1. Here Sk,j is the message
sent by player j in round k. In other words, if at each round in the protocol you try
to guess what message player j will send in the next round, then with probability 1
you will eventually fail. Notice that the model for innocent communication here is
almost the same as the definition of always informative in Hopper’s PhD thesis [41]
when one player is communicating.1
We say that a collaborating cryptogenography protocol π is revealing if there is
a partial transcript tk and a player plrj that is to send the next message A when
the transcript is tk and a message a such that plrj will send message a with positive
1The differences are that in [41], the communication is only from one player to another and∏
k∈N Pr(Sk,j = sk,j |Sk−1 = sk−1) has to go to 0 exponentially fast.
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probability if Lj = 1 but not if Lj = 0. If plrj did send such a message a, it would
reveal her as a leaker. If π is not revealing, we say that it is non-revealing.2 The
point in cryptogenography is to hide who is sending the information, so we are only
interested in non-revealing protocols.
The following is the main theorem of this section. Notice that in this theorem we
will assume that π is collaborative. Thus, the result can be used to strengthen the
results in Chapter 3 and Chapter 53 to a model where non-leakers are not actively
collaborating, but it cannot be used in the case where some players are actively
trying to prevent the leakage. In Theorem 6.3 we will show that a similar result
holds in that model.
Theorem 6.1. Let π be a non-revealing collaborating cryptogenography protocol,
and let ι be an informative innocent communication protocol. Then there exists a
protocol ιπ that is equivalent to π, but where the non-leakers follow the protocol ι.
Proof. We will define an algorithm that given π and ι constructs a protocol ιπ and at
the same time an interpretation function i that sends transcripts s of ιπ to transcripts
t of π. We want them to satisfy the following.
1. For each partial transcript sk of ιπ and each player plrj, the protocol ι
π gives
a probability distribution, depending only on X,Lj, s
k and j that plrj will
use to choose his next message.
2. If Lj = 0 then plrj chooses her messages in ι
π using the same distributions
as in ι.
3. The interpretation function i sends (infinite) transcripts s of ιπ to either tran-
scripts t of π or to “error”. The probability of error is 0.
2A non-revealing protocol can also reveal who the leakers are. For example, if it is known that
exactly one person is leaking and all but one person sends a message that could not have been
sent by a leaker. However, if Pr(L = (0, . . . , 0)) > 0 then a non-revealing protocol will never reveal
anyone as a leaker.
3The construction suggested in Lemma 5.1 for achieving certainty about the secret results in
revealing protocol. However, assuming that it is possible to send message that are never send in
ι, you can use Lemma 5.1 on ιπ to get a protocol where you learn X with certainty. All other
protocols in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 are non-revealing.
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4. If T denotes the transcript of π and S denotes the transcript of ιπ, then given
that i(S) is not error, (X,L1, . . . , Ln, i(S)) is distributed as (X,L1, . . . , Ln, T ).
5. For each transcript t of π, the random variable (X,L1, . . . , Ln) is independent
from S given i(S) = t.
Here the second requirement ensures that non-leakers can follow the protocol without
knowing X or π. In fact, unlike in the collaborating communication protocol, they
might be thinking that everyone is just having an innocent conversation. Thus, in ιπ
we often refer to the non-leakers as innocents. Notice the important assumption that
first the innocent communication protocol ι is defined and then we create a protocol
ιπ for leaking information on top of that. This corresponds to assuming that the
non-leaking players either do not care about the leak, or that they are oblivious to
the protocol. If ι was allowed to depend on what the leakers do, the non-leaking
players could try to prevent the leak. The model where some of the non-leakers are
motivated to prevent the leakage has been analysed in Chapter 4.
The fourth of the above requirements tells us that ιπ reveals at least as much
about (X,L1, . . . , Ln) as π and the last requirement says that we do not learn any-
thing more. This ensures that Joe and Eve, who both know ιπ, learn exactly as much
from the transcript of ιπ as they would from the transcript of π. Recall that in Def-
inition 5.2, we defined two protocols π and π′ to be equivalent for a distribution µ
of (X,L) if, when used on input (X,L), the distributions of posterior distributions
µT and µT ′ are the same.
Proposition 6.2. If ιπ satisfies the above requirements, then ιπ and π are equivalent.
Proof. By assumption, i gives error with probability 0, so we can ignore all those
cases. By requirement 4, i(S) has the same distribution as T , and by requirement
4 and 5 the distribution µs of (X,L1, . . . , Ln) given S = s equals the distribution
µi(s). Thus, µS, µi(S) and µT have the same distribution.
Before we construct the protocol ιπ we will define a function i′ that sends partial
transcripts sk
′
of ιπ to tuples (tk, [y, z)) where tk is a partial transcript of π, and
[y, z) ⊂ [0, 1) is a half-open interval. When i′(sk′) = (tk, [y, z)), we refer to tk as
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the interpretation of sk
′
. Loosely speaking, the point of the interval is that not
all messages in ι are sufficiently unlikely that they can correspond to a message in
π, so instead of interpreting them to a message in π, we store the information by
remembering an interval. This is very similar to arithmetic coding [76], however
it is complicated by the fact that each player’s messages depend on other players’
messages. For an infinite transcript s, the function i′ will satisfy
1. i′(λ) = (λ, [0, 1)), where λ is the empty transcript
2. If i′(sk
′
) = (tk, [y, z)) then either
• i′(sk′+1) = (tk ◦m, [0, 1)) for some message m in π, or
• i′(sk′+1) = (tk, [y′, z′)), where [y′, z′) ⊆ [y, z)
3. If i′(sk
′
) = (tk, [y, z)) and tk is a complete transcript for π, then y = 0, z = 1
and i′(sk
′′
) = (tk, [0, 1)) for all k′′ ≥ k′
Thus, every time we reveal one more round from the transcript s, we will either
learn one message in π from the interpretation of s, or the interval gets smaller or
stays the same. If i′(sk
′





) and j(tk) denote the index of the player to send the next message in π
when the current transcript is tk. When it is clear what sk
′
is, we write j instead
of j(sk
′
). We will sometimes abuse language, and talk about what the players are
doing in π even if they are following ιπ. For example if j = j(sk
′
) we might say that
“j is sending the message m in π” instead of “j is sending messages in ιπ which will
be interpreted as m by i′”. If i′(sk
′
) = (tk, [y, z)) and i′(sk
′+1) = (tk ◦m, [0, 1)) we
say that at time k′ player j(sk
′
) finished sending the message m in π and at time
k′ + 1 player j(sk
′+1) starts sending a new message in π.
For each partial transcript tk of π, we let Atk denote the set of possible next
messages. We assume that all sets of messages, both in π and ι, have an ordering,
for example the lexicographical order. Algorithm 1 gives a pseudo code for i′, but
we will also define it in the main text.
Define a function f : [0, 1)→ Atk,j such that






2: t← λ . λ denotes the empty string, t a partial transcript
3: k ← 0
4: y ← 0
5: z ← 1
6: for r from 1 to k’ do
7: y′ ← y + (z − y) Pr(Sr,j(t) < sr,j(t)|Sr−1 = sr−1)
8: z′ ← y + (z − y) Pr(Sr,j(t) ≤ sr,j(t)|Sr−1 = sr−1)
9: y ← y′
10: z ← z′
11: if ∃a ∈ At : Pr(Tk+1 < a|T k = t, Lj(t) = 0) ≤ y and
12: z ≤ Pr(Tk+1 ≤ a|T k = t, Lj(t) = 0) then
13: t← t ◦ a
14: k ← k + 1
15: y ← 0
16: z ← 1
17: if t is a complete transcript then




22: return (t, [y, z))
23: end procedure
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By definition of innocent communication protocol, each message in ι is chosen from
a finite set, but to explain the point of the function f , imagine for now that ι said
that in the next round plrj should send a real number chosen uniformly from [0, 1).
We could now interpret that as the message f(x) ∈ Atk in π. Then ιπ would say
that if plrj was innocent he should send a number uniformly from [0, 1) and if he
was leaking, he should first choose a ∈ Atk using the distribution specified by π, and
then send a number chosen uniformly at random from f−1(a). More generally, if ι
said that plrj should choose his next message M from some continuous distribution
on R, we could take the quantile function given Lj = 0 of the message, that is
m 7→ Pr(M < m|Lj = 0),
to turn it into a message that is uniform on [0, 1) given Lj = 0. Unfortunately, there
is only finitely many possible messages for plrj to sent in each round, so instead of
getting a number out of the quantile function, we define a similar function to get
an interval. Let i′(sk
′
) = (tk, [y, z)) and choose some ordering on Msk′ ,j. Define
g : [y, z)→Msk′ ,j by
g−1(m) = {y + (z − y)t|t ∈ [Pr(M < m|Lj = 0),Pr(M ≤ m|Lj = 0))}.
Here when we write M we are implicitly assuming that the current transcript is sk
′
.
Instead of getting a number in [0, 1) out of m ∈Mj,sk′ , as we did above, we now get
an interval g−1(m) ⊂ [y′, z′), whose length is proportional to the probability that
an innocent player would send that message. If g−1(m) ⊂ f−1(a) for some a ∈ Atk
we say that plrj send a in π and define i
′(sk
′+1) = (tk ◦ a, [0, 1)). Otherwise, plrj
is not done sending his message and we define i′(sk
′+1) = (tk, g−1(m)). Algorithm
1 gives a pseudo code for computing i′. Here sr,j denotes the message in ι sent by
player j in round r.
If for some k′ we have i′(sk
′
) = (t, [0, 1)) where t is a complete transcript of π we
define i′(sk
′′
) = (t, [0, 1)) for all k′′ > k′ and i(s) = t. If for some s no such k′ exists,
we define i(s) to give “error”.
Next we define the protocol ιπ. Any non-leaking player chooses his messages as
given by ι and when the current transcript is sk
′
all players except plrj(sk′ ) also
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choose their messages as in ι. When a leaking player, plrj(sk′ ), starts sending a
message in π, he first choose the message a ∈ Atk using the distribution given by π
(this distribution depends on X = x). Next he chooses a number α randomly and
uniform in f−1(a). Until he has sent his message in π, he will now send messages
m such that α ∈ g−1(m). This uniquely specifies which messages m to send (notice
that g will depend on current transcript in ιπ, so m is not necessarily the same for
every round, and can depend on messages sent by other players). When we get to a
transcript sk
′
that is interpreted as a complete transcript t of π, all the players will
just follow ι. Figure 6.1 defines ιπ more formally, and Figure 6.2 gives an example
of how one message in π is send by using ιπ.
We see that if in π a leaking player’s distribution of a is exactly the same as a
non-leaking players, then the distribution of the number α chosen by the leaking
player is uniform on [0, 1). By the definition of g, the probability that a leaking
player sends a particular message m in ιπ is exactly the probability given by ι, and
thus the same as a non-leaking player. Using this reasoning in the opposite direction,
this tells us that we can assume that even the innocents, when starting sending a
message in π, chooses a uniformly distributed α ∈ [0, 1) and sends the message m
such that α ∈ g(m), until they have sent the message in π. They probably do not
do that, but the probability of any transcript is the same as if they did.
Finally, we need to check that ιπ satisfies the 5 requirements. The first two
follow from the construction. To show the third, we need to show that for a random
transcript s of ιπ there will with probability 1 exists a k′ such that i′(sk
′
) = (t, [0, 1))
where t is a complete transcript for π. As π only has finitely many rounds, it is
enough to show that for each message of π we start sending in ιπ, there is probability
1 that we will finish sending it. Assume that i′(sk
′
) = (tk, [0, 1)) for some k′, where
tk is an incomplete transcript of π, but for all k′′ > k′ the interpretation of sk
′′
is still
tk. If plrj(sk′ ) is innocent, everyone will be following ι, so by the assumption that ι
is informative, the set of transcripts where the length of the interval does not go to
0 has probability 0. As stated earlier we can assume that when sending a message in
π, even the innocents starts by choosing a random number α uniformly from [0, 1).
As f only jumps in finitely many points, there is probability 0 that plrj(sk′ ) chooses
one of these points. If he does not, and the length of the interval goes to 0, he will
eventually send his message in π. Thus, there is probability 0 that a non-leaker
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does not send his message. A leaker chooses his random α ∈ [0, 1) using a different
distribution, but we can divide [0, 1) into a finite set of intervals (given by f−1(a))
such that it is uniform on each of these intervals. This tells us that given sk
′
there
is a constant C such that, as long as plrj(sk′ ) is still sending the same message in
π, any continuation of the transcript is at most C times more likely when plrj(sk′ )
is leaking as when he is not leaking. Thus, there is still probability C · 0 = 0 that
he will not finish his message in π.
For the fourth requirement, we observe that any leaking player is actually choos-
ing messages in π following the distribution given by π, and then making sure that
the message send in ιπ will be interpreted as the message he wanted to send in π.
The innocent players are not doing this, but we have seen that the distribution on
the message they send in ιπ are the same as if they did. Thus, requirement 4 holds.
Finally, we see that given i(S) = t a player not sending a message in π always
follows ι and a player sending a message in π can be thought of as haven chosen
an α uniformly from f−1(a) where a is the next message in transcript t. This is
independent from (X,L1, . . . , Ln) and thus the last requirement follows.
To implement the protocol ιπ the leaking players do not have to choose all the
infinitely many digits in a random number α. Instead, they can just for each message
compute the probability that they would send each message if they had chosen an
α. We also see that if i(S) does not give an error, then there is some k such that
Sk determines i(S). If we let K be the random variable that is ∞ when we have
error and otherwise gives the smallest value k such that Sk determines i(S), then
we know that Pr(K =∞) = 0. So all the probability mass of K is on the integers,
hence for any ε > 0 there must exists some k0 such that Pr(K ≥ k0) < ε. That is,
i(Sk0) gives a total transcript with probability greater than 1− ε.
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Parameters:
π : A collaborative cryptogenography protocol
ι : An informative innocent communication protocol
Input distribution: (X,L) has some distribution over X × {0, 1}n. Each plri
learns Li and if Li = 1 she also learns X.
Protocol:
1. t := λ, k := 0, s′ := λ, k′ := 0
2. While t is not a complete transcript of π
3. Let plrj be the player to send the next bit in π when the transcript is t
4. If Lj = 1, plrj chooses the message tk+1 according to π and she chooses
an α uniformly at random from the interval [Pr(Tk+1 < a|T k = tk, Lj =
0),Pr(Tk+1 ≤ a|T k = tk, Lj = 0))
5. y := 0, z := 1
6. While no new message have been added to t:
7. If Lj = 1 let sk′+1 be the unique message such that y+(z−y) Pr(Sk′+1,j <
sk′+1) ≤ α < y+(z−y) Pr(Sk′+1,j < sk′+1) where the probabilities are according
to ι.
8. Leakers plri with i 6= j and non-leakers all sends a message according to
ι, if plrj is a leakers, she now sends the message sk′+1,j chosen in the previous
line
9. s′ := s′ ◦ sk′+1, k′ := k′ + 1 where sk′+1 is the list of messages sent in the
previous line
10. y′ = y + (z − y) Pr(Sk′+1,j < sk′+1), z′ = y + (z − y) Pr(Sk′+1,j < sk′+1)
11. y := y′, z := z′
12. If there exists a tk+1 with [y, z) ⊂ [Pr(Tk+1 < a|T k = tk, Lj =
0),Pr(Tk+1 ≤ a|T k = tk, Lj = 0)) then t := t ◦ tk+1 and k := k + 1
13. Everyone follows ι




















Figure 6.2: Example of how to construct a part of ιπ.
In this figure we see an example of how construct a part of ιπ. The line in the
middle represent the interval [0, 1), which contain subsets [y, z) for i′. In π, the next
player to send a message is plrj. The message A1 should come from A = {a1, a2},
which is represented on the left of the figure. We have Pr(A1 = a
1|Lj = 0) = 0.4,
so f : [0, 1) → A sends x ∈ [0, 0.4) to a1, and x ∈ [0.4, 1) to a2 as indicated. Now
Lj = 1, so plrj first chooses a message from A to send, this happens to be a1, and
then a number α chosen randomly and uniformly from f−1(a1).
In ι, the next message Mλ that plrj sends should be fromMλ = {m1λ,m2λ}. If plrj
was innocent and was following the protocol ι, we would have Pr(Mλ = m
1
λ) = 0.6,
so g1 : [0, 1) → Mλ sends x ∈ [0, 0.6) to m1λ and the rest to m2λ. As α ∈ [0, 0.6),
plrj now sends the message m
1




λ) overlaps with both f
−1(a1)
and f−1(a2), so an observer cannot yet determine which message in π plri was
sending, so plrj has not sent his message yet. His next message, M1, should be
send from M1 = {m11,m21}, and again it happens that if he was following ι then
Pr(M1 = m
1
1) = 0.6, so g1 : [0, 0.6) → M1 sends x ∈ [0, 0.36) to m11 and the rest
to m21. As α ∈ [0, 0.36), plrj sends the message m11, and now g−11 (m11) ⊂ f−1(a1),
so now an observer can see that plrj was sending the message a
1 in π, and plrj is
done sending his message in π.
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6.2 Hiding among innocents with censors
In this section we will show that even when there are censors, the leakers can still
hide among players who are following a fixed innocent strategy ι. We cannot simply
reuse the protocol ιπ from above, because the censors might obstruct the protocol.
This can be done in two ways: either by obstructing when j(sk) is a censor, or when
it is not. When j(sk) is a censor, that censor can keep sending message which makes
the interval in i′(sk) smaller: the censor could simply send messages as if he had
chosen an α which is on the boundary between two intervals on the form f−1(a).
When the j(sk) is not a censor, the censors could possibly obstruct the protocol by
making player j(sk)s messages uninformative. For example, suppose that ι says that
only one player should send a non-empty message in each round, and no players can
start sending non-empty messages before the player who currently sends non-empty
messages sends the message “over”. Then a censor can ensure that j(sk) cannot
send her message in π by never sending the message “over”. Such a protocol ι could
still satisfy our definition of informative, if the probability that a player following ι
does not send “over” tends to 0.
To avoid this problem, we need a stronger definition than informative. We say
that an innocent communication protocol ι is strongly informative for all players
plrj, we have
∏
k∈N Pr(Sk,j = sk,j|Sk−1 = sk−1) = 0 for all possible transcripts s.
While “informative” means that we cannot predict all of player js messages with
positive probability when all the players follow ι, “strongly informative” means that
we cannot do so with positive probabilities, even if we can control the messages send
by all the other players.
Even if we assume that ι is strongly informative, censors could still obstruct
the protocol ιπ when they are j(sk) as described above. To avoid this, we need to
eventually give up on a player sending a message in π. That is, if the interval in
i′(sk
′
) = (tk, [y, z)) becomes too small, we will define i′(sk+1) = (tk ◦ tk+1,0, [0, 1))
where tk+1,0 is the lexicographically first element in Atk . When this happens, we say
that player j = j(sk
′
) timed out. From here, the players (and the function i) will
continue as if player j had sent tk+1,0 in π, except that if player j is a leaker, she
will now follow ι, i.e. pretend ignorance, for the rest of the protocol.
The following is a resilient version of Theorem 6.1.
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Theorem 6.3. Let n,L ∈ N, h, ε, ε′ > 0, b = (bl, bc, bm) with bm < 1 be given. Let π
be an (n, h,L, ε, b)-protocol and ι a strongly informative innocent communication
protocol. Then there exists an (n, h,L, ε + ε′, b)-protocol ιπ,res where the neutral
players follow ι.
Proof. Let π and ι be as in the statement of the theorem.
We define i′ just as in the proof of Theorem 6.1, except that if the interval
z − y becomes very small, i′ will just say that the current player j(tk) sent the
lexicographically first message, tk+1,0, in Atk . When this happens, we say that




Pr(Tk+1 = tk+1|T k = tk, Lj(tk) = 0)
2k+2 · |Atk | · ε′
Notice that Ctk is strictly positive: as π is a (n, h,L, ε, b)-protocol, it is a b-leaker
protocol, hence it is non-revealing, so any message send by a leaker could be send
by a non-leaker. Algorithm 2 computes this new i′.
Next we need to specify ιπ,res. In this protocol, the non-leakers will follow ι. Any
leaker j will do as in the proof of Theorem 6.1 (of course using the new i′ to interpret
other player’s messages), unless j has previously timed out. Once a leaker has timed
out, that leaker will follow ι for the rest of the communication. The protocol ιπ,res
is defined more formally in Figure 6.3.
Before we show that this ιπ,res is a (n, h,L, ε + ε′, b)-protocol, we will show two
propositions.
Proposition 6.4. For any infinite transcript S where leaker and innocent are fol-
lowing ιπ,res and censors are following σ′, there exists some k′ such that i′(Sk
′
) =
(t, [0, 1)) where t is a complete transcript using protocol π and some σ.
Proof. As π only has finitely many rounds, it is enough to show that any message
started will be finished. Assume the i′(sk
′
) = (tk, [0, 1)) for some k′. For k′′ > k′
with i′(sk
′′
) = (tk, [y, z]) we have












2: t← λ . λ denotes the empty string, t a partial transcript
3: k ← 0
4: y ← 0
5: z ← 1
6: for r from 1 to k’ do
7: y′ ← y + (z − y) Pr(Sr,j(t) < sr,j(t)|Sr−1 = sr−1)
8: z′ ← y + (z − y) Pr(Sr,j(t) ≤ sr,j(t)|Sr−1 = sr−1)
9: y ← y′
10: z ← z′
11: if ∃a ∈ At : Pr(Tk+1 < a|T k = t, Lj(t) = 0) ≤ y and
12: z ≤ Pr(Tk+1 ≤ a|T k = t, Lj(t) = 0) then
13: t← t ◦ a
14: k ← k + 1
15: y ← 0
16: z ← 1
17: else
18: if z − y < Ctk then
19: t← t ◦ tk+1,0 . If this line is evaluated we say j(tk) timed out
20: k ← k + 1
21: y ← 0
22: z ← 1
23: end if
24: end if
25: if t is a complete transcript then
26: return (t, [0, 1))
27: end if
28: end for
29: return (t, [y, z))
30: end procedure
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Sl,j(tk) = sl,j(tk)|Sl−1 = sl−1
)





Sl,j(tk) = sl,j(tk)|Sl−1 = sl−1
)
< Ctk . This shows that i
′(sk
′′+1)
cannot be on the form (tk, [y, z)), so the message must be finished.
Thus, we can define i(S) to be the complete transcript t with i′(Sk
′
) = (t, [0, 1))
just as we did in the proof of Theorem 6.1.
Proposition 6.5. For any x and any l, if the leakers and neutral are following
ιπ,res, and the censors are following some σ′, the probability that at least one leaker
or neutral will time out during the execution of the protocol given X = x and L = l
is at most ε′.
Proof. Let us bound the probability that a leaker or neutral will time out while in
round k of π given tk−1. As stated in the proof of Theorem 6.1, we can assume that
leakers and neutrals first decide on a message a ∈ Atk−1 and then choose a number
α ∈ f−1(a). We want to bound the probability that α is within a distance of Ctk−1 of
the boundary between two intervals on the form f−1(a′). As there are |Atk−1| such
intervals, there are |Atk−1| − 1 < |Atk−1| such boundaries. Thus, the set of numbers
that are within Ctk−1 of such a boundary has measure at most 2Ctk−1 |Atk−1 |. When










Pr(T k = a′|T k−1 = tk−1, Lj = 0)
.
Here | · | denotes the length of an interval. Thus, the probability given a that α is







this is true for all a, the probability is this at most 2−kε′ when taking the weighted
average over a. We see that when α is at least Ctk−1 away from a boundary point,
4Here we are assuming, just as in Chapter 4, that the censors will only send messages that a
neutral would send with positive probability. If we allow censors to send other messages we would
have to modify i′, but just as we argued in Chapter 4, this can be done by pretending that such
players send a default message tk,0 whenever it is their turn.
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we cannot have z − y < Ctk−1 and α ∈ [y, z) without [y, z) being contained in an
interval on the form f−1(a). Thus, in round k of π there is probability at most 2−kε′
that a leaker or a neutral will time out, so in total there is probability at most ε′
that a non-censor times out.
We are now ready to show that ιπ,res is a (n, h,L, ε + ε′, b)-protocol. To do so,
we need to show two properties of ιπ,res: reasonable doubt and reliable leakage.
Proposition 6.6. The protocol ιπ,res keeps reasonable doubt, that is, it is a b-leaker
protocol.
Proof. By assumption, π is a b-leaker protocol. This implies that the likelihood ratio
of π is at most r(b). From the proof of Theorem 6.1 we know that if it was not for
the possibility of timing out, the likelihood ratio of ιπ,res would also be at most r(b).
For any particular player, j, we see that the fact that other players can time out
does not affect the upper bound on player js likelihood ratio, and if player j times
out, she will just start pretending ignorance. Thus, the likelihood ratio of ιπ,res is at
most r(b), so ιπ,res is a b-leaker protocol.





L = (L1, . . . Ln) ∼ b. Assume the leakers and neutrals use ιπ,res to communicate.
Then there is a function G′ taking as values subsets of X = [2dhe] of size at most L,
such that no matter what protocol σ′ the censors use, we have Pr(X ∈ G′|X = x) ≥
1− ε− ε′.
Proof. Define G′(S) = G(i(S)), where G is the function which shows π to be an
(n, h,L, ε, b)-protocol. For any censor protocol σ′ used against ιπ,res, we define a
joint distribution of (X,L, T, S) as follows. We let (X,L) be distributed as in the
statement of this theorem. For simplicity, we first consider the case without censor.
When the leakers and neutral sends a message in ιπ,res we can, as we argued in the
proof of Theorem 6.1, assume that they first think of a message in π they want to
send. By using the messages they were thinking of to get a distribution of T , and
the message they send to get the distribution of S, we get a distribution (X,L, T, S)
such that i(S) = T unless someone timed out. Next we add the censors. For these,
we simply assume that they follow σ′ to construct our distribution of S, and we
use i′ to interpret this as a distribution of message tk. This way we still have a
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distribution of (X,L, T, S) where i(S) = T unless either a leaker or a neutral timed
out. The probability that such a player times out is at most ε′ given X = x. By the
union bound,
Pr(X 6∈ G′(S)|X = x) = Pr(X 6∈ G(i(S))|X = x)




π : A resilient cryptogenography protocol
ι : A strongly informative innocent communication protocol
ε′ : Acceptable increase in probability of error
Input distribution: (X,L) has some distribution over X ×{−1, 0, 1}n. Each plri
learns Li and if |Li| = 1 she also learns X, and if Li = −1 she also learns L− =
(min(L1, 0), . . . ,min(Ln, 0)). Players plri with Li 6= −1 will follow the protocol we
define here, but and players with Li = −1 might follow any censor protocol σ.
Protocol:
1. t := λ, k := 0, s′ := 0, k′ := 0
2. While t is not a complete transcript of π
3. Let plrj be the player to send the next bit in π when the transcript is t
4. If Lj = 1, plrj chooses the message tk+1 according to π and then chooses
an α uniformly at random from the interval [Pr(Tk+1 < a|T k = tk, Lj =
0),Pr(Tk+1 ≤ a|T k = tk, Lj = 0))
5. y := 0, z := 1
6. While no new message have been added to t:
7. If Lj = 1, let sk′+1 be the unique message such that y+(z−y) Pr(Sk′+1,j <
sk′+1) ≤ α < y + (z − y) Pr(Sk′+1,j < sk′+1) where Sk′+1,j ∼ ι.
8. Leakers plri with i 6= j and non-leakers all sends a message according to
ι, if plrj is a leakers, she now sends the message sk′+1,j chosen in line 7
9. s′ := s′ ◦ sk′+1, k′ := k′ + 1 where sk′+1 is the list of messages sent in line
8 , y′ := y + (z − y) Pr(Sk′+1,j < sk′+1), z′ := y + (z − y) Pr(Sk′+1,j < sk′+1) ,
y := y′, z := z′
10. If there exists a tk+1 with [y, z) ⊂ [Pr(Tk+1 < a|T k = tk, Lj =
0),Pr(Tk+1 ≤ a|T k = tk, Lj = 0)) then t := t ◦ tk+1 and k := k + 1
11. Else, if z−y < Ctk as defined in the proof, then t := t◦ tk+1,0, k := k+1
12. Everyone follows ι




In this chapter, we consider a model where there is only one leaker and we want
to ensure that an observer can guess a secret, but does not get much advantage in
guessing who the leaker was. However, unlike in the rest of this thesis, we will in
this chapter assume that the adversary has bounded computational power. We will
see that even with this weaker adversary, the leaker can only reveal a very small
amount of information. However, the leaker can do something she cannot do against
an unbounded adversary: she can bootstrap an anonymous channel. That is, if she
has access to an expensive or small anonymous channel as well as a large public
non-anonymous channel, she can use this to send a large message anonymously.
One idea for having anonymous communication might be to use steganography.
The goal of traditional steganography is to hide that a certain communication is
taking place, by embedding sensitive content in innocent looking traffic (such as
pictures, videos, or other documents). There is no doubt that steganography is a
useful tool for Lea the leaker: using steganography she could send sensitive docu-
ments to Joe the journalist in such a way that even someone monitoring all internet
traffic would not be able to notice that this sensitive communication is taking place.
However, steganography alone cannot help Lea if she wants to make sure that even
Joe does not learn her identity.
To solve this problem, we introduce a novel cryptographic primitive, which we
call anonymous steganography. Very informally, anonymous steganography works
in the following way: Lea wants to communicate a sensitive large message x to
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Joe. To do so, she embeds x in some large innocent looking document c which
she uploads to a popular website, not necessarily in an anonymous way. Then
Lea produces some short decoding key dk which is a function of c and all other
documents on the website – or at least a set large enough so that her identity is
hidden in a large group of users, such as “all videos uploaded last week”. She then
sends dk to Joe using an anonymous channel. Now Joe is able to recover the original
message x from the website using the decoding key dk, but at the same time Joe
has no way of telling which document contains the message and therefore which
of the website’s users is the leaker. Intuitively, it is crucial for Lea’s anonymity
that Joe can only decode the entire website: if Joe had a way of decoding single
documents or portions he would easily be able to pinpoint which document actually
contains the leaked message. To construct an anonymous steganography scheme we
will be using an indistinguishablity obfuscator. These are conjectured to exist and
a candidate construction exists [30], but they have not been proved secure under
standard cryptographic assumptions. Furthermore, the candidate construction is so
slow that our scheme is currently infeasible in practice.
In the scheme described above, Lea sends Joe a decoding key dk using a pre-
existing anonymous channel. It is a natural question to ask whether this is necessary,
or if we can construct a scheme where all communication between Lea and Joe takes
place over regular channels. Unfortunately this is too good to be true, and in
Section 7.4 we prove that it is impossible to construct an anonymous steganography
scheme unless Lea sends a key of super-logarithmic size to Joe. The idea behind the
proof is: if the scheme is correct at some point the probability that Joe outputs x
has to increase from exponentially small to 1. Once the probability has increased
to only polynomially small, Joe can estimate how each message sent by any of the
users over the non-anonymous channel affects this probability and concludes that
the messages which increases this probability the most, must come from the leaker.
Hence, the message that causes this increase has to be sent over an anonymous
channel.
In this chapter we will assume that the innocents sample their documents in-
dependently from the uniform distribution. As we are assuming the adversary has
bounded computational power, we could weaken this to the assumption that inno-
cents are uploading documents which are computationally indistinguishable from
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uniformly distributed. This is a good model if Lea is uploading her message to a
webpage where people upload encrypted documents or if she is taking part in a
cryptographic protocol where each person provides a large amount of randomness.
If she is uploading to a webpage where the innocent communication is not com-
putational indistinguishable from uniform, we could imagine using the results from
Chapter 6. However, this requires knowing the distribution of innocent messages.
This might be a reasonable assumption when the domain is small, for example
it is realistic to find a distribution which is very close to computationally indis-
tinguishable from the minute number a blogpost is posted. However, for larger
messages, this is much harder, for example it will be extremely difficult to define a
distribution over videos which is indistinguishable from videos uploaded to youtube.
Instead, if Lea is uploading to a website where the documents do not look uniformly
distributed, she should use a steganography protocol to transform her uniformly
looking message ti to an innocent looking message t
′
i. If the transcript of innocent
looking documents is (t′1, . . . , t
′
n) we define tj to be what you get when applying the
steganographic extraction algorithm on t′j. For a good steganography protocol this
tj should be computationally indistinguishable from uniform, when t
′
j is chosen from
the innocent distribution. The problem of finding such steganography protocols is
well known (see Section 2.3).
7.1 Definitions
We define an anonymous steganography scheme to be a tuple of four algorithms,
(Gen,Enc,KeyEx,Dec). All algorithms, even when not specified, take as input the
security parameter λ, and the length parameters s, `, `′ (s is short, ` is long). The
syntax of the algorithm is as follows:
• ek ← Gen(1λ) is a randomized algorithm which generates an encoding key ek.
• c ← Encek(x) is a randomized algorithm which encodes a secret message x ∈
{0, 1}`′ into a (random looking) document c ∈ {0, 1}`.
• dk ← KeyExek(t, i) takes as input a public vector of documents t ∈ ({0, 1}`)d,
an index i ∈ [d] such that ti = c and extracts a (short) decoding key dk ∈
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{0, 1}s.
• x′ = Decdk(t) recovers a message x′ using the decoding key dk and the public
vector of documents t in a deterministic way.
We chose to keep Gen separated from Enc since a single key could be used to
encode multiple messages – in a natural extension of the scheme Lea hides her
secret(s) in a subset of documents I ⊂ [d]. Finally, KeyEx is a separated algorithm
since it takes as input documents which are generated from honest users after c is
published.
7.1.1 How to use the scheme
To use anonymous steganography, Lea generates the encoding key ek using Gen and
encodes her secret x using Encek to get the c. Lea then uploads c to this website
as if she was a normal user of the website, and waits until more honest content is
published. Then she chooses the set of documents she is hiding among, for example,
all files uploaded to this website during that day or that week. Lea then downloads
all these documents t and finds the index i of her own document in this set. Finally,
she computes dk ← KeyExek(t, i), and uses the small anonymous channel to send dk
to Joe together with a pointer to t.
Lea can use this scheme, even if Joe have never heard about anonymous steganog-
raphy beforehand. In this case, Lea can just send him a short message over the
anonymous channel, asking him to run a program that finds t on the internet and
computes Decdk on them.
7.1.2 Properties
We require the following properties: correctness (meaning that x′ = x with over-
whelming probability), compactness (meaning that s < `′) and anonymity (meaning
that the receiver does not learn any information about i). Another natural require-
ment is confidentiality (meaning that one should not be able to learn the message
without the decoding key dk), but we will see that this follows from anonymity.
Formal definitions follow.
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Definition 7.1 (Correctness). We say an anonymous steganography scheme is q-
correct if for all λ ∈ N, x ∈ {0, 1}`′ , i ∈ [d], t−i ∈ ({0, 1}`)d−1 over {0, 1}` the
following holds:
Pr [Decdk ((t−i, c)) = x] ≥ q,
where ek ← Gen(1λ), c ← Encek(x), dk ← KeyExek((t−i, c), i) and the probabilities
are taken over all the randomness in these algorithms. We simply say that a scheme
is correct when q ≥ 1− negl(λ).
Definition 7.2 (Anonymity). We define a game between an adversary A and a
challenger C :
1. The adversary A outputs a message x ∈ {0, 1}`′ ;
2. The challenger C:
(a) generates a key ek ← Gen(1λ);
(b) samples a bit b← {0, 1};
(c) computes cb ← Encek(x) and samples c1−b ← {0, 1}`;
(d) outputs c0 and c1;
3. The adversaryA outputs a vector t such that there exists i0 and i1 with ti0 = c0
and ti1 = c1;
4. The challenger C finds a possible value of ib and outputs dk ← KeyExek (t, ib);
5. A outputs a guess bit g;
We say π satisfies anonymity if for all PPT A we have
∣∣Pr[g = b]− 1
2
∣∣ = negl(λ).
This definition says that even if all but two of the players are censors, Eve will
not be able to get an advantage in guessing which of the two non-censors is the
leaker. This definition implies that if there are more than two non-leakers, Eve still
do not get any advantage when guessing who the leakers are. The definition given
here is much stronger than the definition in the published version of the work [50]:
in the original definition, the adversary had to send i0, i1 and t−(i0,i1) before receiving
ti0 and ti1 . Unlike the original definition, the above definition provides anonymity
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against an adversary who controls the database to which Lea is uploading files, and
who can reorder, insert and delete documents in an attempt to break the anonymity.
The anonymity set will be the set of users who uploaded documents that have not
been modified. Thus, an adversary with control over the website would be able to
confirm that Lea was the leaker by modifying all the other documents. However, this
is unlikely, as the adversary would have to do this before the leak has been completed,
and would have to suspect that Lea was about to leak information anonymously
using this particular database.
It might also seem natural to add the requirement that an adversary who does
not know dk cannot get any information about the message. However, as we will
see below, this follows from the anonymity requirement.
Definition 7.3 (Confidentiality). Consider the following game:
1. A outputs x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1}`, i, t−i;
2. Coutputs ti ← EncGen(1λ)(mb) with b← {0, 1};
3. A outputs a guess bit g;
We say π satisfies confidentiality if for all PPT A we have
∣∣Pr[g = b]− 1
2
∣∣ = negl(λ).
Given an adversary B which breaks confidentiality we construct an adversary A
for anonymity. First, assume for contradiction that for any message x0 adversary B
has only negligible advantage when guessing if a string is t0 ← EncGen(1λ)(x0) or r ←
{0, 1}`. By a hybrid argument, B would then only have negligible advantage when
guessing if a string is t0 ← EncGen(1λ)(x0) or t1 ← EncGen(1λ)(x1). This contradicts
the assumption that B breaks confidentiality.
Thus, we can choose a message x0 where B has non-negligible advantage in
distinguishing it from r ← {0, 1}`. Now we let A be an adversary that sends this
message x0 in the first round of the anonymity game, and later chooses i0, i1 and t
in any legal way. Then A runs B on c0. Because B has a non-negligible advantage at
telling the difference between c0 ← EncGen(1λ)(x0) and a random sample c0 ← {0, 1}`,
A will have a non-negligible advantage at the anonymity game.
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7.2 Building blocks
In this section, we will describe the building blocks we will use to construct an
anonymous steganography scheme.
7.2.1 Indistinguishability obfuscation.
An indistinguishability obfuscator is a randomized function that takes a circuit as
input and gives a circuit as output. The idea is that the output circuit should
compute the same function as the input circuit, but at the same time hide the
information, such as a secret key, which was used to build the input circuit. We use
an obfuscator O as proposed in [30] which takes any polynomial size circuit C and
outputs an obfuscated version O(C) that satisfies the following property.
Definition 7.4 (Indistinguishability Obfuscation). We say O is an indistinguisha-
bility obfuscator for a circuit class C if for all C0, C1 ∈ C such that ∀x : C0(x) = C1(x)
and |C0| = |C1| it holds that:
1. ∀C ∈ C,∀x ∈ {0, 1}n,O(C)(x) = C(x);
2. |O(C)| = poly(λ|C|)
3. for all PPT A:
|Pr[A(O(C0)) = 1]− Pr[A(O(C1)) = 1]| < negl(λ)
It is not known if indistinguishable obfuscators exist, but a candidate has been
proposed [30]. Even if they exist, they are far from being efficient enough to be
practical.
7.2.2 IND-CPA public-key encryption scheme
A public-key encryption scheme is a tuple (E.G,E.E,E.D) where, E.G takes the secu-
rity parameter as input and outputs (pk, sk) where pk is called the public key and
sk is the (secret) private key. The encryption algorithm E.E takes the public key
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and a message as input, and outputs a ciphertext c ← E.Epk(x), and the decryp-
tion algorithm E.D takes the private key and a ciphertext as input, and outputs a
message x′ ← E.Dsk(c). We make the following definitions
Definition 7.5. A public-key encryption scheme (E.G,E.E,E.D) is correct if, for all
λ and all x ∈ {0, 1}` we have x = E.Dsk(E.Epk(x)) whenever (pk, sk)← E.G(λ).
Definition 7.6. We define the indistinguishability game for chosen plaintext attack,
or IND-CPA game as follows.
1. C choose b← {0, 1}.
2. C compute (pk, sk)← E.G(λ) and sends pk to the attacker.
3. A outputs two messages m0,m1.
4. C outputs c← E.Epk(mb)
5. A outputs a guess g
We say that (E.G,E.E,E.D) is IND-CPA secure if for all PPTA we have





Informally, a homomorphic encryption scheme is a way to encrypt data in such a
way that someone can make computations on the data, even if they cannot decrypt
it.
Formally, let (HE.G,HE.E,HE.D) be an IND-CPA public-key encryption scheme
with an additional algorithm HE.Eval which on input the public key pk, n ciphertexts
c1, . . . , cn and a circuit C : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} outputs a ciphertext c∗, then we say
that:
Definition 7.7 (Correctness – HE). An HE scheme (HE.G,HE.E,HE.D,HE.Eval) is
correct for a circuit class C if for all C ∈ C
HE.Dsk(HE.Evalpk(C,HE.Epk(x1), . . . ,HE.Epk(xn)) = C(x1, . . . , xn)
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Definition 7.8 (Compactness – HE). An HE scheme (HE.G,HE.E,HE.D,HE.Eval)
is called compact if there exists a polynomial s ∈ poly(λ) such that the output of
HE.Eval(C, c1, . . . , cn) is at most s bits long (regardless of the size of the circuit |C|
or the number of inputs n).
The first candidate homomorphic encryption for all circuits was introduced by
Gentry [31]. Later Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [7] showed that it is possible to
build homomorphic encryption based only on the (reasonable) assumption that the
learning with error problem (LWE) is computationally hard.
7.2.4 Pseudorandom functions
A pseudorandom function family (or a PRF ) is a function f : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}λ →
{0, 1}, such that for random k ∈ {0, 1}λ, the function x → f(k, x) is indistinguish-
able from random. More formally, we consider the following game.
• Challenger chooses b← {0, 1}, k ← {0, 1}λ.
• If b = 1 then h(x) = f(k, x) if b = 0 then h(x) is chosen uniformly and
independently from {0, 1} for each x ∈ {0, 1}λ.
• The adversary A gets oracle access to h.
• The adversary A outputs a guess bit g.
We say that f is a PRF if for all PPT A we have
∣∣Pr[g = b]− 1
2
∣∣ < negl(λ).
It is well known that the existence of one way function (implied by the existence
of homomorphic encryption) implies the existence of PRFs.
7.2.5 Somewhere statistically binding vector commitment
scheme
This primitive was introduced by Hubáček and Wichs [43] under the name some-
where statistically binding hash, but we think that the term vector commitment
scheme is better at communicating the goal of this primitive.
The idea behind commitment schemes in general is that you can commit to
some value without revealing it. For example, suppose you made some prediction,
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represented with a string β, which you do not want to reveal for now. However, you
also want to ensure that in the future, you can prove that you made this particular
prediction. To do this, you could compute γ = H(β ◦r) for some cryptography hash
function H and randomness r and reveal the result, or you could encrypt β and
reveal the result γ. Later you can reveal that you had chosen β, by revealing β and
the randomness used. This is called decommiting. In the first case, γ will typically
be much shorter than β, and the commitment will only be computational. That is,
there exists a β′ 6= β with H(β′ ◦ r′) = γ, but the commitment scheme still works,
because such β′and r′ are hard to find. In the second case, the commitment will
be statistically binding1, which means that there are no β′ 6= β which encrypt to γ,
however, γ will have to be at least as long as β.
To construct an anonymous steganography scheme, we will need a commitment
scheme. The problem is, we need the best from both types of commitments: we
need the γ to be much shorter than β to make our dk shorter than the message
we send, but we also need the commitment to be statistically binding to make our
proofs work. This is impossible, for the simple reason that if γ is much shorter than
β, there are more possible values of β than γ, so each β cannot have their own γ.
Instead, we will be using what we call a vector commitment scheme. In this scheme,
any commitment will be computationally binding, which mean that we can make
γ shorter than β, but it will also be statistically binding in one particular entry i.
That is, if you can open γ as both β and β′ we must have βi = β
′
i. Furthermore,
the value of i will not be known to the person who makes the commitment.
More formally a SSB vector commitment scheme is composed of the following
algorithms:
Key Generation: The key generation algorithm ck ← VC.G(1λ, L, i) takes as input
an integer L ≤ 2λ and index i ∈ [L] and outputs a public key ck.
Commit: The commit algorithm VC.Cck : ({0, 1}`b)L → {0, 1}`c is a deterministic
polynomial time algorithm which takes as input a string x = (x1, . . . , xL) ∈
({0, 1}`b)L and outputs VC.Cck(x) ∈ {0, 1}`c .
1Assuming the encryption scheme is correct will probability 1, not just probability 1− negl(λ).
This is not the case for deniable encryption, which is designed specifically to ensure that the
encryption can be opened to something else. [11]
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Decommit: The decommit algorithm π ← VC.Dck(x, j) given the commitment key
ck, the input x ∈ ({0, 1}`b)L and an index j ∈ [L], creates a proof of correct
decommitment π ∈ {0, 1}`d .
Verify: The verify algorithm VC.Vck(y, j, u, π) given the key ck and y ∈ {0, 1}`c an
integer index j ∈ [L], a value u ∈ {0, 1}`b and a proof π ∈ {0, 1}`d , outputs 1
for accept (that y = VC.Cck(x) and xj = u) or 0 for reject.
Definition 7.9 (Vector Commitment Scheme – Correctness). A vector commitment
scheme is correct if for any L ≤ 2λ and i, j ∈ [L], any ck ← VC.G(1λ, L, i), x ∈
({0, 1}`b)L, π ← VC.Dck(x, j) it holds that VC.Vck(VC.Cck(x), j, xj, π) = 1.
Definition 7.10 (Vector Commitment Scheme – Index Hiding). We consider the
following game between an attacker A and a challenger C:
• The attacker A(1λ) chooses an integer L and two indices i0 6= i1 ∈ [L];
• The challenger C chooses a bit b← {0, 1} and sets ck ← VC.G(1λ, L, ib).
• The attacker A gets ck and outputs a guess bit g.
We say a vector commitment scheme is index hiding if for all PPT A we have∣∣∣∣Pr[g = b]− 12
∣∣∣∣ < negl(λ)
Definition 7.11 (Vector Commitment Scheme – Somewhere Statistically Binding).
We say ck is statistically binding for index i if there are no y, u, u′, π, π′ such that
u 6= u′ and
VC.Vck(y, i, u, π) = VC.Vck(y, i, u
′, π′) = 1
In Hubáček and Wichs [43] it is shown how to construct SSB vector commitments
using homomorphic encryption. Notice that we do not require the scheme to be
computationally binding, because this property follows from the properties of being
somewhere statistically binding and index hiding: an adversary who can break the
binding at some coordinate will learn that that coordinate was not statistically
bound.
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7.3 A protocol for anonymous steganography
We start with a high-level description of our protocol (in steps) before presenting
the actual construction and proving that it satisfies our notion of anonymity.
First attempt: Let the encoding key ek be a key for a PRF f , and let the
encoding procedure simply be a random looking symmetric encryption of x using
this PRF. That is, cj = xj ⊕ fek(j) where xj is the jth bits in x and cj the jth bit
in c. Clearly now the resulting document c is indistinguishable from other elements
sampled from the uniform distribution over {0, 1}`.
In this first attempt we let the decoding key dk be the obfuscation of a circuit
C[i, ek, γ](t). The circuit contains two hard-wired secrets, the index of Lea’s docu-
ment i ∈ [d] and the key for the PRF ek. It also contains the hash of the entire set
of documents γ = H(t). On input a database t the circuit checks if γ = H(t) and if
this is the case outputs x by decrypting ti with ek.
Clearly this first attempt fails miserably since the size of the circuit is now
proportional to the size of the entire database t = d`, which is even larger than the
size of the secret message |x| = `′ ≤ `.
Second attempt:2 To remove the dependency on the number of documents
d, we include in the decoding key an encryption α = HE.Epk(i) of the index i
(using the homomorphic encryption scheme), and an obfuscation of a (new) circuit
C[ek, sk, γ](β), which contains hardwired secrets ek and sk (the secret key for the
homomorphic encryption scheme), as well as a hash γ = H(HE.Eval(mux[t], α)),
where the circuit mux[t](i) outputs ti. The circuit C now checks that γ = H(β) and
if this is the case computes ti ← HE.Dsk(β) using the secret key of the HE scheme,
then decrypts ti using the PRF key ek and outputs the secret message x. When Joe
receives the decoding key dk, Joe constructs the circuit mux[t] (using the public t)
and computes β = HE.Eval(mux[t], α). To learn the secret, he runs the obfuscated
circuit on β.
In other words, we are now exploiting the compactness of the homomorphic
encryption scheme to let Joe compute an encryption of the document c = ti from
the public database t and the encryption of i. Since Lea the leaker can predict this
2A different approach at this stage could be to use iO for Turing machines [53]. Unfortunately,
[53] uses complexity-leveraging and therefore must assume sub-exponentially hard iO for circuits,
while the solution described next will be secure using only standard hardness.
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ciphertext3, she could construct a circuit which only decrypts when this particular
ciphertext is provided as input. However, the size of β is proportional to poly(λ)+`,
so the obfuscation of C is still too long.4
Third attempt: To remove the dependency from the length of the document
`, we construct a circuit which takes as input an encryption of a single bit j of ti
instead of the whole ciphertext. However, we also need to make sure that the circuit
only decrypts these particular ciphertexts, and does not help Joe in decrypting
anything else. Moreover, the circuit must perform this check efficiently (meaning,
independent of the size of `), so we cannot simply “precompute” these ` ciphertexts
and hardwire them into C.
This is where we use the vector commitment scheme: we let the decoding key
include a commitment key ck. We include in the obfuscated circuit a commitment
γ = VC.Cck(β), where β = (β
1, . . . , β`) is a vector of encryptions of bits, and we
make sure that the circuit only helps Joe in decrypting these ` ciphertexts. In
other words, we obfuscate the circuit C[ek, sk, ck, γ](β′, π′, j) which first checks if
VC.Vck(γ, j, β
′, π′) = 1 and if this is the case it outputs the jth bit of x from the jth
bit of the ciphertext tji ← HE.Dsk(β′). We have now almost achieved our goal, since
the size of the decoding key is poly(λ log(d`)).
Final attempt: We now have to argue that our scheme is secure. Intuitively,
while it is true that the index i is only sent in encrypted form, we have a problem
since the obfuscated circuit contains the secret key for the homomorphic encryption
scheme, and we therefore need a final fix to be able to argue that the adversary does
not learn any information about i.
The final modification to our construction is to encrypt the index i twice under
two independent public keys. From these encryptions Joe computes two independent
encryptions of the bit tji which he inputs to the obfuscated circuits together with
proofs of decommitment. The circuit now outputs ⊥ if any of the two decommitment
proofs are incorrect, otherwise the circuit computes and outputs xj from one of the
two encryptions and ignores the second ciphertext.
Anonymity: Very informally, we can now prove that Joe cannot distinguish
3The evaluation algorithm HE.Eval can always be made deterministic since we do not need
circuit privacy.
4Note that the decryption key also contains an encryption of i which depends logarithmically
on d, but we are going to ignore all logarithmic factors.
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between the decoding keys computed using indices i0 and i1 in the following way:
we start with the case where the decoding key contains two encryptions of i0 (this
corresponds to the game in the definition with b = 0). Then we define a hybrid game
where we change one of the two ciphertext from being an encryption of i0 with an
encryption of i1. In particular, since we change the ciphertext which is ignored by
the obfuscated circuit, this does not change the output of the circuit at all (and
we can argue indistinguishability since the obfuscated circuit does not contain the
secret key for this ciphertext). We also replace the random document ci1 with an
encryption of x with a new key for the PRF. Finally, we change the obfuscated
circuit and let it recover the message x from the second ciphertext. Thanks to the
SSB property of the commitment scheme it is possible to prove, in a series of hybrids,
that the adversary cannot notice this change. To conclude the proof we repeat the
hybrids (in inverse order) to reach a game which is identical to the definition of
anonymity when b = 1.
The Actual Construction: A complete specification of our anonymous steganog-
raphy scheme follows. Note that in our construction `′ = `.
Key Generation: On input the security parameter λ the algorithm Gen samples
a random key ek ∈ {0, 1}λ for the PRF and outputs ek.
Encoding: On input a message x ∈ {0, 1}` and an encoding key ek the algorithm
Enc outputs an encoded message c ∈ {0, 1}` where for each bit j ∈ [`], cj =
xj ⊕ fek(j).
Key Extraction: On input the encoding key ek, the database of documents t,
and index i such that ti = c the algorithm KeyEx outputs a decoding key dk
generated as follows:
1. For all u ∈ {0, 1} run (pku, sku)← HE.G(1λ) and αu ← HE.Epku(i).
2. For all j ∈ [`], u ∈ {0, 1} run βju = HE.Evalpku(mux[t, j], αu)5 where the
circuit mux[t, j](i) outputs the j-th bit of the i-th document tji ;
3. For all u ∈ {0, 1} run cku ← VC.G(1λ, `, 1) and γu ← VC.Ccku(β1u, . . . , β`u).
5Note that we consider HE.Eval to be a deterministic algorithm. This can always be achieved
by fixing the random tape of HE.Eval to some constant value.
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4. Pick a random bit σ ∈ {0, 1}.








1, j) as fol-
lows:
(a) if(∀u ∈ {0, 1} : VC.Vcku(γu, j, β′u, π′u)) output HE.Dskσ(β′σ)⊕ fek(j);
(b) else output ⊥;
6. Compute an obfuscation C̄ ← O(Cσ) where Cσ is a shorthand for the
circuit defined before, padded to length equal to maxτ,ρ(C,C
′
τ,ρ), where
the circuits C ′τ,ρ are defined in the proof of security.
7. Output dk = (pk0, pk1, α0, α1, ck0, ck1, C̄)
Decoding: On input a decoding key dk and a database of documents t the algo-
rithm Dec outputs a message x′ in the following way:
1. Parse dk = (pk0, pk1, α0, α1, ck0, ck1, C̄);
2. For all j ∈ [`], u ∈ {0, 1} run βju = HE.Evalpku(mux[t, j], αu);
3. For all u ∈ {0, 1} run γu ← VC.Ccku(β1u, . . . , β`u).
4. For all j ∈ [`], u ∈ {0, 1} compute πju ← VC.Dcku((β1u, . . . , β`u), j);
5. For all j ∈ [`] output (x′)j ← C̄(βj0, βj1, πj0, πj1, j);
Theorem 7.1. If a) f is PRF b) (VC.G,VC.C,VC.D,VC.V) is a vector commitment
scheme satisfying Definitions 7.9-7.11 c) (HE.G,HE.E,HE.D,HE.Eval) is a homomor-
phic encryption scheme satisfying Definition 7.5-7.8 and d) O is an obfuscator for
all polynomial size circuits satisfying Definition 7.4 then the anonymous steganogra-
phy scheme (Gen,Enc,KeyEx,Dec) constructed above satisfies Definition 7.1 and 7.2
and has |dk| = poly(λ log(d`)).
Proof. Correctness follows from inspection of the protocol. In particular, for each
















By Definition 7.7, ∀u ∈ {0, 1} the ciphertext βju is such that
HE.Dsku(β
j




Now, since tji = x
j⊕fek(j) it follows that the output z of C̄ is either ⊥ or xj. Finally,
the circuit only outputs ⊥ if ∃u ∈ {0, 1} such that VC.Vcku(γu, j, βju, πju) = 0. But
since
cku ← VC.G(1λ, `, 1), γu ← VC.Ccku(β1u, . . . , β`u), πju ← VC.Dcku((β1u, . . . , β`u), j),




u) = 1 so C̄, and therefore Dec, outputs
xj.
We prove anonymity using a series of hybrid games. We start with a game
which is equivalent to the definition when b = 0 and we end with a game which is
equivalent to the definition when b = 1. We prove at each step that the next hybrid
is indistinguishable from the previous. Therefore, at the end we conclude that the
adversary cannot distinguish whether b = 0 or b = 1.
Hybrid 0: This is the same as the definition when b = 0. In particular, here it
holds that
(α0, α1)← (HE.Epk0(i0),HE.Epk1(i0)).
Hybrid 1: In the first hybrid we replace α1−σ with α1−σ ← HE.Epk1−σ(i1). Note
that the circuit C[ek, σ, skσ, ck0, ck1, γ0, γ1](·) does not contain the secret key sk1−σ,
therefore any adversary that can distinguish between Hybrid 0 and 1 can be turned
into an adversary which breaks the IND-CPA property of the HE scheme.
Hybrid 2: In the previous hybrids ti1 is a random string from {0, 1}`. In this
hybrid we replace ti1 with an encryption of x using a new PRF key ek
′. That is, for
each bit j ∈ [`] we set tji1 = xj ⊕ fek′(j). Clearly, any adversary that can distinguish
between Hybrid 1 and Hybrid 2 can be used to break the PRF.
Hybrid 3.(τ, ρ): We now define a series of 2` hybrids indexed by τ ∈ [`], ρ ∈
{0, 1}. In Hybrid 3.(τ, ρ) we replace the obfuscated circuit with the circuit:









1. if(∃u ∈ {0, 1} : VC.Vcku(γu, j, β′u, π′u) = 0) output ⊥
2. else if(j ≥ τ + ρ) output HE.Dskσ(β′σ)⊕ fek(j);




We use C ′τ,ρ as a shorthand for a circuit defined as above, and which, if necessary,
is padded to make Cσ and all the C
′
τ,ρ’s equally long.
In addition, we also replace the way the keys for the vector commitment schemes
are generated. Remember that in the previous hybrids
∀u ∈ {0, 1} cku ← VC.G(1λ, `, 1),
which are now replaced with
∀u ∈ {0, 1} cku ← VC.G(1λ, `, τ).
From inspection it is clear that in Hybrid 3.(1, 0) is computationally indistin-
guishable from Hybrid 2 thanks to Definition 7.4 (Bullet 3) since 1) the keys ck0, ck1
are identically distributed and 2) the circuit C ′1,0 computes the same function as the
circuit C obfuscated in Hybrid 2: since j is indexed starting from 1 we always have
j ≥ 1 + 0 and the branch (3) is never taken.
Next, we argue that Hybrid 3.(τ, 0) is indistinguishable from Hybrid 3.(τ, 1).
First we note that the commitment keys ck0, ck1 are identically distributed in these
two hybrids i.e., in both hybrids
∀u ∈ {0, 1} cku ← VC.G(1λ, `, τ).
The only difference between the two hybrids is what circuits are being obfuscated:
in Hybrid 3.(τ, 0) we obfuscate C ′τ,0 and in Hybrid 3.(τ, 1) we obfuscate C
′
τ,1. We will
now argue that these two circuits give the same output on every input, and therefore
an adversary that can distinguish between Hybrid 3.(τ, 0) and Hybrid 3.(τ, 1) can
be used to break the indistinguishability obfuscator.
It follows from inspection that the two circuits behave differently only on inputs






1, τ). On input of this form:
• C ′τ,0 (since j = τ ≥ τ) chooses branch (2) and outputs
xj0 ← HE.Dskσ(β′σ)⊕ fek(j),
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• C ′τ,1 (since j = τ 6≥ τ + 1) chooses branch (3) and outputs
xj1 ← HE.Dsk1−σ(β′1−σ)⊕ fek′(j).
Now, the statistically binding property of the vector commitment scheme (Defini-
tion 7.11) allows us to conclude that there exists only one single pair (β′0, β
′
1) for
which C ′τ,0 and C
′
τ,1 do not output ⊥ (remember that in both hybrids the commit-
ment keys ck0, ck1 are statistically binding on index τ), namely the pair
∀u ∈ {0, 1} βju = HE.Evalpku(mux[t, τ ], αu)
which decrypts to the pair (tji0 , t
j
i1
) (since we changed α1−σ in Hybrid 1), which in




) = (xj ⊕ fek(j), xj ⊕ fek′(j))
which implies that xj0 = x
j
1 and therefore the two circuits have the exact same
input/output behavior.
Finally, we argue that Hybrid 3.(τ, 1) is indistinguishable from Hybrid 3.(τ+1, 0)
for all τ ∈ [`] since by definition the circuits C ′τ,1 and C ′τ+1,0 are identical and the
only difference between these hybrids is in the way the commitment keys ck0, ck1
are generated. In particular, the only difference is the index on which the keys
are statistically binding. Therefore, any adversary who can distinguish between
3.(τ, 1) and Hybrid 3.(τ + 1, 0) can be used to break the index hiding property
(Definition 7.10) of the vector commitment scheme.
This concludes the technical core of our proof, what is left now is to make few
simple changes to go from Hybrid 3.(`, 0) to the game from Definition 7.2 when
b = 1.
Hybrid 4: In this hybrid we replace the obfuscated circuit with
C[ek′, σ′, skσ′ , ck0, ck1, γ0, γ1](·)
where σ′ = 1− σ. It is easy to see that the input/output behavior of this circuit is
exactly the same as C ′`,1: since ∀j ∈ [`] : j 6≥ ` + 1 the circuit C ′`,1 always executes
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branch 3) and therefore an adversary that can distinguish between Hybrid 4 and
Hybrid 3.(`, 0) can be used to break the indistinguishability obfuscator.
Hybrids 5, 6, 7: In Hybrid 5 we change the distribution of both commit-
ment keys ck0, ck1 to VC.G(1
λ, `, 1) whereas in Hybrid 4 they were both sampled
as VC.G(1λ, `, `). Indistinguishability follows from the index hiding property. In
Hybrids 6 we replace ti0 with a uniformly random string in {0, 1}` whereas in the
previous hybrid it was an encryption of x using the PRF f with key ek. Since the
obfuscated circuit no longer contains ek we can use an adversary which distinguishes
between Hybrids 5 and 6 to break the PRF. In Hybrid 7 we replace α1−σ′ (which
in the previous hybrid is an encryption of i0) with an encryption of i1. Since the
obfuscated circuit no longer contains sk1−σ′ = skσ we can use an adversary which
distinguishes between Hybrids 6 and 7 to break the IND-CPA property of the en-
cryption scheme. Now Hybrid 7 is exactly as the definition of anonymity with b = 1
with a random bit σ′ = 1 − σ (which is distributed uniformly at random) and a
random encoding key ek′. This concludes the proof.
Our theorem, together with the results of [43] implies the following.
Corollary 7.2. Assuming the existence of homomorphic encryption and indistin-
guishability obfuscators for all polynomially sized circuits, there exists an anonymous
steganography scheme.
7.4 Lower bound
In this section we show that no correct anonymous steganography scheme can have a
decoding key of size O(log(λ)). Since the decoding key must be sent over an anony-
mous channel, this gives a lower bound on the number of bits which are necessary
to bootstrap anonymous communication.
To show this, we find a strategy for Joe that gives him a higher probability of
guessing the leaker than if he guessed uniformly at random.
Our lower bound applies to a more general class of anonymous steganography
schemes than defined earlier, in particular it also applies to reactive schemes where
the leaker can post multiple documents to the website, as a function of the documents
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posted by other users. We define a reactive anonymous steganography scheme as a
tuple of algorithms π = (Enc,KeyEx,Dec) where:
• (tk, statej) ← Encek(x, tk−1, statej−1) is an algorithm which takes as input a
message x ∈ {0, 1}`′ , a sequence of documents tk−1 (which represents the set
of documents previously sent) and a state of the leaker, and outputs a new
document tk ∈ {0, 1}`, together with a new state.
• dk ← KeyExek(td, state) is an algorithm which takes as input a transcript of all
documents sent and the current state of the leaker and outputs a decryption
key dk ∈ {0, 1}s.
• x′ = Decdk(td) is an algorithm that given transcript td returns a guess x of
what the secret is in a deterministic way.
To use a reactive anonymous steganography scheme, the leaker’s index i is chosen
uniformly at random from {1, . . . , n} where n is the number of players. For each
k from 1 to d we generate a document tk. If k 6≡ i mod n we let tk ← {0, 1}`.
This corresponds to the non-leakers sending a message. When k ≡ i mod n we
define (tk, statej)← Encek(x, tk−1, statej−1). Then we define dk ← KeyExek(td, state)
and x′ = Decdk(t
d). Here dk is the message that Lea would send over the small
anonymous channel.6
The definition of q-correctness for reactive schemes is the same as for standard
schemes, but our definition of anonymity is weaker because we do not allow the
adversary to choose the documents for the honest users. By using a weaker definition
of anonymity, we get a stronger lower bound.
Definition 7.12 (Correctness). A reactive anonymous steganography scheme is q-










where t and dk is chosen as above.
6Note that an anonymous steganography scheme can easily be turned into a reactive anonymous
steganography scheme by combining Gen and Enc into one algorithm and storing ek in the state.
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Definition 7.13 (Weak Anonymity). Consider the following game between an ad-
versary A and a challenger C
1. The adversary A outputs a message x ∈ {0, 1}`′ ;
2. The challenger C samples random i ∈ [n], and generates td, dk as described
above
3. The challenger C outputs td, dk
4. A outputs a guess g;
We say that an adversary has advantage ε(λ) if
∣∣Pr[g = i]− 1
n
∣∣ ≥ ε(λ). We say a
reactive anonymous steganography scheme provides anonymity if, for any adversary,
the advantage is negligible.
In this model we assume that the non-leakers’ documents are chosen uniformly
at random. This is realistic in the case where we use steganography, so that each tk
is the result of extracting information from a larger file. We could also define a more
general model where the distribution of each non-leaker’s documents tk depends on
the previous transcript. The proof of our impossibility results works as long as the
adversary can sample from Tk|Tk−1=tk−1,i 6≡k mod n in polynomial time. An assumption
like this is necessary to ensure that running a cryptographic protocol, for example
multi-party computation, is not considered to be innocent communication. Using
this general model, we can also model the more realistic situation where the players
do not take turns in sending documents, but at each step only send a document
with some small probability. To do this, we just consider “no document” to be a
possible value of tk.
We could also generalize the model to let the leaker use the anonymous channel
at any time, not just after all the documents have been sent. However, in such a
model, the anonymous channel transmits more information than just the number
of bits send over the channel: the times at which the bits are sent can be used to
transmit information [44]. For the number of bits sent to be a fair measure of how
much information is transferred over the channel, we should only allow the leaker
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to use the channel when Joe knows she would use the anonymous channel7, and
the leaker should only be allowed to send messages from a prefix-free code, which
might depend on the transcript, but should be computable in polynomial time for
Joe. This ensures that he receives another bit if and only if he expects to receive a
bit, thus, he only gets information from the values of the bits he receives, not from
whether he receives a bit. Our impossibility result also holds for this more general
model, however, to keep the notation simple, we will assume that the anonymous
channel is only used at the end.
Also note that we assume that Eve knows the secret. If we assume that Eve
does not know the message X, but its distribution is known to everyone, there is
a protocol π that reveals the secret with probability 1
n
but reveals no information
about the leaker: Simply let the first player say a random number i between 1 and
n. Then player i sends a message. If she is the leaker she sends x otherwise she
just send a random message from the same distribution as X. Then Dec is just the
message she sent.
Finally, we could generalize the model by allowing access to public randomness.
However, this does not help the players: as none of the players are controlled by the
adversary, the players can generate trusted randomness themselves.
We let T ′ = (T ′1, . . . , T
′
d) denote the random variable where each T
′
i is uniformly
distributed on {0, 1}`. In particular T ′|T ′k=tk is the distribution the transcript would
follow if the first k documents are given by tk and all the players were non-leakers.
We let dk′ be uniformly distributed on {0, 1}s. Joe can sample from both T ′|T ′k=tk
and dk′ and he can compute Dec. His strategy to guess the leaker, given a transcript
t, will be to estimate Pr(Decdk′(T
′) = x|T ′k = tk) for each k ≤ d. That is, given that
the transcript of the first k documents is tk and all later documents are chosen as
if the sender was not a leaker and the anonymous channel just sends random bits,
what is the probability that the result is x? He can estimate this by sampling: given
tk he randomly generates td and dk′, and then he computes Dec of this extended
transcript.
If we assume that the protocol π is symmetric8 in the messages x, then before
7That is, there should be a polynomial time algorithm that given previous transcript tk and
previous messages over the anonymous channel decides if the leaker sends a message over the
anonymous channel.
8By this we mean that for random transcript T ′ and random dk′ the result Decdk′(T
′) is uni-
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any documents are sent, we have Pr(Decdk′(T
′) = x|T ′0 = t0) = 2−`′ . If, after all
the documents are sent, there exists a key dk′ ∈ {0, 1}s such that Decdk′(td) = x,
then for a random dk′ we must have Pr(Decdk′(T
′) = x|T ′d = td) ≥ 2−s. As s < `′
the documents in td must have increased the probability of decoding to x. The
non-leakers’ documents affect this probability, but in expectation they do not, so
in most cases most of this increase will have to come from the leaker, that is,
these probabilities would tend to be higher just after the leaker’s documents than
just before. Of course, a leaking player might send some documents that lowers
Pr(Decdk′(T
′) = x|T ′k = tk) to confuse Joe, so we need a way to add up all the
changes a players does to Pr(Decdk′(T
′) = x|T ′k = tk). The simplest idea would be
to compute the additive difference
Pr(Decdk′(T
′) = x|T ′k = tk)− Pr(Decdk′(T ′) = x|T ′k−1 = tk−1)
and add these for each player. However, the following example shows that if Joe
uses this strategy for determining who the leakers is, there is a protocol for two
people which ensures that Pr(Decdk(T ) = X) > 1 − ε but Joe will almost always
guess that the non-leaker is the leaker.
Example 3. Consider this protocol for two players, where one of them wants to
leak one bit. We have s = 0, that is dk is the empty string and will be omitted
from the notation. First we define the function Dec. This function looks at the
two first documents. If none of these are 0`, it returns the first bit of the third
document. Otherwise, it defines the leader to be the first player who send 0`. Next
Dec looks at the first time the leader sent a document different from 0`. If this
number represents a binary number less than 9
10
· 2`, then Dec returns the last bit
of the document before, otherwise it outputs the opposite value of that bit. If the
leader only sends the document 0`, then the output of Dec is just the last bit sent
by the other player.
The leaker’s strategy is to become the leader. There is extremely small proba-
bility that the non-leaker sends 0` in his first document, so we will ignore this case.
Otherwise, the leaker sends 0` in her first document and becomes the leader. When
sending her next document, she looks at the last document from the non-leaker. If
formly distributed. In the formal proof we will show why we can make this assumption.
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it ended in 0, Joe will think there is 90% chance that 0 it is output and 10% chance
that the output will be 1, and if it ended in 1 it is the other way around. If the last
bit in the non-leakers document is the bit the leakers wants to leak, she just sends
the document 0`−11. To Joe, this will look like the non-leaker raised the probability
of this outcome from 50% to 90% and then the leaker raised it to 100%. Thus, Joe
will guess that the non-leaker was the leaker.
If the last bit of the previous document was the opposite of what the leaker
wanted to reveal, she will “reset” by sending 0`. This brings Joe’s estimate that
the result will be 1 back to 50%. The leaker will continue “resetting” until the
non-leaker have sent a document ending in the correct bit more times than he has
sent a document ending in the wrong bit. For sufficiently high d, this will happen
with high probability, and then the leaker sends 0`1. This ensures that Dec(T ) gives
the correct value and that Joe will guess that the non-leaker was the leaker.
If the leaker wants to send many bits, the players can just repeat this protocol.
Obviously, the above protocol for revealing information is not a good protocol:
it should be clear to Joe that the leader is not sending random documents.
As the additive difference does not work, Joe will instead look at the multiplica-
tive factor
Pr(Decdk′(T
′) = x|T ′k = tk)
Pr(Decdk′(T ′) = x|T ′k−1 = tk−1)
.
Definition 7.14. For a transcript t the multiplicative factor mfj,[k0,k1] of player j





′) = x|T ′k = tk)







′) = x|T ′k = tk)
Pr(Decdk′(T ′) = x|T ′k−1 = tk−1)
,
If we use the multiplicative factor on the non-leaker in the protocol in Example
3 we see that for each document sent by the non-leaker there is probability 0.5
that his multiplicative factor increases by a factor 1.8 and probability 0.5 that it
is multiplied by a factor 0.2. Thus, if the non-leaker first sends a document which
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decreases Pr(Decdk′(T
′) = x|T ′k = tk) from 0.5 to 0.1 and later a document that
increases it from 0.5 to 0.9, the two documents no longer cancel each other out: they
result in multiplying the multiplicative factor by 0.36.
For fixed k0 and non-leaking player j the sequence
mfj,[k0,k0](T ),mfj,[k0,k0+1](T ), . . .
is a martingale. This implies that if we consider the first k1−2 documents to be fixed
and player 1 sends a document at time k1 − 1 and player 2 at time k1, then player
1’s document can affect the distribution of mf2,[k0,k1](T
′)|T ′k1−1=tk1−1 but no matter
what document tk1−1 player 1 sends, mf2,[k0,k1](T
′)|T ′k1−1=tk1−1 will have expectation
mf2,[k0,k1−1](t
k1−1). Similar statements holds for the sum of additive differences, but
the advantage of the multiplicative factor is that it is non-negative. For example, as
the multiplicative factor starts at 1 there is probability at most 0.1 that it will ever
be at least 10. Thus, while the leaker’s multiplicative factor has to be large in most
cases, all the non-leakers will with high probability have small multiplicative factors.
The same does not hold for the sum of additive differences, because as Example 3
shows, you can have a probability arbitrarily close to 1 that a non-leaker’s sum of
additive differences increases to 0.4 (or any other positive number) as long as there
is a small probability that it decreases to negative values of large absolute value.





Proof. For k1 6≡ j mod n we have mfj,[k0,k1](t) = mfj,[k0,k1−1](t) for any t so the
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′) = x|T ′k1 = t′k1)




Pr(T ′ = t′|T ′k1−1 = tk1−1) Pr(Decdk′(T ′) = x|T ′k1 = t′k1)





Pr(T ′ = t′|T ′k1 = t′k1) Pr(T ′k1 = t′k1|T ′k1−1 = tk1−1) Pr(Decdk′(T ′) = x|T ′k1 = t′k1)





Pr(T ′k1 = t′k1|T ′k1−1 = tk1−1) Pr(Decdk′(T ′) = x|T ′k1 = t′k1)






′) = x|T ′k1−1 = t′k1−1)
Pr(Decdk′(T ′) = x|T ′k1−1 = t′k1−1)
mfj,[k0,k1−1](t)
= mfj,[k0,k1−1](t)
Here the second equality is obtained by pulling the k = k1 term out of the product,
and recognising the resulting product as mfj,[k0,k1−1](t).
By sampling T ′d|T ′k=tk and dk′ Joe can estimate Pr(Decdk′(T ′) = x|T ′k = tk) with
a small additive error, but when the probability is small, there might still be a large
multiplicative error. In particular, Joe can only do polynomially many samples, so
when Pr(Decdk′(T
′) = x|T ′k = tk) is less than polynomially small Joe will most
likely estimate it to be 0.9 Instead, the idea is to estimate the multiplicative factor
starting from some time k0 such that Pr(Decdk′(T
′) = x|T ′k = tk) is not too small
for any k ≥ k0. The following proposition is useful when choosing k0 and choosing
how many samples we make.
Definition 7.15. In the following we say that Joe’s estimate of Pr(Decdk′(T
′) =
x|T ′k = tk) is bad if Pr(Decdk′(T ′) = x|T ′k = tk) ≥ ε
2
2s+7d2
but his estimate is not in
9This is the reason that anonymous steganography with small anonymous channel works at all:
we keep Pr(Decdk′(T
′) = x|T ′k = tk) exponentially small until Lea uses the anonymous channel.
When Lea then uses the anonymous channel to send dk, the probability of x being the output














′) = x|T ′k = tk)
]
.











′) = x|T ′k = tk).
No matter the true value of Pr(Decdk′(T
′) = x|T ′k = tk), there is probability at
most ε
2d
that his estimate is bad.
Proof. By definition, the estimate cannot be bad unless Pr(Decdk′(T
′) = x|T ′k =
tk) ≥ ε2
2s+7d2
, so in the following we assume this inequality holds.
Let Yi be the random variable that is 1 if the ith sample of T
′, dk′ satisfy
Decdk′(T
′) = x and is 0 otherwise. Let Y be the sum of all the Yis. We see that
















Joe’s estimate of Pr(Decdk′(T
′) = x|T ′k = tk) is going to be divided by number of
samples. Thus, Joe’s estimate is going to be within a factor 1 ± δ of the correct
probability if Y is within a factor 1± δ of µ.
As the Yis are independent and only take the values 0 and 1, we can use the
multiplicative Chernoff bound [61, Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2]:







3 , for δ < 1





So the probability of a bad estimate is at most 2e
−δ2µ











12d2 ln( 4dε )






Proposition 7.5. Fix a leaker protocol and a number m0 > 2. Let i denote the
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(random) index of the leaker. For a random transcript T given X = x there is
probability at most 4d
m0
that there exists j 6= i and k0 such that mfj,[k0,d](T ) ≥ m02 or
mf−i,[k0,d](T ) ≥ m02 .




= 1 no matter








∣∣∣X = x) ≤ 2
m0
.
Similarly for mf−i,[k0,d]. We have
mfj,[k0,d](t) = mfj,[k0−1,d](t)
if player j does not send the k0’th document, so for fixed t there are only d different
values (not counting 1) of mfj,[k0,d](t) with j 6= i and k0 ≤ d. By the union bound,
the probability that one of the mfj,[k0,d](t)’s or one of the mf−i,[k0,d](t)’s are above
m0
2





Now we are ready to prove the impossibility result.
Theorem 7.6. Let ε be a function in λ such that 1
ε
is bounded by a polynomial,
and let π be a q(λ)-correct reactive anonymous steganography scheme with s(λ) =
O(log(λ)) and `′ ≥ s+7+2 log(d)−2 log(ε). Now there is a probabilistic polynomial






Notice that we cannot do better than q + 1−q
n
. The players could use a protocol
where with probability q the leaker reveals herself and the information and otherwise
no-one reveals any information. This protocol succeeds with probability q, and when
it does, Joe will guess the leaker. With probability 1 − q it does not succeed, and
Joe has probability 1
n
of guessing the leaker. In total Joe will guess the leaker with




Proof. Let π be a reactive anonymous steganography scheme. We assume that for
random T ′ and dk′ the random variable Decdk′(T
′) is uniformly distributed10 on




. Consider a random transcript t. If for some k0 and some non-leaker
j we have mfj,[k0,d] ≥ m02 or if we have mf−i,[k0,d] ≥ m02 we set E = 1.
First Joe will estimate Pr(Decdk′(T
′) = 0`








samples for each k. Set E = 1 if at least one of these estimates is bad. In all cases
where E has not been defined yet we set E = 0. By the above propositions and the





Now let k0 be the smallest number such that for all k ≥ k0 Joe’s estimate of
Pr(Decdk′(T
′) = 0`
′ |T ′k = tk) is at least ε2
2s+7d2
. The idea would be to estimate the
multiplication factors mfj,[k0+1,d], but the problem is that Pr(Decdk′(T
′) = 0`
′|T ′k0 =
tk0) could be large (even 1) even though Pr(Decdk′(T
′) = 0`
′|T ′k0−1 = tk0−1) is small,
so the players might not reveal any information after the k0−1’th document. Thus,
Joe needs to include the k0 − 1’th document in his estimate of the multiplication
factors, but his estimate of Pr(Decdk′(T
′) = 0`
′|T ′k0−1 = tk0−1) might be off by a
large factor. To solve this problem, we define
mfj =





if j ≡ k0 − 1 mod n
that is, we pretend that Pr(Decdk′(T
′) = 0`






then use mfj,[k0,d]. We define mf−i the similar way. Joe’s estimate of Pr(Dec(T ) =
X|T k0−1 = tk0−1) is less than ε2
2s+7d2
, otherwise k0 would have been lower (here we
are using the assumption h ≥ s+ 7 + 2 log(d)− 2 log(ε). Without this, k0 could be
10If this is not the case, we can define a reactive anonymous scheme π̃ where this is the case:
just let X ′ be uniformly distributed on {0, 1}`′ , let Ẽnc(x, tk, state) = Enc(x ⊕ X ′, tk, state) and
D̃ecdk(t) = X
′ ⊕ Decdk(t), where ⊕ is bitwise addition modulo 2. To use π̃ we would need `′ bits
of public randomness to give us X ′. To get this, we can just increase ` by `′ and let X ′ be the last
`′ bits of the first document.
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1). Thus, if this estimate it not bad we must have
Pr(Decdk′(T
′) = 0`







So if E = 0 then mfj ≤ mfj,[k0,d] ≤ m02 . Similar for mf−i.
If E = 0 then mfj ≤ m02 for all j 6= i and mf−i ≤ m02 . Furthermore, as all of Joe’s






Now we define Joe’s guess: if exactly one of his estimated mfj’s are above m0 he
guesses that this player j is the leaker. Otherwise, he chooses his guess uniformly
at random from all the players. There are two ways Pr(Decdk′(T
′) = 0`
′|T ′k = tk)
can increase as k increases11: by the leaker sending documents or by a non-leaker
sending documents. In the cases where E = 0 and Joe’s estimate of mfi is less than
m0 we know that the contribution from the leaker’s documents is a factor less than
2m0. As E = 0 we also know that the total contribution from all the non-leakers is
at most a factor m0
2
. So when only dk′ has not been revealed to Joe we have















As the only randomness left to be revealed12 is dk′ which is uniformly distributed
on a set of size 2−s, we know that
Pr(Decdk′(T ) = 0
`′|T = td)
is a multiple of 2−s. This implies
Pr(Decdk′(T ) = 0
`′ |T = td) = 0.
11If we allow the leaker to send anonymous bits before the end of the open communication,
this is a third way Pr(Decdk′(T
′) = 0`
′ |T ′k = tk) can increase. However, if the times where the
anonymous channel is used are predictable by Joe, he can still sample as if the anonymous bits
where random. This way, each anonymous bits makes Pr(Decdk′(T
′) = 0`
′ |T ′k = tk) increase by
at most a factor 2. If the leaker can only send s anonymous bit in total this only moves a factor
2s increase in Pr(Decdk′(T
′) = 0`
′ |T ′k = tk) from a later point in the proof to here.
12Here we are using that Dec is deterministic. However, allowing it to be non-deterministic does
not help: we could just increase ` and let Dec use the extra bits in each document as randomness
instead of using a random tape.
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In other words, if Decdk(T ) = 0
`′ and E = 0 then A must output i. Furthermore, in
all other cases where E = 0 Joe will either guess the leaker correctly (because Joe’s
estimate of mfi is sufficiently high) or guess uniformly among all the players. The
probability that Joe is correct is now
Pr(g = i) ≥Pr(Decdk(T ) = 0`
′
, E = 0) +
Pr(Decdk(T ) 6= 0`′ , E = 0)
n
= Pr(Decdk(T ) = 0
`′)− Pr(Decdk(T ) = 0`
′
, E = 1)
+
Pr(Decdk(T ) 6= 0`′)
n
− Pr(Decdk(T ) 6= 0
`′ , E = 1)
n
≥q + 1− q
n
− Pr(E = 1) ≥ q + 1− q
n
− ε.
Finally we can conclude that:
Corollary 7.7. If π is a reactive anonymous steganography scheme with s = O(log(λ)),
d polynomial in λ and `
′
log(λ)
→∞ that ensures weak anonymity, then the probability
of correctness q tends to 0 as λ→∞.







By assumption, s = O(log(λ)), log(d) = O(log(λ)), and `
′
log(λ)
→∞, so ε→ 0. The
parameters satisfy the assumptions in Theorem 7.6 so there is an adversary that can















As π ensures anonymity, q(n−1)−nε
n





In Chapter 3 we studied the problem of sending information anonymously in the
presence of what might be the strongest possible passive adversary who cannot read
people’s minds: an adversary who has unbounded computational power, who can
observe all messages and (this assumption was implicit) knows all of people’s shared
randomness. Intuitively, it should be impossible to send information anonymously,
when such an adversary exists: any hint towards a secret should increase the ad-
versary’s suspicion towards the leaker. We formalized this intuition by defining a
measure of suspicion and showed that it exactly captures the price of revealing in-
formation: when you reveal one bit of information, your suspicion must increase by
one in expectation. Conversely, it is always possible to reveal one bit of information
while only increasing your expected suspicion by one.
We used this measure to show that if leakers just want to preserve reasonable
doubt, they can reveal some amount of information. However, even in the best case
models1, each leaker can reveal at most − log(1−bm)
bm
− log(e), where bm is the threshold
of reasonable doubt. For bm = 0.3 this is only 0.27 . . . bits and even for bm = 0.95
it is only 3.1 . . . bits.
Perhaps the biggest obstacle to using cryptogenography, is to get people to follow
a protocol. Part of this problem is that many people might not care to follow a
protocol. This issue was addressed in Chapter 6, and it turned out not to be a
problem at all: as long as people send out a sufficient amount of randomness, we
1That is, in the model where the total number of people is much larger than the number of
leakers, and in two of the adaptive models: “bl-threshold centrally organised” and “bl- threshold
informed choice”.
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can take a protocol π, and adapt it to the distribution of innocent communication.
To do so, we need to know the distribution of the innocent communication used.
This should be possible by, for example, using the last digit of time stamps, or
by using the randomness that people send out when participating in cryptographic
protocols.
Another part of the problem of getting people to follow a protocol, is that some
people might be actively against the purpose of the protocol, and want to obstruct
it. This problem was addressed in Chapter 4. If bl denotes the probability that
any given person is a leaker and bc denotes the probability that they are a censor
(that is, they are trying to obstruct the protocol), then the censors can prevent any
information from being revealed if bl+bc ≥ bm. However, we also saw that if bl+bc is
much smaller than bm, the censors only have a small effect on the number of leakers
it takes to leak a bit of information. In the case where bl and bc are both small, the
main effect of the censors is that they can spread false stories: they can ensure that
the observer of the communication can only produce a list of length 1 + b bc
bl
c which,
unless something unlikely happens, contains the truth x.
Probably the largest part of the problem of getting people to follow a cryp-
togenography protocol, is to choose a protocol and communicate it to people who
want to reveal information, without being stopped or punished by the adversary.
One way of doing this would be to prepare the protocol before the adversary is
“active”. Warrant canaries is an example of a communication method which has to
be prepared before an adversary is “activated”. Besides providing anonymity to the
leakers, cryptogenography has the advantage over warrant canaries that there is a
much smaller risk of false positives: while a warrant canary can die (disappear) by
mistake, in cryptogenography it is possible to ensure that G(T ) returns an empty
message with very high probability, unless some people try to send a message. How-
ever, there would be many legal questions about such a use of cryptogenography:
is it “speech”, if you send less than one bit of information? Is it legal to prepare
to use cryptogenography to leak information you will not be allowed to leak? Can
a company, whose employees have, beyond reasonable doubt, leaked information,
be punished for leaking information, if no particular employee, no particular action
and no particular message is likely to have been part of the leakage?
In the model in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 we assumed the leakers would never
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be willing to lose reasonable doubt, and as long as they had reasonable doubt, they
did not care how suspicious they were. Perhaps it would be more realistic if the
leakers were willing to make trade-offs between the amount of information revealed
and how suspicious they are. There is no canonical model for such a situation, as
different people might prefer different outcomes, but in Chapter 5 we considered a
model where the players had to make such trade-offs. We saw that in the case with
many leakers, the measure of suspicion was still useful, although in this model we
did not manage to get matching upper and lower bounds. We proved a concavity
characterization, which is useful for proving upper bounds on the utility in the case
of only one leaker.
Finally, in Chapter 7 we considered a model where the adversary has bounded
computational power. We showed that this is still not enough for a single leaker
to be able to reveal information anonymously, but it can in theory be used for
bootstrapping a small or expensive anonymous channel. One of the building blocks
used for doing this bootstrapping is indistinguishability obfuscation, so the scheme
is currently infeasible in practice. It is still an open problem if you can bootstrap
anonymous communication in a computationally cheaper way. Another disadvan-
tage in the scheme is that it requires the leaker to download a large amount of
information. Perhaps this could be improved by finding a protocol, where the leaker
only needs to get a hash of the transcript.
Throughout the thesis we have considered the problem of how to get anonymity in
the presence of an extremely strong adversary. In particular, we have only considered
models where leakers cannot get any meaningful help from non-leakers. While we
do have positive results, we have also shown very strong impossibility results. Most
anonymity research assumes that there exist helpers and at least one of them can
be trusted. Our impossibility results justify this assumption, by showing that only
very little can be done without it.
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[37] Ceki Gülcü and Gene Tsudik. Mixing e-mail with babel. In Network and
Distributed System Security, 1996., Proceedings of the Symposium on, pages
2–16. IEEE, 1996. 28
[38] Venkatesan Guruswami. Algorithmic results in list decoding. Foundations and
Trends in Theoretical Computer Science, 2(2):107–195, 2006. 108
[39] Temporary injunction in the anonymous remailer case. http://web.archive.
org/web/19970414065743/http://www.penet.fi/injuncl.html. 27
[40] Johan Helsingius. Johan helsingius closes his internet remailer.
http://web.archive.org/web/19970414065812/http://www.penet.fi/
press-english.html. 27
[41] Nicholas J. Hopper. Toward a theory of Steganography. PhD thesis, Carnegie
Mellon University, 2004. 177
[42] Nicholas J. Hopper, John Langford, and Luis von Ahn. Provably secure
steganography. In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2002, 22nd Annual In-
ternational Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, California, USA, August
18-22, 2002, Proceedings, pages 77–92, 2002. 31
[43] Pavel Hubacek and Daniel Wichs. On the communication complexity of secure
function evaluation with long output. In Proceedings of the 2015 Conference
on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science, pages 163–172. ACM, 2015.
202, 204, 212
[44] Russell Impagliazzo and Ryan Williams. Communication complexity with syn-
chronized clocks. In Computational Complexity (CCC), 2010 IEEE 25th Annual
Conference on, pages 259–269. IEEE, 2010. 214
[45] Luca Invernizzi, Christopher Kruegel, and Giovanni Vigna. Message in a bot-
tle: Sailing past censorship. In Proceedings of the Annual Computer Security
Applications Conference (ACSAC). ACM, 2013. 31




[47] Sune K. Jakobsen. Information theoretical cryptogenography. In ICALP (1),
pages 676–688, 2014. 2
[48] Sune K Jakobsen. Information theoretical cryptogenography. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1402.3125, 2014. 2
[49] Sune K Jakobsen and Claudio Orlandi. How to bootstrap anonymous commu-
nication. arXiv preprint arXiv:1502.05273, 2015. 3
[50] Sune K Jakobsen and Claudio Orlandi. How to bootstrap anonymous com-
munication. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Innovations in
Theoretical Computer Science, pages 333–344. ACM, 2016. 3, 23, 198
[51] Sune K Jakobsen, Troels B Sørensen, and Vincent Conitzer. Timeability of
extensive-form games. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Innova-
tions in Theoretical Computer Science, pages 191–199. ACM, 2016. 28
[52] Dogan Kesdogan, Jan Egner, and Roland Bschkes. Stop-and-go-mixes providing
probabilistic anonymity in an open system. In In Proceedings of Information
Hiding workshop, pages 83–98. Springer-Verlag, 1998. 23
[53] Venkata Koppula, Allison Bishop Lewko, and Brent Waters. Indistinguishabil-
ity obfuscation for turing machines with unbounded memory. In Proceedings
of the Forty-Seventh Annual ACM on Symposium on Theory of Computing,
STOC 2015, Portland, OR, USA, June 14-17, 2015, pages 419–428, 2015. 205
[54] Eyal Kushilevitz and Noam Nisan. Communication Complexity. Cambridge
University Press, New York, NY, USA, 1997. 36
[55] Ladar Levison. Secrets, lies and snowden’s email: why I was forced to shut down
lavabit. The Guardian, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2014/may/20/why-did-lavabit-shut-down-snowden-email. 27
[56] Richard J. Lipton. Who knew the secret? https://rjlipton.wordpress.
com/2013/12/13/who-knew-the-secret/, 2013. 14
[57] N. Ma and P. Ishwar. Interactive source coding for function computation in
collocated networks. IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, 58(7):4289–4305, 2012. 154
233
REFERENCES
[58] N. Ma and P. Ishwar. The infinite-message limit of two-terminal interactive
source coding. IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, 59(7):4071–4094, 2013. 154
[59] Hooman Mohajeri Moghaddam, Baiyu Li, Mohammad Derakhshani, and Ian
Goldberg. Skypemorph: Protocol obfuscation for tor bridges. In Proceedings
of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security, pages
97–108. ACM, 2012. 31
[60] Ulf Möller, Lance Cottrell, Peter Palfrader, and Len Sassaman. Mixmaster
protocol?version 2. Draft, July, 154, 2003. 28
[61] Rajeev Motwani and Prabhakar Raghavan. Randomized algorithms. Chapman
& Hall/CRC, 2010. 220
[62] Andreas Pfitzmann and Marit Hansen. A terminology for talking about privacy
by data minimization: Anonymity, unlinkability, undetectability, unobservabil-
ity, pseudonymity, and identity management, 2010. 24
[63] The Tor project. Tor metrics – relays with exit, fast, guard, stable, and hsdir
flags. https://metrics.torproject.org/relayflags.html. 15
[64] Niels Provos and Peter Honeyman. Hide and seek: An introduction to steganog-
raphy. Security & Privacy, IEEE, 1(3):32–44, 2003. 30
[65] Michael K Reiter and Aviel D Rubin. Crowds: Anonymity for web transactions.
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC), 1(1):66–92,
1998. 27, 28
[66] Andrei Serjantov and George Danezis. Towards an information theoretic metric
for anonymity. In Proceedings of Privacy Enhancing Technologies Workshop
(PET 2002). Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2482, April 2002. 24, 25
[67] Claude E. Shannon. A mathematical theory of communication. Bell system
technical journal, 27, 1948. 22, 57
[68] Paul Syverson. Why I’m not an entropist. In Security Protocols XVII, pages
213–230. Springer, 2009. 28, 29
234
REFERENCES
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